Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged. View "Kreisler & Kreisler, LLC v. National City Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff manufactures accessories for small arms weaponry, including handguards that attach to military rifles. Defendant, a distributor who became an employee, signed a nondisclosure agreement, and became familiar with all of plaintiff's products before he was terminated and went into competition with plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed patent infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court holding that the patent at issue, covering a sleeve for a handgun, was invalid for failing to meet the written description and best mode requirements. Plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to support a verdict in its favor on Massachusetts law trade secret claims. The district court erred in denying a motion for mistrial and did not take adequate steps to determine whether the presence of a clamp, brought to the jury room by a juror, had a prejudicial effect. View "Atlantic Research Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy" on Justia Law

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded. View "Curtis v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Wehrenberg, Inc. operated a restaurant-style concession offering hotdogs, pizza, and similar items at four of its movie theaters. Wehrenberg charged its customers the four percent state sales tax imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.202. Wehrenberg then filed a sales tax refund claim with the Director of Revenue, asserting that the concession items should have been taxed at the one percent rate set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. The Director and the AHC denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the food for sale at Wehrenberg's concession stands was not intended for home consumption, the one percent state sales tax rate set forth in section 144.014 did not apply to Wehrenberg's food sales. View "Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of cable connectors that are used to connect coaxial cables to electronic devices filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission asserting that the importation, sale for importation, and sale after importation of certain coaxial cable connectors infringed four of its patents and therefore violated 19 U.S.C. 1337. Its 539 design patent patent issued in 2001 and describes an ornamental design for a coaxial cable connector. The Commission ruled that the company failed to satisfy the requirement of showing that a "domestic industry" exists or was being established. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The company's enforcement litigation expenses did not constitute "substantial investment in exploitation" of the 539 patent. Those costs were not sufficiently related to licensing. The company has no formal licensing program and the litigation opponent was its only licensee. View "John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1). View "HVT, Inc. v. Law" on Justia Law

The companies are direct competitors in importing and distributing pharmaceutical ingredients manufactured in China. Plaintiff claimed that defendant intentionally interfered with one of its contracts and sought damages. In court-ordered settlement negotiations, plaintiff demanded $675,000. Defendant made a counter-offer, demanding that plaintiff pay it $444,444.44 in order to settle the case and avoid a motion for sanctions and a suit for malicious prosecution. The court noted that the peculiar amount was due to the fact that the number four is considered an unlucky number in Chinese culture because it is homophonous with the Chinese word for death, but concluded that it was not a death threat and declined to impose sanctions. The court later entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed the court's refusal to impose sanctions under FRCP 11. Plaintiff's claims were not patently frivolous. View "CQ Int'l Co., Inc. v. Rochem Int'l, Inc., USA" on Justia Law

U.S. Customs and Border Protection set duty rates on motocross jerseys, pants, and motorcycle jackets imported by plaintiff, classifying the items as apparel under chapters 61 and 62 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, rather than as sports equipment, as argued by plaintiff. The Court of International Trade upheld the classification and the Federal Circuit affirmed.Considering the definition of "sports equipment" as informed and clarified by Explanatory Notes, the subject merchandise is not prima facie classifiable as sports equipment under Chapter 95. View "Lemans Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff complained that defendant told credit agencies that she was behind in payments on a loan in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(a). The district court dismissed the federal claim on the ground that the statute does not create a private cause of action and held that state common law claims are not preempted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state claims should have been dismissed with prejudice. Allowing state common law claims would defeat the purpose of the statute. View "Purcell v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Robin Branhan borrowed money from Appellee Great Western Bank. As collateral for the loan, the Branhans gave Great Western a security interest in their shares of Glacial Lakes stock. The Branhans later defaulted on their loan. Great Western subsequently brought a foreclosure action against the Branhans. As part of a settlement agreement, the Branhans agreed to surrender and transfer to Great Western all their rights to Glacial Lakes stock they were unable to sell by a certain date. After Great Western issued a satisfaction of judgment, Glacial Lakes announced a capital call repayment. In response, the Branhans filed a motion to determine which party was entitled to the capital call repayments. The circuit court concluded that Great Western owned the stock and was therefore entitled to the repayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Great Western was entitled to the capital call repayment because the benefit of capital call repayment transferred with the shares. View "Great Western Bank v. Branhan" on Justia Law