Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee, which manufactures and distributes specialized products for use in the defense, security, and aerospace industries, entered into a consultant agreement with Appellant, under which Appellant agreed to identify buyers for Appellee’s products. Three years later, Appellee acquired the rights to manufacture and sell RH1280B field-programmable gate array (“FPGA”)s, which are semiconductor integrated circuits that are used in satellites and other space equipment. Operating under the terms of the consultant agreement, Appellant found customers for RH1280B FPGAs, accepted delivery of the PFGAs, and resold the goods to its customers. Before Appellant accepted delivery, however, Appellee warned it that the RH1280Bs failed to meet certain specifications. Appellant subsequently refused to pay an outstanding balance of $1,800,000, alleging that Appellee breached its express warranty regarding the performance characteristics of the RH1280B. Thereafter, Appellee terminated the consultant agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. View "BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. SpaceKey Components, Inc." on Justia Law

Corporation, which owned corporate operating accounts at Bank, took out a loan and line of credit. Corporation passed a corporate resolution providing that unless it notified Bank within fourteen days of an improperly paid item in order to recover the payment, Bank would not be held liable for any error in Corporation’s account. Corporation later discovered that its bookkeeper had been forging signatures on certain Bank documents and had embezzled approximately $386,000 over the course of two years. Corporation sued Bank to prevent Bank from forcing repayment on the loans. Bank counterclaimed to recover amounts due under the loans. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Bank, concluding that a bank and its customer may agree to shorten from one year to fourteen days the statutory time period under N.Y. U.C.C. Law 4-406(4) within which the customer must notify its bank of an improperly paid item in order to recover the payment thereon. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) a customer and bank can contractually reduce section 4-406(4)’s one-year limitations period; and (2) shortening the one-year period to fourteen days was not manifestly unreasonable under the facts of this case. View "Clemente Bros. Contracting Corp. v Hafner-Milazzo" on Justia Law

Brothers Patrick and Thomas each owned one‐third of the stock of Commercial Light, a Chicago electrical contractor. Between 1982 and the 2008 sale of the company, Thomas was the CEO, board chairman, and president. The other officers were the company’s treasurer, and its executive vice‐president. The board of directors had only two members: Thomas and a lawyer. Patrick took no part in the company’s management. Patrick sued, claiming that when Morris became executive vice‐president in 1992, he, with Thomas’s approval, started jacking up the salaries and bonuses paid so that the compensation of the three officers soared, totaling $22 million between 1993 and 2000, and that the lawyer on the board rubber‐stamped Thomas’s compensation decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding breach of fiduciary duty. The jury did not have to find that the compensation was excessive in order to find a breach of fiduciary duty by concealment. Illinois allows as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty a forfeiture of all the fiduciary’s earnings during the period of breach. The court speculated on why the highly-educated Patrick did not discover the concealment until several years after the sale, but noted that the appeal only concerned jury instructions. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Microsoft filed a complaint in the U.S. International Trade Commission, alleging that Motorola had violated the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, by importing mobile phones and tablets that infringe several Microsoft patents. The Commission instituted an investigation and, after an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found that the accused Motorola products did not infringe the 054, 762, 376, or 133 patents and that Microsoft had failed to prove that the mobile devices on which it relied actually implemented those patents. The Commission upheld the ALJ’s findings, finding that Microsoft failed to prove that the Microsoft-supported products on which it relied for its domestic-industry showing actually practiced the patents. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first affirming that Motorola does not infringe the 054 patent and that Microsoft failed to prove that a domestic industry exists for products protected by the 762 and 376 patents. With respect to the 133 patent the Commission relied on incorrect claim constructions in finding no infringement, the only basis for its finding no violation, for the main group of accused products. The court affirmed the noninfringement finding for the accused alternative design. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce initiated a CVD investigation, 19 U.S.C. 1671(a), on multi-layered wood flooring from China in response to a petition from domestic producers, limiting its individual examination to companies accounting for the largest volume of imports, and selected Fine Furniture as a mandatory respondent. Commerce sent out questionnaires to analyze an allegation that the government of China subsidized the respondents’ electricity costs. Among other things, Commerce sought draft provincial price proposals for 2006 and 2008 for each province in which the mandatory respondents were located. Fine Furniture provided all of the requested information, while the government of China did not. Commerce determined that the government of China’s decision not to provide information about how electricity rates were determined for each province in which mandatory respondents were located was a failure to cooperate to the best of its ability. Accordingly, Commerce applied an adverse inference to find that the Electricity Program provided a financial contribution specific to the identified respondents. Commerce also applied adverse inferences to determine the benchmark price for electricity. The Court of International Trade held that Commerce did not apply adverse inferences against Fine Furniture, but applied adverse inferences as its method for determining the information requested from, but not provided by, the government of China. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Fine Furniture Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Rapid-prototyping “additive technology” creates parts by building layer upon layer of plastics, metals, or ceramics. Subtractive technology starts with a block and cuts away layers. Additive technology include SL, fused deposition modeling, laser sintering, 3D printing, direct metal laser sintering, and digital light processing. 3DS is the sole U.S. supplier of SL machines, which use an ultraviolet laser to trace a cross section of an object on a vat of liquid polymer resin. The laser solidifies the resin it touches, while untouched, areas remain liquid. After one cross-section has solidified, the newly formed layer is lowered below the surface of the resin. The process is repeated until the object is completed. Users of SL machines often own many machines with varying sizes, speeds, and accuracy levels. 3DS began equipping some of its SL machines with wireless technology that allows a receiver to communicate with a transmitter on the cap of a resin bottle. A software-based lockout feature shuts the machine off upon detection of a resin not approved by 3DD. 3DS has approved two of Desotech’s resins and entered into negotiations for approval of additional resins. After negotiations broke down, Desotech sued, alleging tying, unreasonable restraint of trade, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act; tying under the Clayton Act; patent infringement; and violations of the Illinois Antitrust and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. The district court granted 3DS summary judgment on the antitrust claims and certain state-law claims. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Following a request from ICP, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued New York Ruling Letter D86228 classifying ICP’s white sauce as “sauces and preparations therefor” under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) 2103.90.9060 Years later, Customs issued a notice of action reclassifying all pending and future entries of white sauce as “[b]utter and ... dairy spreads” under HTSUS 0405.20.3000, which increased the tariff by about 2400%. After protesting and paying duties on a single entry, ICP filed a claim in the Court of International Trade, alleging that the notice of action improperly revoked the Ruling Letter without following procedures required by 19 U.S.C. 1625(c). The court ordered Customs to reliquidate the merchandise under the “[s]auces and preparations therefor” heading required by the Ruling Letter. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Int'l Custom Prods. v. United States" on Justia Law

