Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

The Tote Towel is a large towel with binding around all the edges, zippered pockets at both ends, and an angled cloth loop in the middle. Hall applied for a design patent for the Tote Towel in 2008 and began producing the item soon after the filing, with a label marked “patent pending.” While the application was pending, Hall contacted Bed Bath & Beyond to discuss whether BB&B would sell the Tote Towel at retail stores. Hall left samples of packaged Tote Towels with BB&B. The package and the towel were marked “patent pending.” BB&B had copies of the Hall towel manufactured in Pakistan, for retail sale by BB&B. The patent issued, and Hall sued for patent infringement, unfair competition under the Lanham Act, and for misappropriation under New York law. The district court dismissed all claims and counterclaims on the pleadings. The Federal Circuit held that the counts of patent infringement, unfair competition, and misappropriation were not subject to dismissal on the pleadings, but affirmed dismissal of claims against BB&B executives who had been sued in their personal capacities, and affirmed dismissal of the counterclaims. View "Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc." on Justia Law

The 314 patent, its continuation, the 492 patent, and the 639 patent, relate to electronic commerce; products are offered and purchased through computers interconnected by a network. The patents arise from a software system called “Transact,” developed in 1996 by Open Market. In 2001 Open Market was sold, with the Transact software and patents, to Divine, which was unable to provide support for the complex product and declared bankruptcy. Soverain acquired the Transact software and patents, then sued seven online retailers for patent infringement. The defendants, except Newegg, took paid up licenses to the patents. Newegg declined to pay, stating that its system is materially different and that the patents are invalid if given the scope asserted by Soverain: similar electronic commerce systems were known before the system; the Transact software was generally abandoned; and Newegg’s system, based on the different principle of using “cookies” on the buyer’s computer to collect shopping data, is outside of the claims. The district court awarded Soverain damages and an ongoing royalty and held that the claims were not invalid as obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that claims in the all of the patents are invalid for obviousness. View "Soverain Software, LLC v. Newegg, Inc." on Justia Law

For approximately a decade, Global NAPs, Inc. (GNAPs) had been engaged in litigation with Verizon New England, Inc. The dispute arose over access fees the companies owed each other. Verizon prevailed in the dispute in 2009, but the district court as of the date of this appeal was still overseeing a receivership sale to satisfy the judgment against GNAPs. In 2011, the district court entered a sale order authorizing the sale of assets to Quality Speaks, LLC. In 2012, the district court entered an order imposing an injunction against GNAPs' former principal, Frank Gangi, prohibiting Gangi from taking any action to interfere with the ability of the receiver to transfer purchased assets in connection with the sale, or to reduce the value of the purchased assets. Gangi appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the injunction was plainly justified under longstanding equity principles. View "Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc." on Justia Law

OCV supplies equipment and licenses software for in-room hotel entertainment and sought a judgment of $641,959.54 against Roti, the owner of companies (Markwell, now defunct) that owned hotels to which OCV provided services. The district judge granted summary judgment, piercing the corporate veil, but rejecting a fraud claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Markwell companies were under-funded, OCV failed to treat the companies as separate businesses and proceed accordingly in the bankruptcy proceedings of one of the companies and made no effort to determine the solvency of the companies. View "On Command Video Corp. v. Roti" on Justia Law

Nike alleged that Already’s athletic shoes violated Nike’s Air Force 1 trademark; Already challenged the trademark. While the suit was pending, Nike agreed not to raise any trademark or unfair competition claims against Already or any affiliated entity based on Already’s existing footwear designs, or any future designs that constituted a “colorable imitation” of Already’s current products. Nike moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and to dismiss Already’s counterclaim without prejudice. Already opposed dismissal of its counterclaim, indicating that Already planned to introduce new versions of its lines, that potential investors would not consider investing until Nike’s trademark was invalidated, and that Nike had intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the case moot. The breadth of the covenant suffices to meet the burden imposed by the “voluntary cessation doctrine.” The covenant is unconditional and irrevocable. Already did not establish that it engages in or has concrete plans to engage in activities that would arguably infringe Nike’s trademark yet not be covered by the covenant. The fact that some individuals may base decisions on hypothetical speculation does not give rise to the sort of injury necessary to establish standing. The Court rejected the “sweeping argument” that, as one of Nike’s competitors, Already inherently has standing because no covenant can eradicate the effects of a registered but invalid trademark. View "Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

