Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Kentucky law prohibits businesses that sell substantial amounts of staple groceries or gasoline from applying for a license to sell wine and liquor, Ky. Rev. Stat. 243.230(7). A regulation applies the prohibition to retailers that sell those items at a rate of at least 10% of gross monthly sales. A group of grocers sued the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, alleging that the law irrationally discriminated against them in violation of state and federal equal-protection rights; that it violated state separation-of-powers principles by granting the administrative board unfettered discretion to define the law; and that it violated state and federal due process rights by vaguely defining its terms. A liquor store intervened as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to the grocers on the federal equal-protection claim but rejected the other claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the statute. Applying the rational basis test, the court reasoned that the statute conceivably seeks to reduce access to high-alcohol products, and offends neither separation of powers nor due process principles. View "Maxwell's Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner" on Justia Law

Shapiro, a U.S. affiliate of Aifudi, imports laminated woven sacks manufactured and exported by Aifudi in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 2008, the Department of Commerce found that those sacks were being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value (19 U.S.C. 1673) and issued an antidumping-duty order. Aifudi participated, submitted verified information, and demonstrated that it was not subject to government control. Aifudi was assigned a “separate rate” of 64.28 percent, not the default PRC-wide rate. In a later review, conducted at Aifudi’s request, of the amount of the duty for a defined period, Commerce considered Aifudi’s eligibility for a company-specific rate for that period. Commerce published preliminary results, favorable to Aifudi. Aifudi immediately withdrew from the proceeding and removed its confidential information from the record. Commerce concluded that the record no longer contained enough verifiable information to prove that Aifudi was not subject to government control and assigned Aifudi the default PRC-wide rate for the review period. Shapiro appealed. The Court of International Trade upheld the decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that Commerce’s decision to apply the PRC-wide rate to Aifudi was supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any law.View "AMS Assocs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Newman Park, LLC was formed for the sole purpose of developing a piece of property. In 2004, it took out a loan to purchase the property at issue in this suit. In 2008, without knowledge of the other owners in Newman Park, one member went to Columbia Community Bank and requested a loan for his 95%-owned company, Trinity. Trinity had nothing to do with Newman Park, but the Bank's loan to Trinity was secured by a second deed of trust on the Newman Park property. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Bank, who was tricked into refinancing the property that the borrower lacked authority to pledge as security, could benefit from equitable subrogation when that Bank had no preexisting interest in the property. The property-owner/debtor argued that the Bank's lack of the preexisting interest barred it from equitable subrogation because of the "volunteer rule" which would characterize it as an intermeddler. The Court rejected the volunteer rule as a bar to equitable subrogation. The Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the defrauded Bank was entitled to be equitably subrogated as first priority lienholder.View "Columbia Cmty. Bank v. Newman Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Until 2001 Dean and Suiza competed to process and sell bottled milk to retailers. Suiza was the largest U.S. processor of milk and Dean was the second largest. Both purchased raw milk from other entities. DFA, a dairy farmer cooperative, was Suiza’s primary supplier and business partner. Dean obtained its raw milk predominantly from independent farmers. Dean and Suiza merged in 2001, becoming Dean Foods, hoping to obtain “distribution efficiencies and economies of scale,” for millions of dollars in cost savings. Certain agreements were negotiated, with input from the Department of Justice, which approved the proposed merger, subject to divestment of particular milk processing plants. Retailers of processed milk sued, charging violation of 15 U.S.C. 1, the Sherman Antitrust Act, by conspiring with a raw milk supplier-milk processor and the purchaser of the divested processing facilities to divide markets and restrict output. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dean Foods, finding insufficient proof of injury and failure to establish the relevant antitrust geographic market, primarily because plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was excluded. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the expert should not have been excluded and that the conclusions regarding injury were based on flawed propositions. View "Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Levi Strauss has stitched the back pocket of its jeans with the “Arcuate” design since 1873 and holds multiple trademarks on the design. In 2005, Abercrombie sought to register a “mirror image stitching design” for use on clothing, stating no limitations on the goods’ nature, type, channels of trade, or class of purchasers. Levi Strauss initiated an opposition to the parent application (concerning jackets and seeking Principal Registration). Levi Strauss petitioned to cancel Supplemental Registration of the child application covering other clothing. Abercrombie began selling “Ruehl jeans” with the design. Levi Strauss sued. The PTO stayed proceedings. Abercrombie claimed that its products were sold in different channels, at different prices. A jury found no infringement; the court rejected a claim of dilution by blurring. Levi Strauss did not appeal concerning infringement. The Ninth Circuit remanded, holding that dilution by blurring does not require identity or near identity of marks. Meanwhile, Abercrombie shut down the Ruehl brand, but sought to register its mirror-image design on “clothing, namely bottoms,” disclosing use of the design on denim shorts sold as “Gilley Hicks,” at different prices, and through different channels. Levi Strauss sought to amend to include the Gilley Hicks products. The district court declined and dismissed the dilution claim. The PTO opposition and cancellation proceedings were dismissed on the ground of issue preclusion. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the registrations at issue in the PTO cover a broader range of uses than were the subject of the litigation. View "Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co." on Justia Law

