Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Trademark
US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie’s Coffee LLC
US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) operates a bed and breakfast at the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River, Massachusetts, offering ghost tours and related activities. Ghost Adventures holds federal trademarks for the name "Lizzie Borden" and a hatchet logo. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) opened a coffee shop next to the Lizzie Borden House, using the Lizzie Borden story in its marketing, including a hatchet logo and references to being "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World." Some visitors mistakenly believed the two businesses were affiliated.Ghost Adventures sued Miss Lizzie's in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for trademark infringement and unfair competition, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Miss Lizzie's from using the "Lizzie Borden" name and hatchet logo. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that Ghost Adventures failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court determined that the key element in any infringement action is the likelihood of confusion, which Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate. The court found that Miss Lizzie's hatchet logo and use of the name "Lizzie" were not similar enough to Ghost Adventures' trademarks to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos were dissimilar and that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie" was to the historical figure, not the trademark. The court also found that any consumer confusion was due to the proximity of the businesses and their common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story, not the similarity of their marks. The court concluded that Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC" on Justia Law
Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd.
Ayla, a San Francisco-based brand, is the registered owner of trademarks for use of the “AYLA” word mark in connection with on-site beauty services, online retail beauty products, cosmetics services, and cosmetics. Alya Skin, an Australian company, sells and ships skincare products worldwide. Ayla sued in the Northern District of California, asserting trademark infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125(a).Alya Skin asserted that it has no retail stores, offices, officers, directors, employees, bank accounts, or real property in the U.S., does not sell products in U.S. retail stores, solicit business from Americans, nor direct advertising toward California; less than 10% of its sales have been to the U.S. and less than 2% of its sales have been to California. Alya Skin uses an Idaho company to fulfill shipments outside of Australia and New Zealand. Alya Skin filed a U.S. trademark registration application in 2018, and represented to potential customers that its products are FDA-approved; it ships from, and allows returns to, Idaho Alya Skin’s website listed U.S. dollars as the default currency and advertises four-day delivery to the U.S.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) comports with due process. Alya Skin had minimum contacts with the U.S., and subjecting it to an action in that forum would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The company purposefully directed its activities toward the U.S. The Lanham Act and unfair competition claims arose out of or resulted from Alya Skin’s intentional forum-related activities. View "Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd." on Justia Law
The Ohio State University v. Redbubble, Inc.
Redbubble operates a global online marketplace. Around 600,000 independent artists, not employed by Redbubble, upload images onto Redbubble’s interface. Consumers scroll through those images and order customized items. Once a consumer places an order, Redbubble notifies the artist and arranges the manufacturing and shipping of the product with independent third parties. Redbubble never takes title to any product shown on its website and does not design, manufacture, or handle these products. The shipped packages bear Redbubble's logo. Redbubble handles customer service, including returns. Redbubble markets goods listed on its website as Redbubble products; for instance, it provides instructions on how to care for “Redbubble garments.” Customers often receive goods from Redbubble’s marketplace in Redbubble packaging.Some of Redbubble’s artists uploaded trademark-infringing images that appeared on Redbubble’s website; consumers paid Redbubble to receive products bearing images trademarked by OSU. Redbubble’s user agreement states that trademark holders, and not Redbubble, bear the burden of monitoring and redressing trademark violations. Redbubble did not remove the offending products from its website. OSU sued, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, and Ohio’s right-of-publicity law. The district court granted Redbubble summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Redbubble’s marketplace involves creating Redbubble products and garments that would not have existed but for Redbubble’s enterprise. The district court erred by entering summary judgment under an overly narrow reading of the Lanham Act. View "The Ohio State University v. Redbubble, Inc." on Justia Law
Hyson USA Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd.
Hyson USA and Hyson 2U are food distributors. Hyson USA is wholly owned by its president, Tansky, and has operated since 2006. Kaminskas was one of its managers. In 2012, Hyson USA encountered serious financial difficulty, culminating in the loss of its liability insurance, forcing the company to suspend operations. Months later, Kaminskas established Hyson 2U. Hyson USA transferred its branded inventory and equipment to the new company. Hyson 2U leased the warehouse from which Hyson USA had operated. Tansky then switched roles with Kaminskas and went to work at the new company. Hyson 2U operated in the same manner and in the same markets as Hyson USA. In 2014, Tansky was fired. He and Hyson USA, again operational, sued Hyson 2U and Kaminskas alleging trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The judge dismissed the trademark claims, citing acquiescence, and relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that acquiescence is a fact-intensive equitable defense that is rarely capable of resolution on a motion to dismiss. View "Hyson USA Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd." on Justia Law
Sorensen v. WD-40 Co.
Sorensen is the CEO of Inhibitor Technology, which produces rust-inhibiting products containing volatile corrosion inhibitor (VCI), branded with the federally registered trademark THE INHIBITOR. That word mark is owned by Sorensen; he also claims common law trademark rights in a design mark associated with his products, an orange-and-black crosshair. The WD-40 Company, maker of the spray lubricant, introduced the new WD-40 Specialist product line. Sorensen claimed that the branding for those products infringed upon his marks. WD-40 Specialist Long-Term Corrosion Inhibitor, which contains VCI and has a purpose similar to that of Sorensen’s products, contains on its packaging both the word “inhibitor” and an orange crosshair. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that WD-40’s use of the word “inhibitor” was a non-trademark descriptive fair use of the word. As to the crosshair mark, the court found that Sorensen had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to a likelihood of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The most important factors: similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evidence of actual confusion, weigh in favor of WD-40. No consumer would think that the marks are similar. The court noted the” clear weakness of Sorensen’s marks,” which appear inconsistently on his products. View "Sorensen v. WD-40 Co." on Justia Law
Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc.
