Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Rahman filed a securities class action against KB, an importer of infant furniture and products, and individuals, alleging violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 and (2) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The complaint alleged that defendants misled investors by artificially inflating KB’s stock price by issuing deceptive public financial reports and press releases dealing with compliance with customs laws and overall financial performance. A second amended complaint specified failure to disclose product recalls, safety violations, and illegal staffing practices. The district court dismissed for failure to satisfy the heightened scienter pleading standard required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Kraft sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store for trademark infringement, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale of food products to grocery stores under the name Cracker Barrel, which is a registered trademark of Kraft. Kraft has been selling cheese in grocery stores under that name for more than 50 years. Kraft did not challenge CBOCS’s right to sell the products under the name Cracker Barrel in CBOCS’s restaurants, in its “country stores” that adjoin the restaurants, or by mail order or online. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the similarity of the logos, the products, and of the channels of distribution. View "Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, James Wiese attended an auction held by Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC (APA) and purchased a "Yerf Dog Go-Cart," for his two minor sons. The go-cart was on consignment to APA from FF Acquisition; however, Wiese was not aware that FF Acquisition had manufactured the go-cart. Soon after purchasing the go-cart, Wiese discovered that the engine would not operate for more than a few minutes at a time. After several failed attempts to repair the go-cart, Wiese stored the go-cart in his garage for almost two years. In 2007, Wiese repaired the go-cart. Matthew Wiese was riding the go-cart and had an accident in which he hit his head on the ground causing a brain injury that resulted in his death in 2010. The elder Wiese brought contract claims against APA stemming from his purchase of the go-cart and for his son's death. APA appealed the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the common-law principles of agency, an auctioneer selling consigned goods on behalf of an undisclosed principal may be held liable as a merchant-seller for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under 7-2-314, Ala. Code 1975. As a result,the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment denying APA's summary-judgment motion as to Wiese's breach-of-the-implied-warranty-of-merchantability claim. View "Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC v. Wiese" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2004, 1st Source Bank entered into secured transactions with the debtors for the sale or lease of tractors and trailers. The agreements granted 1st Source a security interest in the tractors and/or trailers, accounts, and in proceeds from that collateral. 1st Source filed financing statements that identified the collateral as including the specified tractors/and or trailers, and “all proceeds thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts.” The financing statements did not refer to “accounts,” “accounts receivable,” or any similar language. Later, defendant banks also entered into secured transactions with the debtors and filed financing statements that specifically referred to a security interest in “all accounts receivable now outstanding or hereafter arising.” In 2009, the debtors defaulted. 1st Source undertook repossession of the collateral securing the agreements and attempted to claim a perfected security interest and first priority in debtors’ accounts, arguing that the term “and all proceeds thereof” included accounts receivable. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that 1st Source’s financing statements were not sufficient to put defendants on notice that 1st Source claimed a security interest in accounts receivable, and holding, as a matter of Tennessee law, that “proceeds,” as used in a company’s financing statement, does not include its accounts receivable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Wilton imported 39 models of paper punches from Taiwan for use in scrapbooking and craft projects, to cut paper in a variety of shapes and sizes. Except for one model, U.S. Customs and Border Protection initially liquidated the punches under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) subheading 8203.40.60 as “perforating punches and similar handtools” with a duty margin of 3.3%. Customs denied Wilton’s protests to classify them under the duty free HTSUS subheading 8441.10.00 as “cutting machines of all kinds.” The parties entered into a stipulation agreement to classify 23 models under subheading 8441.10.00 because they were too large to use in the hand. Customs maintained that subheading 8203.40.60 was proper for the 16 models that remained in dispute because they were “intended for use when held in the hand.” The U.S. Court of International Trade granted the government summary judgment, setting aside the stipulation and finding that the punches “prima facie fall under Heading 8203 as a perforating punch.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; the articles at issue are described eo nomine by HTSUS Heading 8203.40 View "Wilton Indus., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Sasafrasnet, an authorized distributor of BP products, provided Joseph with notice of its intent to terminate his franchise based on three occasions when Sasafrasnet attempted to debit Joseph’s bank account to pay for fuel deliveries but payment was denied for insufficient funds. The district court denied Joseph a preliminary injunction, finding that Joseph failed to meet his burden for a preliminary injunction under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 15 U.S.C. 2805(b)(2)(A)(ii). After a remand, the district court found that two of Joseph’s NSFs should count as “failures” under the PMPA justifying termination, at least for purposes of showing that he was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Joseph’s bank account was not adequately funded for the debit on two occasions because Joseph had decided to change banks, circumstances entirely within Joseph’s control. Given Joseph’s history of making late payments in substantial amounts because of insufficient funds (each was more than $22,000), the delinquent payments were not “technical” or “unimportant.” View "Joseph v. Sasafrasnet, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff successfully bid at a combined foreclosure sale of real estate and secured party auction of personal property owned by Debtors. Bank held mortgage and security interests in the real and personal property. Auctioneer conducted the auction. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff discovered he would not receive much of the personal property he believed to be in the sale. Plaintiff and the current owner of the property (Plaintiffs) brought this action against Debtors, Bank, and Auctioneer (collectively, Defendants), claiming that Defendants' failure to inform Plaintiffs there were conflicting claims as to the ownership of the property constituted negligence and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), among other causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on four of their counts. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that Defendants had a common-law duty to Plaintiffs to properly identify the personal property that was subject to the secured party sale; and (2) lacked the authority to award nontaxable costs pursuant to CUTPA. View "Ulbrich v. Groth" on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, to “preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology,” Delaware granted the Court of Chancery power to arbitrate business disputes. That Court then created an arbitration process as an alternative to trial for certain disputes, 10 DEL. CODE tit. 10, 349; Del. Ch. R. 96-98. To qualify for arbitration, at least one party must be a business entity formed or organized under Delaware law, and neither can be a consumer. Arbitration is limited to monetary disputes that involve an amount of at least one million dollars. The fee for filing is $12,000, and the arbitration costs $6,000 per day after the first day. Arbitration begins approximately 90 days after the petition is filed. The statute and rules bar public access. Arbitration petitions are confidential and are not included in the public docketing system. Attendance at proceedings is limited to parties and their representatives, and all materials and communications produced during the arbitration are protected from disclosure in judicial or administrative proceedings. The Coalition challenged the confidentiality provisions. The district court found that Delaware’s proceedings were essentially civil trials that must be open to the public, under the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine" on Justia Law

The ability of consumers to make purchases on the internet from out-of-state merchants without paying Illinois sales or use taxes caused Illinois retailers to ask the legislature to “level the playing field.” The result was a taxing statute, Public Act 96-1544, effective in 2011, called the “click-through” nexus law. The law was challenged by a group of internet publishers that display website texts or images, such as a retailer’s logo, containing a link to a retailer’s website; they are compensated by the retailer when a consumer clicks on the link and makes a purchase from the retailer. Out-of-state retailers who use such arrangements to generate sales of over $10,000 per year become subject to taxation under the statute. Their challenge was based on the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which prohibits discriminatory taxes on electronic transactions, and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute is invalid. The court noted that such marketing, when conducted through print media or on-the-air broadcasting, does not give rise to tax obligations under the Illinois statute. The enactment is a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce within the meaning of federal law, which preempts it. The court did not reach the commerce clause issue. View "Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer" on Justia Law