Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

The holder of patents on an FDA-approved product that promotes eyelash growth claimed patent infringement and violation of California Business & Professions Code 17200 unfair competition provisions against companies marketing similar products. The district court dismissed the state law claims for lack of standing under an amendment to that law, enacted by the voters as Proposition 64. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The complaint adequately alleged economic injury caused by defendants' unfair business practices; it is not necessary that the plaintiff had direct business dealings with the defendants.

The credit union provides indirect lending, which allows applicants to apply for loans at automobile dealerships. A third-party administrator compiles the applications and automatically approves low-risk loans. Higher-risk applications are forwarded to the credit union for further review using an eight-factor policy. After an audit disclosed hundreds of high-risk loans issued in violation of the policy, the credit union filed a claim under a fidelity bond that provided coverage for losses caused by an employeeâs "failure to faithfully perform his/her trust." The district court awarded $5,050,000 plus $2,730,415 in interest to be offset by prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; there was sufficient evidence to support the juryâs finding that the lending policy was "established," "enforced," and "consciously disregarded" as described in the bond language. There was no evidence that the credit union board acquiesced in the violations. Although the court allowed an improper "golden rule" argument, the error does not require reversal; references to the insurer's ability to check the policies and to checklists were not errors.

An Indiana medical transport company executed a software licensing agreement with the plaintiff to replace its dispatch and billing software. The software did not work as the Indiana company expected, so it attempted to exercise an option to terminate the agreement. Plaintiff sued and the Indiana company counter-claimed fraud. A magistrate dismissed the fraud claim and awarded plaintiff damages on the breach of contract claim and attorney's fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decisions on fraud and breach of contract, but vacated the damages award and remanded. A party is not required to disclaim every departure from earlier proposals made during negotiations to avoid liability for fraud; there was no termination option. The plaintiff terminated the contract by locking the software, so the computation of damages was incorrect. The court ordered reconsideration of attorney fees, noting that the contract language did not appear to allow fees for defense of the fraud claim.

Plaintiff filed a quiet title claim against Bank of New York ("BNY") after he failed to make payments on a loan for over a half of a year and BNY foreclosed on his property. At issue was whether BNY lacked authority to carry out the sale where plaintiff alleged that America's Wholesale Lender, the original lender, had authority to foreclose on the property. The court held that plaintiff's note plainly constituted a negotiable instrument under Va. Code. Ann. 8.3A-104 and that note was endorsed in blank. Therefore, BNY possessed the note at the time it attempted to foreclose on the property and once plaintiff defaulted on the property, Virgina law straightforwardly allowed BNY to take the actions that it did.

A division of New Jersey's Department of Treasury purchased $300 million in preferred stock issued by the defendant, which later asked New Jersey to convert its preferred shares to common stock. New Jersey agreed, if the terms of conversion were as favorable as terms governing the exchange of other stockholders' preferred shares. Defendant agreed and in July 2008 the parties entered into a share exchange agreement with a forum selection clause providing that "exclusive jurisdiction . . . shall lie in the appropriate courts of the State [of] New Jersey." The state sued for breach and the defendant sought to remove the case to federal court. The district court held that the agreement waived the right to remove the pending litigation to the federal district courts in New Jersey. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts are in the states, but not "of" the states.

Plaintiff and defendant, investment trusts that specialize in healthcare-related properties, participated in a two-step auction to purchase the assets of a Canadian company. The defendant's efforts derailed. Plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the assets, but before the agreement was approved by shareholders, the defendant made a higher bid and made a public announcement. After a flurry of press releases and a ruling by a Canadian court concerning a confidentiality clause that was part of the bidding process, the defendant revoked its bid. The stockholders rejected the agreement with the plaintiff; the deal closed after plaintiff increased its bid. The district court awarded the plaintiff $101,672,807 for tortious interference with contract and with prospective advantage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for consideration of punitive damages. The declaratory proceedings in Canada did not preclude the claims at issue. Jury instructions concerning tortious interference involving competitors, motive, causation, and breach of the confidentiality agreement as wrongful conduct were appropriate.

Wanting to retire from the trucking business, the owner entered into employment contracts so that the plaintiffs would act as CEO and vice president and a stock purchase agreement. The relationship broke down while they were negotiating a buy-sell agreement. The owner fired the plaintiffs and paid benefits specified in the employment contract. The plaintiffs did not purchase stock or place $750,000 into an escrow, as they were entitled to do to secure their position. The district court ruled in favor of the owner. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that neither party violated a clause in the stock purchase contract that required that they use "best efforts" to enter into a buy-sell agreement. The plaintiffs retained the right to purchase stock, but chose not to do so, which entitled the owner to terminate their employment. The owner took full advantage of his rights under the contracts, but did not exploit the plaintiffs.

For many years the owners of the original bridal shop allowed family members to operate similar businesses under the same name. The owners sold one of their own shops and the buyer agreed to pay $75,000 per year for the use of the name and marks. When the agreement expired in 2002, the buyer continued to use the name and marks, without paying. The district court dismissed a 2007 claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1117, 1125. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the owners abandoned their mark by engaging in "naked licensing:" allowing others to use the mark without exercising reasonable control over the nature and quality of the goods, services, or business on which the mark is used. It was not enough that the owners had confidence in the high quality of the buyer's operation; they retained no control.

Appellant appealed an order of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") in his eight Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests for 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c) Notices of Seizures of Infringing Merchandise ("Notices") from certain United States ports. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the district court's findings that the Notices contained plainly commercial information, which disclosed intimate aspects of an importers business such as supply chains and fluctuations of demand for merchandise, was well supported. The court also held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the information at issue was confidential and privileged where the trade secret exemption of FOIA ("Exemption 4") was applicable. The court further held that when an agency freely disclosed to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption without limiting the third-party's ability to further disseminate the information then the agency waived the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA request for the disclosed information. Therefore, the district court's ruling was affirmed in regards to FOIA Exemption 4 but the district court's conclusion as to the fees charged to appellant was reversed where CBP must follow the FOIA fee provisions under 19 C.F.R. 103.

Dell manufactures and sells secondary batteries for laptop computers, which may be packaged with new computers, at the option of the customer. The batteries at issue were admitted separately from computers into Dellâs Foreign Trade Sub-Zone (âFTZâ) in Nashville with ânon-privileged foreign status,â meaning that they had not been cleared by Customs and would be appraised for tariff purposes at the time of their formal entry into the United States. Dell proposed to classify secondary batteries that were packaged with computers as duty-free âportable digital automatic data processing [âADPâ] machines,â the ordinary classification for laptop computers. Customs classified the batteries as "other storage batteries," not âgoods put up in sets for retail saleâ with the computers. The Court of International Trade upheld the designation. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that the computer and battery may be packaged and shipped to the customer together, but are not packaged as a single unit for retail sale. There is nothing anomalous about classification of an article depending on the manner in which it is combined or associated with other related articles that are imported with it.