Immunosciences developed and sold medical tests and testing materials. In 2007, NeuroSciences wanted to expand its offerings. Immunosciences and NeuroScience decided to collaborate, but the relationship fell apart within two years. Immunosciences sued. In the first trial, a jury rejected a claim that NeuroScience did not pay what it had contracted to pay for medical testing materials, but the district judge ordered a new trial, concluding that the verdict was undermined by flawed special verdict questions. The jury in the second trial found for Immunosciences but awarded much less money than it was seeking. NeuroScience appealed, claiming that the court’s grant of a new trial was an abuse of discretion. Immunosciences argued that the court abused its discretion by allowing NeuroScience to argue in the new trial that the parties had orally modified their written contract and that NeuroScience breached a separate confidentiality agreement by continuing to use Immunosciences’ testing methods after the parties ended their business relationship. The jury in the first trial had awarded nearly $1.2 million on that claim, but the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for NeuroScience, explaining that Immunosciences had relied on an impermissible damages theory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Vojdani v. Pharmasan Labs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that woven laminated sacks exported from China were being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value and issued an antidumping duty order under 19 U.S.C. 1673. In 2009, Commerce initiated administrative review of that order for periods, during which AMS had imported sacks made from fabric sourced in China, undisputedly subject to the order; and sacks made from fabric imported into China from other countries. Commerce investigated, but did not initiate formal scope inquiry. AMS argued that a ruling obtained from U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided that the sacks produced from non-Chinese fabric were deemed to be from the country of origin of the fabric, not subject to the order and declared a non-Chinese origin for sacks made with non-Chinese fabric. Commerce concluded that China was the country of origin of sacks made with non-Chinese fabric under a substantial transformation analysis, then issued a “clarification” of its instructions to Customs to “suspend liquidation of all [laminated woven sacks] from [China], regardless of the origin of the woven fabric,… on or after January 31, 2008.” The Trade Court sustained application of a country-wide rate; the Federal Circuit affirmed. Following a second administrative review, the trade court held that Commerce violated its own regulations by instructing Customs to retroactively suspend liquidation of entries of the sacks made with non-Chinese fabric The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "AMS Assocs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Cross Match claimed that Suprema and Mentalix violated 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) by importing articles that infringe or are used to infringe its patents. The International Trade Commission entered a limited exclusion order barring importation of certain optical scanning devices, finding that Mentalix directly infringed a method claim by using its own software with imported Suprema scanners and found that Suprema induced that infringement and that certain of Suprema’s imported optical scanners directly infringe other claims of the 993 patent. The Commission found no infringement of the 562 patent. The Commission held that Suprema and Mentalix failed to prove that the 993 patent was invalid as obvious over two prior art patents. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for revision of the order to bar only a subset of the scanners. An exclusion order based on a section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) violation may not be predicated on a theory of induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) where direct infringement does not occur until after importation of the articles the exclusion order would bar. View "Suprema, inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

With respect to Bestpak’s importation of narrow woven ribbons with woven selvedge from China, he U.S. Department of Commerce calculated a separate rate margin using a simple average of a de minimis and an adverse facts available margin, yielding a rate of 123.83%. The Court of International Trade upheld the decision. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that substantial evidence did not support the rate. View "Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Hartney, a fuel oil retailer with a home office in Forest View, in Cook County, accepted purchase orders in the Village of Mark, in Putnam County, through a business with which it contracted. No Hartney employees were involved there. By so structuring sales, Hartney avoided liability for retail occupation taxes of Cook County, Forest View, and the Regional Transportation Authority. Hartney’s interpretation of the law was consistent with regulations published at the time. However, The Illinois Department of Revenue determined, through audit, that Hartney’s sales were attributable to the company’s Forest View office, rather than the Mark location reported by the company, and issued a notice of tax liability. Hartney paid penalties of $23,111,939 under protest and filed suit. The court agreed that the bright-line test for the situs of sale is where purchase orders are accepted. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court, court disagreed. The court found the “Jurisdictional Questions” regulations of the Administrative Code inconsistent with the statutes and case law. The legislature has not adopted a single-factor test for the situs of retail activity. The court’s own precedent calls for fact-intensive inquiry where there is a composite of many activities, and the legislature, by consistently employing the “business of selling” language, has effectively invoked that precedent. The Department of Revenue must abate Hartney’s penalties and tax liability for the relevant period because Hartney’s actions were consistent with its regulations in effect at the time.View "Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Village of Forest View" on Justia Law