Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

In 1989, the Department of Commerce determined that U.S domestic industry for ball bearings was being materially injured by sales of ball bearings imported from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the U.K. at less than fair value and published an anti-dumping order. Following four remands, the Court of International Trade’s affirmed the Commission’s decisions, issued under protest, to revoke the anti-dumping orders on ball bearings from Japan and the U.K. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, finding that the Commission’s second remand determination was supported substantial evidence and that the Court of International Trade erred in repeatedly remanding the case. View "NSK Corp. v.. FAG Italia, S.P.A." on Justia Law

Motiva’s patent, issued in 2007 and titled “Human Movement Measurement System,” generally relates to a “system for ... testing and training a user to manipulate the position of ... transponders while being guided by interactive and sensory feedback . . . for the purpose of functional movement assessment for exercise and physical rehabilitation.” Motiva accused Nintendo’s Wii video game system of infringement. The district court stayed the case pending patent reexamination. Motiva then filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, asserting that the Wii infringed the patent, so that its importation violated the Tariff Act. After the Commission began its investigation, Nintendo moved for summary determination under Section 337, which prohibits importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent if “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent ... exists or is in the process of being established.” 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(2). According to Nintendo, there were no commercialized products incorporating Motiva’s patented technology, and Motiva’s activity aimed at developing a domestic industry consisted solely of the litigation. The administrative law judge agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Motiva, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U. S. C. 14501(c)(1). Pelkey sued in New Hampshire state court, alleging that Dan’s towing company towed his car from a parking lot without Pelkey’s knowledge, failed to notify him of its plan to auction the car, held an auction despite Pelkey’s notice that he wanted to reclaim the car, and traded the car away without compensating Pelkey. Pelkey alleged Dan’s did not meet the requirements of New Hampshire statutes, chapter 262, which regulates disposal of abandoned vehicles by a “storage company;” violated New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act; and violated its duties as a bailee The court granted Dan’s summary judgment, concluding that the FAAAA preempted Pelkey’s claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding FAAAA preemption inapplicable to claims related to conduct in post-storage disposal, as opposed to conduct concerning “transportation of property,” or a “service.” The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a towed vehicle. Pelkey’s claims are not related to “transportation of property” nor the “service” of a motor carrier. The words “with respect to the transportation of property” limit the FAAAA’s preemptive scope. Transportation of Pelkey’s car from his landlord’s parking lot was a service that ended months before the conduct on which Pelkey’s claims are based. The New Hampshire prescriptions Pelkey invokes hardly constrain participation in interstate commerce by requiring a motor carrier to offer services not available in the market. Nor do they “freez[e] into place services that carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future.” View "Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey" on Justia Law

Deckers imported UGG® Classic Crochet boots having a knit upper portion and a rubber sole. They do not have laces, buckles, or fasteners, can be pulled on by hand, and extend above the ankle. At liquidation, Customs classified the boots under Subheading 19.35, covering: “Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials: Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics: Other: Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 and except footwear having a foxing or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper” and subject to a duty rate of 37.5 percent. Deckers sought reclassification under subheading 6404.19.90, covering“[f]ootwear with outer soles of rubber . . . uppers of textile materials” that is “[v]alued [at] over $12/pair,” subject to a duty rate of nine percent. Customs rejected an argument that the term “footwear of the slip-on type” only encompasses footwear that does not extend above the ankle. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

