Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anna Miller executed a promissory note to a finance company and conveyed by way of a mortgage her interest in real property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Defendant's mortgage was thereafter assigned to Plaintiff, RMS Residential Properties (RMS), which became the holder of the note prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant contended that RMS lacked standing to commence the foreclosure action because there was no statutory authority that conferred standing on a mere holder of a note to foreclose a mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-17 raises a rebuttable presumption that a holder of a note is the owner of the debt, the statute may confer standing to foreclose a mortgage on a holder of a note. View "RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against Nicolle Bradbury for residential property she owed in Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest. During a deposition, a GMAC employee testified that he did not read the affidavits he signed or execute the affidavits before a notary. Fannie Mae subsequently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the deposition, which the district court denied. The district court ultimately dismissed without prejudice the complaint after finding Fannie Mae submitted a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. As sanctions, the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attorney fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of the affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to find GMAC in contempt even though the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee; and (2) failing to award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order. View "Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

Gene Shields, an agent for State Farm Insurance Companies, opened an account with Bankcorp Bank. The owner of the account was State Farm. Shields's office manager subsequently diverted funds that were due to be deposited into the account, and Shields allegedly suffered at least $77,925 in losses as a result of over 100 overdrafts on the account. Shields sued Bancorp Bank for negligence in failing to notify him of overdrafts. Bancorp moved to compel arbitration based on the account's arbitration clause. The circuit court denied the motion to compel, and Bancorp appealed. At issue on appeal was whether the parties' 2005 agreement to modify the contract entered into by the parties in 1982 controlled when Shields signed the agreement but State Farm was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 2005 agreement, which contained the arbitration provision, was not binding because the agreement was entered into in contravention of the rights of the account owner, State Farm. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Shields" on Justia Law

The manufacturer notified franchise dealers that it was discontinuing the Sterling (a subsidiary of Daimler) line of trucks. The letter offered dealers the opportunity to continue as a service dealership under a new agreement. Plaintiff, a dealer, was warned that, following the termination of the existing agreement, if it did not sign the general release and agree to terminate its Sterling franchise, Daimler Trucks would not renew its Detroit Diesel Direct Dealer Agreement. Daimler later terminated that agreement, which plaintiff alleges prevented it from obtaining parts at wholesale and performing warranty work on Detroit Diesel engines. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 and claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The circuit court dismissed all but two counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear several counts under the Act, because those counts should have been brought before the Motor Vehicle Review Board. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued in state court challenging the validity of both the foreclosure of his home by Chase and the redemption of his home by a junior lienholder, National. The district court subsequently granted Chase's and National's respective motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that Minnesota law required Chase to hold both the mortgage and the promissory note at the time of the foreclosure, and genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Chase held the note. Plaintiff also contended that National's redemption was invalid because the foreclosure itself was invalid. The court held that Chase was the party entitled to commence a foreclosure by advertisement under Minnesota law, even if the promissory note had been transferred to someone else. Assuming arguendo Minnesota law required Chase to possess the note, the district court correctly granted Chase's motion for summary judgment in any event because plaintiff did not raise any genuine issues of material fact showing Chase was not the holder of the note at the time of the foreclosure. The court declined to address plaintiff's argument regarding redemption because plaintiff never challenged it in the district court. View "Stein v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Army and Air Force Exchange Service issues credit cards to military personnel to purchase uniforms and other merchandise from post-exchange stores on military bases. During the relevant period balances for uniforms were interest-free. Plaintiff opened an account in 1997 and became delinquent in 2000. In 2009 He filed suit claiming that the interest rate on delinquent debt exceed that specified in the agreement. The Exchange the conducted an audit and adjusted the accounts of 46,851 individuals, including plaintiff, who received a refund. A second audit resulted in adjustments to accounts of an additional 103,320 individuals. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim as moot and denied class certification. The Federal Circuit vacated. While plaintiff's individual claim was moot, it is unclear whether the claims of all class members were satisfied. View "Russell v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, an "infomercialist," violated a court-approved settlement with the FTC by misrepresenting the content of his book, The Weight Loss Cure They Don't Want You to Know About. The district court held him in contempt, ordered him to pay $37.6 million to the FTC, and banned him from making infomercials for three years. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sanctions. On remand, the district court reinstated the $37.6 million remedial fine, explaining that it reached that figure by multiplying the price of the book by the 800-number orders, plus the cost of shipping, less returns, and instructing the FTC to distribute the funds to those who bought the book using the 800-number. Any remainder was to be returned to defendant. The district court also imposed a coercive sanction, a $2 million performance bond, effective for at least five years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court order, the performance bond in particular, does not violate the First Amendment. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trudeau" on Justia Law

Southern Wine and Spirits, an importer and wholesaler of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in Nevada, was granted the exclusive Nevada importer of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes. Southern Wine filed suit against Appellants, two importers and wholesalers of liquor in Nevada, after Southern Wine discovered Appellants were importing and selling the wines and champagnes in Nevada. Southern Wine sought a permanent injunction, alleging that Appellants' unlawful importation and sales of the wines and champagnes violated its exclusive trade and franchise rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. 369 and 597. The district court permanently enjoined Appellants from further importing and selling the wines and champagnes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted injunctive relief where (1) Southern Wine complied with the requirements of the statutes, and therefore, Southern Wine established exclusive trade rights to import the wines and champagnes; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Appellants infringed on Southern Wine's exclusive trade rights; and (3) Southern Wine was successful in demonstrating the merits of its action for permanent injunctive relief. View "Chateau Vegas Wine v. S. Wine & Spirits" on Justia Law

The Racing Commission suspended certain jockeys' occupational permits for thirty days and imposed fines for the jockeys' failure to declare an overweight amount. Afterwards, PNGI Charles Town Gaming (PNGI), a non-party in the underlying action, excluded the jockeys from its facility. The circuit court (1) entered an injunction and stayed the imposition of sanctions by the Racing Commission until the conclusion of a hearing before the Commission; and (2) extended the injunction and the stay to include PNGI, preventing PNGI from excluding the jockeys from PGNI's premises pending the outcome of the jockeys' administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an ejection of a permit holder by a racing association or its stewards is subject to review by the Commission, and therefore, the jockeys, as permit holders, had the right to appeal the ejection, and PNGI was bound by the Commission's decision, subject to judicial review; and (2) PNGI waived its assigned errors regarding the injunction and stay. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer. View "Vasquez v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law