Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, U.S. Customs classified Aromont's imported flavorings, derived from veal, chicken, duck, lamb, beef, fish, lobster, mushroom, or vegetable stock, under Harmonized Tariff Schedule subheading 2104.10.00 covering "[s]oups and broths and preparations therefor ... Other." Aromont argued that the flavorings should have been classified under subheading 2106.90.99 covering "[f]ood preparations not elsewhere specified or included," which carries a lower ad valorem tax. Customs denied the protest and liquidated the merchandise. The Trade Court found that the products are not covered by 2104 because they are not principally used as soups or broths, but in a variety of end uses. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Aromont made a strong showing with respect to actual use, physical characteristics, and cost. The government did not show that any other factors required a contrary result, or that there is an issue of material fact on any of the relevant factors.View "Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Triumph publishes books and software to prepare teachers and students for standardized tests. In 2004, Triumph filed use-based applications for the COACH word mark, a stylized COACH mark, and a COACH mark and design. CSI sells handbags, luggage, clothing, watches, eye glasses, and wallets and has used the COACH mark since at least 1961. CSI owns 16 incontestable registrations for the COACH mark: all but one issued before Triumph's application. CSI filed Notice of Opposition on grounds of likelihood of confusion (15 U.S.C. 1052(d)) and dilution (15 U.S.C. 1125(c)). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed findings that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks and that CSI failed to prove likelihood of dilution. Because of evidentiary errors, the court vacated and remanded a finding that, although Triumph's marks are merely descriptive, they have acquired secondary meaning, and were entitled to registration. View "Coach Serv., Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC" on Justia Law

A class representing purchasers of securities sued the company and two high-ranking officers, alleging that the company issued false or misleading public statements about demand for its products in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and related regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The First Circuit affirmed. Once a downward trend became clear, the company explicitly acknowledged that its forecasts had been undermined. Whether it was negligent to have remained too sanguine earlier, there was no evidence of anything close to fraud. View "OK Firefighters Pension v. Smith & Wesson Holding Corp." on Justia Law

In 2006, BP began converting company-operated gas and convenience stores into franchisee-operated stores. From 2006 to 2008, plaintiffs purchased gas station sites and entered into long-term contracts with BP for fuel and use of BP's brand name and marks. In 2009 plaintiffs sued under the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act. Consolidated cases were removed to federal court when plaintiffs added claims under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. They later added price discrimination claims under the Robinson-Patman Act. Before trial, all federal claims were withdrawn. The district judge relinquished supplemental jurisdiction and remanded to Illinois state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A district court has broad discretion and the general presumption in favor of relinquishment was particularly strong because the state-law claims are complex and raise unsettled legal issues. View "RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In an action under the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, the International Trade Commission found unfair trade practices based on infringement of Epson's U.S. patents by importation and sale of ink printer cartridges produced in China by Ninestar and imported into and sold in the U.S. by entities including Ninestar's subsidiaries, The Commission issued a general exclusion order, limited exclusion orders, and cease and desist orders. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Final Orders prohibited importation and sale of infringing cartridges, including cartridges in the inventory of U.S. subsidiaries. Subsidiaries continued to import and sell cartridges that were subject to the orders. An Administrative Law Judge determined that Ninestar was in violation and levied a penalty under 19 U.S.C. 1337(f)(2). The Commission reduced the penalty. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding Ninestar China jointly and severally liable for the penalty ($55,000 per day, a total of $11,110,000) along with the U.S. subsidiaries. Ninestar was aware that refurbishing and reselling spent cartridges, not first sold in the U.S., would be patent infringement View "Ninestar Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, domestic producers, sought distributions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, since repealed, which directed the government to distribute collected duties to domestic producers harmed by dumping, 19 U.S.C. 1675c(a). Plaintiffs also sought to compel assessment and collection of additional anti-dumping duties, claiming that U.S. Customs has failed to collect $723 million $771 million in assessed anti-dumping duties. The U.S. Court of International Trade dismissed. Certain counts were dismissed for lack of standing on the ground that plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of bond contracts intended to cover anti-dumping penalties. Other counts were dismissed for for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding alternate grounds for dismissal. The court lacked jurisdiction over claims against the sureties. Plaintiffs do not qualify as intended third-party beneficiaries. View "Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought separate suits alleging unlawful retaliation by their corporate employers, which are private companies that act as contract advisers to and managers of mutual funds organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court addressed both cases in a single order, holding that the whistleblower protection provision within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1514A extends beyond "employees" of "public" companies to encompass employees of private companies that are contractors or subcontractors to those public companies if the employees report violations "relating to fraud against shareholders." The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the protections are limited to employees of public companies, as defined by the statute. View "Lawson v. FMR LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, provides that merchants who accept credit or debit cards shall not print the expiration date of the cards upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale. The district court found no willful violation where a retailer printed the expiration month, but not the year, of the credit card on a receipt. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the retailer's interpretation of the law was erroneous, but not objectively unreasonable. View "Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, certified by the city as a minority-owned business eligible for favored treatment, sells a variety of products. The city is virtually its only customer. Early in 2005 the city began to suspect that plaintiff was a broker rather than a wholesaler, which would make it ineligible to bid for contracts as an MBE. Plaintiff had only six employees, though it claimed to have a warehouse. The city never completed its investigation, so plaintiff retains its certification. The city also believed that the company had shorted it on a shipment of aluminum sign blanks, and ultimately debarred it from dealing with the city. The company sued immediately and obtained a temporary restraining order; debarment was in effect for only eight days. The city abandoned its attempt to debar the company. The district court then ruled in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims by the principals in the company were frivolous, given that they continued to be employed by the company. The temporary diminution in business did not amount to destruction of the company nor did it constitute retaliation. Plaintiff did not prove breach of contract. View "Chicago United Indus. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

This case concerned a Railcar Contract with TriMet that required Colorado Railcar to secure a $3 million standby letter of credit, which Colorado Railcar arranged through Collateral II, a bankruptcy remote entity. TrimMet certified Collateral II's default and drew on the Letter of Credit when Colorado Railcar defaulted. At issue was whether Collateral II was a surety to Colorado Railcar, entitled to the defense of discharge. The court held that it was not. Because the standby letter of credit issued by KeyBank required TriMet to certify Collateral II's default, TriMet sought clarification that should Colorado Railcar default, TriMet's authority to certify Collateral II's default would be triggered. In response to TriMet's concern, Collateral II agreed to become a part of the Railcar Contract via Modification No. 1, but it undertook no new obligation nor did it subject itself to any additional liability beyond what it previously undertook by securing the Letter of Credit at Colorado Railcar's direction. Thus, no suretyship was created. Because Collateral II was not entitled to the protections of a surety, it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment in its favor. View "In re: CRM Collateral II, Inc., et al. v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transp, et al." on Justia Law