Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

A wholesale food supplier, Vista Food Exchange, Inc. ("Vista"), sued Comercial De Alimentos Sanchez S De R L De C.V. ("Sanchez") for breach of contract, alleging that Sanchez failed to pay for over $750,000 worth of meat products. Vista claimed that Sanchez was required to make payments to Vista's headquarters in New York, but Sanchez contended it had paid the invoices in cash to Vista's salesman, Eduardo Andujo Rascón, in Tijuana, Mexico. Sanchez supported its claim with declarations and documents, including an affidavit from Rascón stating he received the cash payments.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Sanchez, dismissing Vista's breach-of-contract claim. The court found that Sanchez provided unrefuted evidence of cash payments to Rascón, fulfilling its contractual obligations. It also ruled that even if paying Rascón in cash breached the contract, Vista could not show that its damages were proximately caused by the breach because Rascón's theft of the money was unforeseeable. The court dismissed Vista's other claims for breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, citing New York law that forecloses such claims when an enforceable contract exists.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding Sanchez's claimed performance, the modification of the contract, and the foreseeability of damages. The appellate court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing Vista's claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment and remanded the case for trial on those claims. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Vista's claims for implied contract and promissory estoppel. View "Vista Food Exchange, Inc. v. Comercial de Alimentos Sanchez" on Justia Law

The City of Fort Collins contracted with Open International, LLC, for software services, which led to mutual breach-of-contract claims. The City also alleged that Open's precontractual statements were negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations. A jury found that Open fraudulently induced the City to enter the contract. The City elected to rescind the contract, and the district court held a bench trial on restitution, ordering a judgment of nearly $20 million against Open.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Open's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which argued that the City’s tort claims were barred by the economic-loss rule and the contract’s merger clause. The court also denied Open's motion to require the City to elect a remedy before trial. The jury found in favor of the City on the fraudulent inducement claim, and the City chose rescission, leading to the dismissal of the jury and a bench trial on restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings and the jury’s verdict. The court held that the City’s tort claims were not barred by the economic-loss rule or the contract’s merger clause. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of fraud, particularly regarding Open’s grading of the functionality matrix and the use of a different software portal. The court also upheld the finding that the City did not waive its right to rescind the contract, as there was conflicting evidence about when the City discovered the fraud. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Open’s Rule 50(b) motion, which argued that Open Investments could not be liable for rescission. View "City of Fort Collins v. Open International" on Justia Law

James E. Carroll, Jr. signed a contract with Isle of Palms Pest Control, Inc. and SPM Management Company, Inc. for termite protection services for his home. The contract specified the use of the Exterra Termite Interception and Baiting System, with a liability limit of $250,000 for new termite damage. However, the respondents abandoned the bait station system without informing Carroll and began using a liquid application, which was allegedly done negligently. Carroll continued to renew the bait station contract, unaware of the change, and discovered significant termite damage to his home ten years later.Carroll sued the respondents for negligence and breach of contract. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the respondents on the negligence claim, citing the economic loss rule, which confined Carroll's remedy to the breach of contract action. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court clarified that the economic loss rule applies only in the product liability context when the only injury is to the product itself. Since the contract did not involve the sale of a product, the economic loss rule did not apply. The court found that the respondents' conduct in secretly switching to a liquid termiticide application was beyond the contract's scope, creating a duty of due care. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the respondents' negligence and its proximate cause of the termite damage. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the $250,000 liability limitation applying only if the verdict is based solely on the breach of contract claim. View "Carroll v. Isle of Palms Pest Control, Inc." on Justia Law

Avanzalia Panamá and its parent company, Avanzalia Solar, built a solar plant in Panama and sought to connect it to the El Coco substation, owned by Goldwind USA's affiliate, UEPI. Avanzalia alleged that Goldwind tortiously blocked their access to the substation, preventing them from selling electricity. Avanzalia filed a complaint with Panama's Autoridad de Servicios Públicos (ASEP), which required them to submit updated electrical studies and obtain an access agreement with UEPI. Despite obtaining the agreement, Avanzalia faced further delays and was unable to connect to the substation until May 2020.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Goldwind. The court found that Avanzalia could not satisfy the Illinois state law requirement for tortious interference, which necessitates that the defendant's actions be directed at a third party. The court also applied collateral estoppel, concluding that ASEP's findings were binding and precluded Avanzalia's claims related to pre-access agreement delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to afford comity to ASEP's order and apply collateral estoppel, barring Avanzalia's claims related to pre-access agreement delays. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in not considering the impossibility theory of tortious interference under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A. The court vacated the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Goldwind wrongfully prevented Avanzalia from performing its contractual obligations. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Avanzalia Solar, S.L. v. Goldwind USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a surety bond company, Granite Re, Inc. (Granite), and a creditor bank, United Prairie Bank (UPB), over entitlement to funds held by a receiver in a receivership action. Granite issued payment bonds to Molnau Trucking LLC (Molnau) for public works projects, but Molnau defaulted on both the projects and loans from UPB. The issue was whether Granite or UPB had priority to the bonded contract funds held by the receiver. Granite argued for priority under equitable subrogation, having paid laborers and suppliers, while UPB claimed priority under the UCC, having perfected its security interests in Molnau’s accounts receivable before Granite issued the bonds.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPB, recognizing Granite’s equitable subrogation rights but ruling that UPB’s perfected security interest had priority. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a “mistake of fact” standard from mortgage context case law, which Granite did not meet.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the “mistake of fact” standard does not apply to performing construction sureties. The court concluded that Granite, as a surety, has the right to equitable subrogation without needing to show a mistake of fact. The court further held that a surety’s right to equitable subrogation is not a security interest subject to the UCC’s first-in-time priority rule. Instead, a performing surety has priority over a secured creditor regarding bonded contract funds.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Granite, allowing Granite to request redistribution of the bonded contract funds. View "In re Receivership of United Prairie Bank v. Molnau Trucking LLC" on Justia Law

