Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries
Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier
SB1 Waukesha County, LLC and Decade Properties, Inc. were two judgment creditors of defendant Jack Collier. SB1 purchased from Associated Bank, N.A. a portion of a default judgment against Collier. Subsequently, Decade obtained a judgment against Collier personally. Each party claimed that they were entitled to collect on Collier’s personal property. The Supreme Court held (1) because SB1 was the first judgment creditor with a docketed money judgment to levy specific, non-exempt personal property of Collier, SB1 had priority over Decade in regard to specific personal property that SB1 identified and levied; but (2) there was no blanket lien in favor of SB1 or Decade that prevented other creditors from pursuing collection from Collier’s personal property. View "Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law
Attorney’s Title Guar. Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank
Defendants, Heartland Wisconsin Corp. and Town Bank, were creditors of a Milwaukee real estate investor and landlord (Debtor). The issue in this case was which defendant had priority over proceeds of the Debtor’s legal malpractice claim that was held in escrow pending resolution of their dispute. Heartland claimed that the Debtor validly assigned the proceeds of his legal malpractice claim, which gave Heartland a security interest in those proceeds that was superior to Town Bank’s interest. Town Bank claimed that it obtained a superior interest in the proceeds by levy and that proceeds from legal malpractice claims are not assignable. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the debtor lawfully assigned the potential proceeds from his legal malpractice claim as collateral for a debt to Heartland; and (2) Heartland perfected a security interest in the proceeds before Town Bank obtained a superior interest in the proceeds, and therefore, Heartland was entitled to the proceeds. View "Attorney's Title Guar. Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law
Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head
Bill Head, doing business as Bill Head Enterprises (Head), hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system at the truck stop Head owned and operated. After a major diesel-fuel leak occurred, Respondents sued Petroleum Solutions for its damages. The trial rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of third-party defendant Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, on Titeflex’s counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment as to Head, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions of charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ statute-of-limitations defense, and the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed the judgment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions. Remanded for further proceedings between Respondents and Petroleum Solutions. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law
Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Inc.
Burzlaff bought a “Stallion” motorized tricycle from Thoroughbred Motorsports in 2009 for $35,000. When Burzlaff reported the first problems to Thoroughbred, the company instructed him to take his vehicle to a Ford dealer for warranty repairs. Burzlaff did so repeatedly. After the vehicle had been out of service for repairs for 71 days during the first year, Burzlaff demanded, under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, that Thoroughbred replace the vehicle or refund his purchase price. Thoroughbred refused. Further efforts to repair the vehicle at the Thoroughbred factory in Texas failed to correct the defects. Burzlaff sued Thoroughbred under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, and the Wisconsin Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171. The district court awarded double damages plus costs and attorney fees for a total judgment of $95,000 under the more generous provisions of the state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions on the Lemon Law claim, the sufficiency of the evidence on that claim, and the submission of the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. View "Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Inc." on Justia Law
Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States
Dependable imports packing, janitorial, floral, office supplies, and some glass items. In 2010, Dependable imported, from China, items invoiced as “Generic Bud Vases” valued at $0.30 or less and larger “Generic Trumpet Vases,” valued at no more than $3.00. Dependable sells the vases to flower-packing houses that fill them with flowers for shipment to supermarkets or similar retailers, where the vase and flower combinations are sold as a single unit. Dependable classified the vases under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 7018.90.50. At liquidation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection applied Heading 7013, which provides for “Glassware of a kind used for . . . indoor decoration.” Dependable protested but after a deemed denial and paying assessed duties, argued to the Court of International Trade that both vases should be classified under Heading 7010, which includes “containers, of glass, of a kind used for the conveyance or packing of goods ... Carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pots, vials, ampules and other containers, of glass ... for the conveyance or packing of goods; preserving jars of glass; stoppers, lids and other closures, of glass." The court stated that “a reasonable jury could only conclude that the vases here are commercially fungible with other inexpensive clear glass vases whose principal use is decorative, rather than with glass packing containers” and granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States