VLM, a Canadian agricultural supplier, sold frozen potatoes to Illinois Trading, a reseller. VLM sued Illinois Trading for $184,000 owed on the contract, with counts based on the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, which creates a trust in favor of the seller when a buyer purchases agricultural goods on short-term credit, 7 U.S.C. 499e(c)(2). To protect the trust assets, VLM sought a preliminary injunction. Illinois Trading had obtained loans from TAB Bank, giving a security interest in its assets. By the time VLM filed suit, TAB had seized Illinois Trading’s assets. The PACA-created trust made VLM’s claim superior to TAB’s security interest. VLM added a claim against TAB for seizing PACA trust assets. Before the amendment, VLM had successfully moved for consolidation of the preliminary-injunction hearing with trial on the merits. The consolidated hearing pertained only to counts against Illinois Trading, not Count V, pertaining to TAB. The court, however, issued an opinion resolving Counts I through IV and also entered judgment for TAB on Count V, because VLM had not presented evidence on that claim. The district court awarded VLM attorney’s fees and interest on the unpaid balance based on provisions in VLM’s invoices. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to Count V; held that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, was controlling not the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code; and reversed and remanded with respect to attorney’s fees and interest View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Transp. Alliance Bank,Inc." on Justia Law

AmEx is the world’s largest issuer of traveler’s checks, which never expire. AmEx and third-party vendors sell the checks at face value, and AmEx profits by investing the funds until the TC is redeemed. Although most are cashed within a year, AmEx uses the remaining uncashed checks for long-term, high-yield investments. Until recently, every state’s abandoned property laws presumed abandonment of uncashed traveler’s checks 15 years after issuance. This presumption requires the issuer to transfer possession of the funds to the state. In 2008 Kentucky amended KRS 393.060(2) to change thes abandonment period from to seven years. AmEx claims violation of the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause. Following a remand and amendment of the complaint to add a dormant Commerce Clause argument and a claim that the legislation did not apply retroactively to checks that were issued and outstanding prior to the effective date, the district court granted the state summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Hollenbach" on Justia Law

Del Monte imports products consisting of tuna, with sauce, in a sealed microwaveable package. The tuna accounts for 80 percent of the total product weight; the sauce accounts for 20 percent. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified two of the three flavors under subheading 1604.14.10 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which covers tuna packed “in oil,” because their sauces include some oil. Customs appraised the goods based on the price that Del Monte paid its supplier of importation, without adjusting for $1.5 million that Del Monte later received from its supplier after negotiations over the accuracy of the amount originally paid. The Court of International Trade held that Del Monte’s goods were properly classified and valued. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Fish products in which the only oil is added as part of a liquid substance introduced at the time of packing are considered “in oil” even if the liquid does not consist entirely of oil; there is no minimum threshold for the amount of oil that must be present. Imported merchandise must be appraised, when possible, based on its “transaction value,” 19 U.S.C. 1401a(a)(1), “the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation,” regardless of subsequent rebates.View "Del Monte Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law