U.S. Customs and Border Protection denied Ford’s claims for post-entry duty refunds. The Court of International Trade upheld the denial and the Federal Circuit vacated. While 19 U.S.C. 1520(d) required Ford to file the relevant certificates of origin within one year, and its failure to do so could not be excused by 19 C.F.R. 10.112, Customs failed to adequately explain why it treats post-entry claims for refunds under 1520(d) differently depending on whether they were filed on paper or through the reconciliation program, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which allows qualifying goods to enter the United States duty free(art. 502). View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Versata’s patents relate to computer-based pricing of products. In prior art, each factor required separate database queries, so that determining a price was highly inefficient. The claimed invention identifies all the groups to which a customer belongs and all corresponding price adjustments and product-related factor. Versata marketed a successful product, Pricer, sold as a package with other Versata software or as an addition to enterprise systems offered by companies like SAP. While Versata’s patent application was pending, SAP released a new version of its software that contained hierarchical pricing capability, which, it stated, was like Pricer. Pricer sales faltered. Versata sued for infringement. In the first trial, the jury found that SAP directly infringed asserted claims, induced and contributed to infringement of one claim, and that the claims were not invalid, and awarded $138,641,000. The court granted JMOL of noninfringement of the 400 patent, but denied JMOL of noninfringement of the 350 patent. Before the second trial, SAP modified its products with a patch that prevented users from saving data into certain fields. The jury concluded that the products still infringed and awarded $260 million in lost profits and royalties of $85 million. The court entered a permanent injunction. The Federal Circuit vacated the injunction as overbroad, but otherwise affirmed. View "Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc." on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Commerce used a practice known as “zeroing” to determine antidumping duties in administrative reviews, even though Commerce no longer uses zeroing in investigations establishing antidumping orders. Using zeroing, negative dumping margins (margins of sales of merchandise sold at nondumped prices) are given a value of zero and only positive dumping margins (margins for sales of merchandise sold at dumped prices) are aggregated, to avoid a negative number that would offset a positive margin for another averaging group. The statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A), does not mention zeroing. However, Commerce has emphasized language that the dumping margin “means the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of the subject merchandise.” Commerce attributes the differing interpretations as necessary to comply with international obligations, while preserving a practice that serves recognized policy goals. Following two remands, the Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. No rule of law precludes Commerce from interpreting the statute differently in different circumstances as long as it provides an adequate explanation. View "Union Steel v. United States" on Justia Law

Grigoleit supplied knobs for Whirlpool’s washing machines and dryers for several years, and sought to increase prices and amend the parties’ purchase contracts in 2004. The parties reached an amended agreement in 2005, which Whirlpool terminated later that year. When Grigoleit demanded final payment, Whirlpool sued, arguing the contract was unenforceable. The district court upheld the contract but found some aspects of it unconscionable. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the contract was enforceable. Under Michigan law both substantive and procedural unconscionability are required to hold an agreement unenforceable. Refusing to certify questions to the state’s supreme court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that a $40,000 flat fee and 8% increase are unconscionable. Whirlpool created the urgent and unfavorable conditions under which it proposed these terms, and had ample time and opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms. Whirlpool had the resources, experience, and ability to avoid the terms entirely, yet chose not to do so. View "Whirlpool Corp. v. Grigoleit Co." on Justia Law

Kahrs imports engineered wood flooring panels for distribution to flooring wholesalers. Kahrs classified the products as “assembled parquet panels” under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 4418.30.00, a duty-free provision for “Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; shingles and shakes: parquet panels.” Customs subsequently liquidated Kahrs’ merchandise under HTSUS 4412, which covers “plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood,” at a duty rate of eight percent ad valorem. Customs denied a protest and the Court of International Trade found that Customs correctly classified Kahrs’ merchandise as plywood under heading 4412. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kahrs Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Cogent sued, alleging that Hyalogic was disseminating false information regarding Cogent’s product Baxyl, an “oral, liquid HA supplement that is sold into the human natural products market.” Shortly after the filing, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Cogent moved to enforce the settlement agreement, claiming that Hyalogic caused false and misleading videos to be uploaded to You Tube and by statements made at a conference. The district court found no breach of the settlement agreement and denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The contract unambiguously refers to a clear statement “about the other Party’s product.” Statements that refer to preservatives that can be found in a number of products, including Cogent’s products, are not statements “about the other Party’s products.” View "Cogent Solutions Grp, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC" on Justia Law