Between October 2007 and August 2008, R.T. foods made 24 entries of “Tempura Vegetables” and “Vegetable Bird’s Nests” (frozen tempura-battered vegetable mixtures) from Thailand, 10 through the port of Boston and 14 through the port of Long Beach. United States Customs and Border Protection classified the 10 Boston entries and three of the Long Beach entries under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 2004.90.85, which carries a duty rate of 11.2%. The remaining 11 entries into Long Beach were liquidated under R.T.’s proposed subheading, HTSUS 2106.90.99, which carries a duty-free preference for products from Thailand. HTSUS 2004.90.85 covers “Other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen, other than products of heading 2006: Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables: Other: Other, including mixtures.” HTSUS 2106.90.99 provides for “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other: Other: Frozen.” R.T. timely filed and Customs denied protests. The Court of International Trade held it only had jurisdiction over three of the entries, then entered summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Chemsol, LLC v. United States
In 2009, Chemsol made six entries of citric acid, purportedly from the Dominican Republic, and in 2009-2010, MCI made 13 entries of citric acid, purportedly from India; both claimed duty-free status for the entries and did not deposit any duties. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection initiated an investigation to determine whether Chinese citric acid was being transshipped through other countries to evade antidumping and countervailing duties applicable to citric acid imported from China. Customs extended the deadline for liquidation of the entries under 19 U.S.C. 1504(b) and notified Chemsol and MCI of the extensions. In response, the companies sought a declaration that the extensions were unlawful and that the entries were deemed liquidated. They asserted that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). The government argued that they were first required to challenge the extensions before Customs by post-liquidation protest, after which they could seek judicial review of any protest denial under 19 U.S.C. 1515, the Tariff Act’s “review of protests” provision. The court agreed, stating that “since the commencement of this action, ICE has completed its investigation and, but for .. suit, Customs could complete its administrative process and liquidate … remaining entries.” The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. View "Chemsol, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
Irwin v. West Gate Bank
Jack Irwin owed a warehouse that Shade rented to store personal property. West Gate Bank held notes payable from Shade that were secured by Shade’s personal property. Shade later defaulted on the notes. Irwin and West Gate subsequently agreed to move Shade’s personal property pursuant to an “Abandonment” document. When Shade filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved distribution of the proceeds in Shade’s personal property to West Gate, concluding that the Abandonment document was not an assignment or release of West Gate’s perfected security interest. Thereafter, Irwin filed this action against West Bank in district court alleging that West Gate breached its obligations under the Abandonment document by failing to pay the proceeds to Irwin. The district curt entered judgment in favor of West Gate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s determination regarding the preclusive effect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling with respect to an assignment or release of West Gate’s security interest in Shade’s property was not relevant to this appeal; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the Abandonment document was not an enforceable contract or a warranty. View "Irwin v. West Gate Bank" on Justia Law
Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States
Resco filed a petition with the Department of Commerce requesting initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations on imports of certain magnesia carbon bricks (MCBs) from China and Mexico. MCBs are a type of refractory brick used to line ladles and furnaces used in steelmaking and steel handling processes. Resco’s petition proposed that the scope of the investigations be limited to certain types of MCBs, distinguishing MCBs from other types of refractory bricks and stating that the different types of bricks are not generally substitutable, due to varying chemical and physical properties and wear characteristics. Commerce studied the proposed scope of the investigation and published notices of initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and its final determinations, using almost all of the language proposed by Resco to define the scope of the investigations: Fedmet is a domestic importer of refractory bricks and other products used in the steelmaking industry. Fedmet was not a party to the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations Fedmet requested a scope ruling that its Bastion® line of magnesia carbon alumina bricks was outside the scope of the outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders on MCBs from China and Mexico. Commerce and the Trade Court rejected Fedmet’s arguments. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding Fedmet’s bricks outside the scope of the order. View "Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
Riddell, Inc. v. United States
Jerseys, pants, and girdles imported by Riddell are all designed to be worn, in conjunction with protective pads (having both hard and soft components), while playing football. As imported none of the merchandise contains such protective items. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified all of the merchandise as articles of apparel under either chapter 61 or chapter 62 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS0. Riddell filed two protests under 19 U.S.C. 1514, arguing that the merchandise should have been classified as football equipment under HTSUS chapter 95. Customs denied Riddell’s protests. Riddell then filed civil actions in the Court of International Trade upheld the classification. The Federal Circuit affirmed the classifications as apparel, rather than sports equipment.
View "Riddell, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade