Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Kopko ran SFS in Michigan, providing financial transaction processing and electronic funds transfers to companies engaged in e-commerce, processing those transactions through its Fifth Third account, Fifth Third discovered that FBD was processing illegal gambling funds through that account and notified SFS that it was closing SFS’s account immediately. Losing this account crippled SFS’s ability to do business. SFS went bankrupt. Kopko telephoned FBD and spoke to Bastable, FBD’s vice-president for e-commerce. According to Kopko, Bastable said FBD did not have an account in SFS’s name. Months later SFS received a grand jury subpoena related to a federal investigation of the gambling transactions done in SFS’s name. When Kopko called Bastable again to discuss the subpoena, Bastable admitted that FBD had an account in SFS’s name and that the board of directors was aware of this account. In 2012, SFS sued FBD, Bastable, and FBD’s individual directors in federal court for negligence and fraud against. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that: answering the phone calls did not establish personal jurisdiction over individual defendants; FBD owed no duty of care to SFS because SFS was not a customer; and SFS failed to adequately plead a claim of fraud. View "SFS Check, LLC v. First Bank of De." on Justia Law

Husband and wife acquired a 25 percent interest in the LLC. Hartley served as president and managing member. A judgment dissolving the marriage awarded wife one-half of the LLC share. Husband's other obligations to wife were secured by his LLC share. Wife did not file a UCC Financing Statement, but gave Hartley and other LLC members written notice. Amendments to the LLC’s records and its tax returns showed her interest. Husband defaulted on his obligations to wife. Hartley loaned husband $200,000 from his pension plan, secured by the same membership share pledged to wife. Hartley did not disclose the loan or his security interest to wife. Wife notified Hartley that she intended to take the LLC share and sued to foreclose "judicial liens" created by the dissolution judgment. Hartley determined that she had not filed a financing statement and filed his own. A court ordered husbandto transfer his share to wife. He complied. Husband failed to repay the Hartley loan; the pension plan published "Notice of Disposition" announcing sale of husband's LLC interest to satisfy the debt. The trial court declared that wife has a 25 percent membership interest, not encumbered by the Hartley claims. The court of appeal affirmed. Where a perfected security interest is created by breaching a fiduciary duty owed to another, equitable principles may give priority to an earlier unperfected security interest. View "Feresi v. The Livery, LLC" on Justia Law

Between July 30, 2003, and August 31, 2003, Sunline imported eight entries of freshwater crawfish tailmeat from Chinese producer Hubei, which were subject to a U.S. Department of Commerce antidumping duty order covering freshwater crawfish tailmeat from China. The Hubei Entries were entered following approval by Customs of eight single-entry bonds that covered the estimated antidumping duties and designated Hartford as surety. The Hubei Entries were made during the pendency of Hubei’s “new shipper review.” After Hubei’s new shipper review was rescinded, meaning Hubei did not qualify for an individual antidumping duty rate, Customs liquidated the Entries at the 223.01% country-wide rate. After Sunline failed to pay, Customs demanded payment from Hartford, which filed a complaint at the Court of International Trade, seeking to void its obligations under the bonds because Customs had been investigating Sunline for possible import law violations during the period in which the bonds were secured and did not inform Hartford of the investigation. The Trade Court dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Hartford did not allege any facts that establish a connection between the investigation and Sunline’s failure to pay its antidumping duties after liquidation. View "Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Commerce published an antidumping duty order on wooden bedroom furniture from China. AFMC requested an administrative review of certain companies exporting such furniture to the U.S. in 2009. After Commerce selected it as the mandatory respondent, Huafeng provided Commerce with data related to its 2008 purchases of wood inputs from market economy suppliers relevant to the subject merchandise. Commerce assigned Huafeng a dumping margin of 41.75% using 2009 import data from the Philippines (surrogate values), a market economy, to value the wood inputs as the “best available information” under 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1) because they were contemporaneous with the Period of Review, and the purchases identified by Huafeng were not. After remand Commerce again relied on the surrogate values. On second remand, Commerce determined that it did not need to reopen the record because the “best available information” analysis focuses on the purchase of inputs, not consumption, verified that the market economy purchases were actually from market economy suppliers, and assigned a new dumping margin of 11.79%. The Court of International Trade judgment sustained that valuation. The Federal Circuit reversed, directing direct the Trade Court to reinstate the valuation in the First Redetermination. View "Home Meridian Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim. View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law

Roche imported BetaTab, a mixture containing beta-carotene, antioxidants, gelatin, sucrose, and corn starch that can be used as a source of Vitamin A in foods, beverages, and vitamin products. Beta-carotene crystalline makes up 20 percent of the mixture and is an organic colorant with provitamin A activity. Whether used as a colorant or provitamin A, beta-carotene must first be combined with other ingredients. Customs classified BetaTab under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 2106.90.97 as “[f]ood preparations not elsewhere specified or included” and denied a protest. In the Court of International Trade,Roche argued that BetaTab was classifiable either as a “coloring matter” under HTSUS subheading 3204.19.35, and eligible for duty-free entry pursuant to the Pharmaceutical Appendix, or, alternatively, as a provitamin under HTSUS heading 2936. The Court ruled in favor of the company, reclassifying the product under HTSUS 2936. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Roche’s manufacturing process did not change BetaTab’s functionality as a provitamin or change the character of beta-carotene as a source of provitamin A. Addition of the stabilizing ingredients did not exclude the merchandise from classification under heading 2936. View "Roche Vitamins, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Alcan imported Flexalcon, an aluminum-plastic laminate foil for food packaging with stringent shelf-life requirements, such as for the military’s Meals Ready to Eat. Flexalcon is a four-layer material for the base of a package and a three-layer material for the lid. Each configuration has a thin layer of aluminum foil between layers of plastic. Aluminum prevents penetration of light, water vapor, oxygen, and other contaminants that would degrade food contents. The plastic gives the packaging tensile strength and increases heat resistance to withstand sterilization and sealing; it prevents cracking and piercing. Alcan listed the material as classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 7607.20.50, which carries no duty rate and covers “[a]luminum foil (whether or not printed, or backed with paper, paperboard, plastics or similar backing materials) of a thickness (excluding any backing) not exceeding 0.2 mm: Backed: Other.” Customs reclassified the Flexalcon under subheading 3921.90.40, with a 4.2% duty rate, covering “[o]ther plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics: Other: Flexible.” Alcan unsuccessfully protested under 19 U.S.C. 1514–1515. The Court of International Trade upheld the classification. The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the competing aluminum-foil heading defers to the applicable plastics heading. View "Alcan Food Packaging v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999 Seltzer registered the word “Kashwére” as a trademark for chenille soft goods. In 2009, Seltzer sold his company’s assets, including the trademark, to its principal officers. They formed TMG, which granted Seltzer an exclusive license to sell chenille products under the Kashwére name in Japan, through Flat Be. TMG claims that Seltzer violated his license by creating USAJPN and transferring to it all rights conferred by his license, to create an appearance of distance between Seltzer and Flat Be. Although Seltzer owned a majority interest in USAJPN, he needed TMG’s approval for the transfer. Flat Be also created a line of fabrics, “Kashwére Re,’ that are not chenille. Seltzer’s license does not authorize use of the Kashwére name for products that are not chenille, but he claimed that a TMG owner approved the Kashwére Re project. USAJPN also failed to comply with a requirement to disclose the TMG licensee. The district judge denied TMG’s request to order the license cancelled or to enjoin future violations and award damages. The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of TMG on Seltzer’s and Flat Be’s counterclaims, but reversed summary judgment in favor of Seltzer and Flat Be on TMG’s claims. View "Kashwere, LLC v. Kashwere USAJPN, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a judgment entered after a demurrer by three banks to plaintiff’s second amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The three banks were US Metro Bank, Wilshire State Bank, and Pacific City Bank. An employee of a corporation with responsibility to gather incoming checks made payable to the corporation and deposit those checks into the corporation’s bank account (in this case, the corporation’s accounting manager) stole some of the incoming checks and took them to a check cashing service where she forged the signature of one of the officers of the corporation and received hard cash in return. After discovery of the thefts, the corporation fired the accounting manager and tried to recoup at least some of its losses. In this case, the corporation’s recoupment effort included suing its own bank, the three check cashing services where the employee took the checks, and the three banks which received those checks from the check cashing services for deposit into those companies’ own accounts. The legal issue presented in this appeal was one of first impression in California: Does the interposition of the check cashing services between (a) the employee who stole the checks and (b) the three banks who took the checks from three check cashing companies and credited the accounts of those check cashing companies, relieve the banks of all duty of care under section 3405 of California’s Commercial Code? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: the three banks were the first banks to process the checks through the banking system, and, as “first banks,” they had a duty of care in the processing of those checks “‘to make certain all endorsements [were] valid; banks subsequently taking the paper have a right to rely on the forwarding bank.’” Check cashing companies are not banks, and should not be treated as banks for purposes of California’s Uniform Commercial Code. View "HH Computer Systems v. Pacific City Bank" on Justia Law