Lackie Drug Store, Inc. filed a putative class action against OptumRx, Inc. and other pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), alleging violations of several Arkansas statutes due to the PBMs' failure to disclose, update, and notify pharmacies of changes to their Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) lists. Lackie claimed this resulted in under-reimbursement for prescriptions. The case was initially filed in Arkansas state court and later removed to federal court. Lackie amended its complaint to include five claims, and OptumRx moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed two of Lackie's claims but retained three. The court also denied OptumRx's motion to dismiss based on the argument that Lackie failed to comply with pre-dispute procedures outlined in the Network Agreement. OptumRx later filed an answer and participated in discovery. After Lackie amended its complaint again, adding two new claims and tailoring the class definition to OptumRx, OptumRx moved to compel arbitration based on the Provider Manual's arbitration clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that OptumRx waived its right to compel arbitration for the original three claims by substantially invoking the litigation machinery before asserting its arbitration right. However, the court found that OptumRx did not waive its right to compel arbitration for the two new claims added in the amended complaint. The court also held that the district court erred in addressing the arbitrability of the new claims because the Provider Manual included a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator to decide arbitrability issues.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case with instructions to grant OptumRx's motion to compel arbitration for the two new claims. View "Lackie Drug Store, Inc. v. OptumRx, Inc." on Justia Law

Veltor Underground LLC, a construction business, applied for a $125,000 loan under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic, claiming it had six employees. However, the Small Business Administration (SBA) later discovered that these "employees" were actually independent contractors. Consequently, the SBA denied Veltor's request for loan forgiveness, as payments to independent contractors do not qualify as "payroll costs" under the CARES Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the SBA and associated individuals. The court found that Veltor's payments to independent contractors did not meet the statutory definition of "payroll costs," which is a requirement for loan forgiveness under the PPP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the CARES Act's definition of "payroll costs" includes only payments to employees and not to independent contractors. The court reasoned that the Act distinguishes between businesses with employees and self-employed individuals, including sole proprietors and independent contractors, and that the term "payroll costs" does not encompass payments made to independent contractors by businesses. Therefore, Veltor was not entitled to loan forgiveness and must repay the loan. View "Veltor Underground, LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, K7 Design Group, Inc. (K7) offered to sell hand sanitizer to Walmart, Inc., doing business as Sam’s Club (Sam’s Club). K7 and Sam’s Club discussed and agreed upon the product, price, quantity, and delivery terms for various hand sanitizer products through email communications. K7 delivered over 1,000,000 units of hand sanitizer to Sam’s Club, which paid approximately $17.5 million. However, Sam’s Club did not collect or pay for the remaining hand sanitizer, leading to storage issues for K7.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of K7 on its breach of contract claim and awarded $7,157,426.14 in damages. Sam’s Club’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Sam’s Club argued that K7 failed to present sufficient evidence of an obligation to pay for the products, the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the communications between K7 and Sam’s Club constituted binding orders under Arkansas’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or in denying Sam’s Club’s motions. The court also affirmed the district court’s award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees and costs. View "K7 Design Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc., a Ford dealership in North Branch, Minnesota, operates under a Ford Sales and Service Agreement. In late 2022, Ford announced plans to establish a new dealership in Forest Lake, Minnesota, and to reassign half of Anderson & Koch’s designated sales area to the new dealership. Anderson & Koch filed a lawsuit in state court, alleging violations of the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act (MVSDA), specifically sections 80E.13(k) and (p). Ford removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota partially granted Ford’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Anderson & Koch failed to state a claim under sections 80E.13(k) and (p) regarding the establishment of the new dealership. However, the court allowed Anderson & Koch to challenge the proposed change to its designated sales area under the same sections. Anderson & Koch then appealed the dismissal of its claims related to the new dealership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Anderson & Koch could not challenge the establishment of the new dealership under sections 80E.13(k) or (p) of the MVSDA. The court held that the establishment of a new dealership did not modify the existing franchise agreement, as required by section 80E.13(k), nor did it arbitrarily change the dealer’s area of sales effectiveness under section 80E.13(p). The court also noted that Anderson & Koch had dismissed its claims regarding the change to its sales area, leaving only the challenge to the new dealership on appeal. View "Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

Calvin Berwald, operating Sokota Dairy, filed a lawsuit against Stan’s, Inc., a local feed mill, alleging breach of contract and breach of implied warranties. Berwald claimed that Stan’s prematurely canceled a soybean meal purchase agreement and sold him contaminated calf starter, resulting in the death of over 200 calves. Stan’s argued that the contract was canceled due to Berwald’s late payments and that the calf deaths were due to poor facilities and feeding practices.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Jerauld County granted summary judgment in favor of Stan’s on the breach of contract claim, citing accord and satisfaction. The court found that Berwald’s acceptance and deposit of a check from Stan’s, which was intended to settle the dispute, discharged the claim. A jury trial on the breach of warranty claims resulted in a verdict that Stan’s breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but awarded no damages to Berwald. The jury found against Berwald on the claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and barratry.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that Stan’s satisfied the requirements for accord and satisfaction under SDCL 57A-3-311. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the good faith tender of the check, the existence of a bona fide dispute, and Berwald’s acceptance of the payment. The court also upheld the denial of Berwald’s motion for a new trial, finding no newly discovered evidence that would likely produce a different result and no prejudicial juror misconduct. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Berwald V. Stan's, Inc." on Justia Law