The class consists of chemical companies that purchase sulfuric acid as one of the inputs into their production of chemicals. The defendants own smelters that process nonferrous minerals such as nickel and copper. They also produce sulfuric acid and sell or sold it to the members of the class. The class was certified, but the suit, alleging violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, was dismissed on the merits. The district judge ruled that the case could not go to trial on a theory of per se liability. The plaintiffs could have gone to trial on a theory of liability under the rule of reason, but chose to appeal the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on how the defendants organized their operations. The court stated that: “ If there were no joint venture, there would still be no per se violation for there would still be the legitimate business reasons for the defendants to have cooperated.” View "In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

When merchandise is sold in the U.S. at less than fair value, the Commerce Department may impose antidumping duties, 19 U.S.C. 1673e(a)(1), 1677b(a)(1), 1677a(a). Commerce generally determines individual margins for each exporter or producer, but if that is not practicable, may investigate a reasonable number of respondents. Others are assigned a separate “all-others” rate. In proceedings involving non-market economy countries, including China, Commerce presumes that exporters and producers are state-controlled, and assigns them a state-wide rate. This presumption is rebuttable; a company that demonstrates sufficient independence from state control may apply for a separate rate. Commerce concluded that the Jiangsu Jianghai Chemical was entitled to a separate rate. The company subsequently challenged the rate calculation. The Court of International Trade held that Commerce did not exceed the scope of a remand order when it recalculated the U.S. price and that the explanation given for calculation of the separate rate was not unreasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded to Commerce to again reconsider its approach to calculating the separate rate. “Commerce must act non-arbitrarily and must explain why its approach is a ‘reasonable method,’” in light alternatives available and with recognition that the calculation will affect only cooperating respondents. View "Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific sued Four-U-Packaging, alleging that Four-U’s supply of off-brand paper towels for use in Georgia-Pacific paper-towel dispensers infringed on its trademarks. Four-U distributes paper and janitorial supplies; it does not manufacturer commercial paper systems. Four-U argued that the claims were barred by the ruling in a similar case brought by Georgia-Pacific in Arkansas against a different distributor of generic paper towels. The district court granted summary judgment to Four-U. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All of the elements of issue preclusion are met and applying the doctrine poses no risk of creating inconsistent rulings. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods., LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

Since 2003, Cummins and TAS have been engaged in three separate actions regarding idle-control technologies for heavy-duty truck engines. Earlier suits concerned breach of a master license agreement between the parties. In a 2009 action, Cummins sought a declaratory judgment that claims of TAS’s 703 and 469 patents are invalid and unenforceable. The district court found that the suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata in light of a decision in an earlier claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Cummins could have pursued claims regarding invalidity and unenforceability of the TAS patents in prior litigation, which featured the same parties, arose from the same group of operative facts, and resulted in a final resolution on the merits so that res judicata bars Cummins’ defenses under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103. View "Cummins, Inc. v. TAS Distrib. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Michigan promotes recycling of beverage containers by offering a cash refund of a 10-cent deposit to consumers and distributors. Retailers are required to accept empty containers of beverages that they sell. The Bottle Bill requires containers to indicate the state and the refund value as “MI 10ç” on each container. To address under-redemption, Michigan mandated that unclaimed deposits escheat to the state. A 1998 study estimated that fraudulent redemption of containers originating outside Michigan resulted in annual loss of $15.6 to $30 million. Michigan criminalized fraudulent redemption and, in 2008, required that, in addition to the MI 10ç designation, containers for certain beverages bear a “symbol, mark, or other distinguishing characteristic” to allow a reverse vending machine to determine whether a container is returnable. An industry association claimed violation of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 445.572a(10) is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial and that a question of material fact existed on the extent of the burden on interstate commerce. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding that the unique mark requirement is not discriminatory. However, because that requirement forces distributors to adopt the unique labeling system, without consideration of less burdensome alternatives, it has impermissible extraterritorial effect. View "Am. Beverage Ass'n v. Snyder" on Justia Law