Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner power companies sought a writ of prohibition in connection with a ruling of the circuit court denying petitioners' motion to dismiss a breach of contract complaint filed against them by respondents, Shell Equipment and Shell Energy, as being barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioners argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the limitations period applicable to contracts for the sale of goods under the UCC does not apply to the coal sales agreement they entered into with Shell Equipment. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, finding that petitioners demonstrated clear legal error for which they were entitled to relief. The Court determined that the subject agreement constituted a sale of goods under W.V. Code 46-2-107(1), and, as a result, the four-year statute of limitations established by the UCC for the sales of goods was controlling. Because respondents did not initiate the lawsuit until after the limitations period had expired, the trial court committed error in failing to grant petitioners' motion to dismiss.

Citizens Bank filed a complaint against Howard Issler, seeking to recover funds allegedly owned to the bank in connection with a line of credit that the bank had extended to him. After judgment was entered against Howard and execution was returned unsatisfied, Citizens filed for a writ of attachment. Kymberly Issler, who had a joint account with Howard, then intervened in the civil action, objecting to the attachment and to the release of any funds to Citizens. A hearing officer granted the attachment. Citizens then filed a motion to charge garnishee to reach funds in the personal account. After a hearing, an order was entered granting Citizens' motion to charge garnishee and denying Kymberly's objection to the attachment of funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, according to precedent, a bank has a right to use funds in a joint account to set off the debt of one account holder, regardless of whether that holder contributed any funds to the account. The Court then held that Citizens had a right to set off Howard's debt with the funds in the joint account to which he and Kymberly were signatories.

Plaintiffs Mark and Karla Gibbs brought claims in the federal district court against, among other defendants, Corinthian Title, Jeffrey Brown, Shelley Hickson, and Christine Tueckes, for civil conspiracy. The above defendants argued that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates the state's long-arm statute. The Court answered in the negative. Arkansas's long-arm statute does not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to certain enumerated circumstances and is therefore limited only by federal constitutional law. Because jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process, the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas's long-arm statute.

Gary Hoff filed a complaint alleging contract and negligence claims against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and Lake County Abstract & Title Company. Countrywide failed to appear or answer within the 20 days permitted by Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(a), after which Hoff moved for entry of default against Countrywide. Countrywide later attempted to reverse the default proceedings with a motion to set aside the default pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and then a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the entry of default for mistake or excusable neglect. The court denied the motions and entered a default judgment against Countrywide. Countrywide appealed and Hoff cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in its judgment against Countrywide because pursuant to Cribb v. Matlock Commc'n, Inc., good cause did not exist to set aside the entry of default, and (2) the district court did not err as Countrywide's 60(b) motion was procedurally defective. Lastly, the Court concluded the district court correctly denied Hoff's request for attorneys fees because the contract did not entitle either party to attorneys fees under the circumstances.

The imported back-mounted packs, used for outdoor activities and athletics, allow the user to drink without interrupting activity. U.S. Customs and Border Protection liquidated and classified the merchandise under subheading 4202.92.30, HTSUS, as "Trunks, . . . traveling bags, insulated food or beverage bags, . . . knapsacks and backpacks, . . . sports bags . . . and similar containers . . . of textile materials: . . . With outer surface of sheeting of plastic or of textile materials: . . . travel, sports and similar bags" at a rate of duty of 17.8%. The company argued that the insulated beverage bag established essential character and that the items were properly classified as either "insulated food and beverage bags . . . whose interior incorporates only a flexible plastic container of a kind for storing and dispensing potable beverages through attached flexible tubing" (4202.92.04) or "insulated food and beverage bags . . . other" (4202.92.08), dutiable at 7%. The Court of International Trade affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The item is a composite product that includes features substantially in excess of those within the common meaning of "backpack." The essential character of the item is a disputed question of fact.

Dennis Deschamps purchased a mobile home park from the estate of Larry Rasmussen. Deschamps financed part of the purchase price through the estate in the form of an indenture note. In the previous case, Deschamps sued the estate, and a jury found the estate was not liable for negligent non-disclosure. In 2007 the estate began the proceedings for a nonjudicial foreclosure on the park after Deschamps stopped making payments on the note. In the instant case, Deschamps again sued the estate, seeking a temporary injunction barring the estate's sale of the property. The district court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment. Deschamps appealed, arguing (1) that the estate is barred from conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure on the property because the nonjudicial foreclosure must have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in the first case; and (2) Deschamps was entitled to raise the affirmative defense of fraud to defeat the estate's nonjudicial foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ruling that the estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure as a mandatory counterclaim in the first action; and (2) as a plaintiff, Deschamps cannot assert affirmative defenses.

During the dissolution of the marriage of Karen and Rodney Stevens in 2008, the district court entered a temporary economic restraining order prohibiting any transfer by the parties of their assets during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court awarded Rodney all right and title in a truck titled in Karen's name and ordered Karen to transfer title to Rodney. Karen later transferred the title to her mother. In 2010 the district court issued a written order declining to hold Karen in contempt for her violation of the economic restraining order. Instead, the court ordered Karen to remove any liens on the truck and to secure a new certificate of title and ruled if Karen refused to do so, a judgment would be entered against her in the amount of $21,000. Later, Karen retook possession of the vehicle. Rodney appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order but did not have authority to modify the distribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard. However, because Rodney was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, the judgment was affirmed.

Grizzly Security Armored Express, which provides security and armored services in Montana, filed suit against The Armored Group (TAG), which sells armored vehicles statewide and internationally, to recover damages from a sale of an allegedly defective vehicle. TAG failed to file a timely answer, and Grizzly moved for entry of default. The district court entered a default judgment against TAG, and the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court granted TAG's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Grizzly appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over TAG because (1) TAG transacted sufficient business in Montana to support the extension of long-arm jurisdiction over TAG under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a), and (2) the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over TAG through long-arm provisions does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs William and Connie Huston sought to enforce the terms of a global class action settlement agreement in the circuit court when defendants Mercedes-Benz and Smith Motor Cars allegedly refused to repair the plaintiffs' sports utility vehicle in accordance with the settlement agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Hustons' claims. The circuit court certified to the Supreme Court the question of the circuit court's authority to adjudicate the plaintiffs' lawsuit against the defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' lawsuit because continuing jurisdiction over the settlement agreement had been retained by the federal district court where the global class action settlement agreement was originally reached. As such, the plaintiffs could not properly maintain their suit against the defendants in the circuit court.

In 2010, a professional debt collector began aggressively attempting to collect a deficiency balance Linda Barr allegedly owed to a bank on a motorcycle loan. According to Barr, the debt collector, among other tactics, misrepresented facts to her and improperly accessed and used information from Barr's and her husband's credit report. Barr filed a complaint against the bank and the debt collector, alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The debt collector moved to dismiss. The district court certified the question of whether a consumer has a private cause of action against a professional debt collector who has engaged in debt collection practices that are prohibited under the Act to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Act does provide a consumer with such a cause of action.