Plaintiff is the marketer, distributor, and seller of 5-hour ENERGY (FHE), an “energy shot,” which is an energy drink sold and consumed in small portions. Plaintiff began selling FHE in 2004. FHE was not the first energy shot on the market, but was the first to achieve widespread success and was unique in being marketed FHE to adults as a replacement for an afternoon cup of coffee or a caffeinated soda. Plaintiff submitted “5-hour ENERGY” for trademark registration with the Patent and Trademark Office, which rejected the application in January 2005, deeming the mark too descriptive to be eligible for protection. Plaintiff placed FHE on the Supplemental Register in September 2005 and secured a trademark for “5-hour ENERGY” in August 2011. Plaintiff also protected its mark and market position through litigation. Defendants have marketed dietary supplements since the mid-1990s. In 2008, defendants began to market and sell “6 Hour Energy Shot,” in a bottle resembling the FHE bottle. In a suit under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, the district court found infringement of plaintiff’s trademark and trade dress, then entered an order of contempt after the defendants violated a permanent injunction entered. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc." on Justia Law
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc.
Cubatabaco, a Cuban entity, and General, a Delaware company, manufacture and distribute cigars using the COHIBA mark. General owns trademark registrations issued in 1981 and 1995. Cubatabaco owns the mark in Cuba and uses it worldwide. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), prohibit Cubatabaco from selling cigars in the U.S.; 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) prohibits “transfer of property rights . . . to a Cuban entity,” but a general or specific license allows Cuban entities to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licenses are available for transactions “related to the registration and renewal” of U.S. trademark. Specific licenses issue from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Cubatabaco used a general license to attempt to register the COHIBA mark in 1997, relying on 15 U.S.C. 1126(e), which allows reliance on a foreign registration if the applicant has a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Cubatabaco also sought to cancel General’s registrations, which the PTO cited as a basis for likelihood of confusion. Cubatabaco obtained a special license to sue General. The district court held that General had abandoned its registration by non-use and enjoined General’s use of the COHIBA mark, finding that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership under the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that injunctive relief would involve a prohibited transfer under CACR because Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of the mark and later affirmed denial of General’s motion concerning cancellation of its registrations. The Board then dismissed Cubatabaco’s petition, stating that it need not address preclusion because Cubatabaco lacked standing. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Cubatabaco has a statutory cause of action to petition to cancel the registrations and that issue and claim preclusion do not bar that petition View "Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.
Levi Strauss has stitched the back pocket of its jeans with the “Arcuate” design since 1873 and holds multiple trademarks on the design. In 2005, Abercrombie sought to register a “mirror image stitching design” for use on clothing, stating no limitations on the goods’ nature, type, channels of trade, or class of purchasers. Levi Strauss initiated an opposition to the parent application (concerning jackets and seeking Principal Registration). Levi Strauss petitioned to cancel Supplemental Registration of the child application covering other clothing. Abercrombie began selling “Ruehl jeans” with the design. Levi Strauss sued. The PTO stayed proceedings. Abercrombie claimed that its products were sold in different channels, at different prices. A jury found no infringement; the court rejected a claim of dilution by blurring. Levi Strauss did not appeal concerning infringement. The Ninth Circuit remanded, holding that dilution by blurring does not require identity or near identity of marks. Meanwhile, Abercrombie shut down the Ruehl brand, but sought to register its mirror-image design on “clothing, namely bottoms,” disclosing use of the design on denim shorts sold as “Gilley Hicks,” at different prices, and through different channels. Levi Strauss sought to amend to include the Gilley Hicks products. The district court declined and dismissed the dilution claim. The PTO opposition and cancellation proceedings were dismissed on the ground of issue preclusion. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the registrations at issue in the PTO cover a broader range of uses than were the subject of the litigation. View "Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co." on Justia Law
Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
Kraft sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store for trademark infringement, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale of food products to grocery stores under the name Cracker Barrel, which is a registered trademark of Kraft. Kraft has been selling cheese in grocery stores under that name for more than 50 years. Kraft did not challenge CBOCS’s right to sell the products under the name Cracker Barrel in CBOCS’s restaurants, in its “country stores” that adjoin the restaurants, or by mail order or online. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the similarity of the logos, the products, and of the channels of distribution. View "Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.
Nike alleged that Already’s athletic shoes violated Nike’s Air Force 1 trademark; Already challenged the trademark. While the suit was pending, Nike agreed not to raise any trademark or unfair competition claims against Already or any affiliated entity based on Already’s existing footwear designs, or any future designs that constituted a “colorable imitation” of Already’s current products. Nike moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and to dismiss Already’s counterclaim without prejudice. Already opposed dismissal of its counterclaim, indicating that Already planned to introduce new versions of its lines, that potential investors would not consider investing until Nike’s trademark was invalidated, and that Nike had intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the case moot. The breadth of the covenant suffices to meet the burden imposed by the “voluntary cessation doctrine.” The covenant is unconditional and irrevocable. Already did not establish that it engages in or has concrete plans to engage in activities that would arguably infringe Nike’s trademark yet not be covered by the covenant. The fact that some individuals may base decisions on hypothetical speculation does not give rise to the sort of injury necessary to establish standing. The Court rejected the “sweeping argument” that, as one of Nike’s competitors, Already inherently has standing because no covenant can eradicate the effects of a registered but invalid trademark. View "Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law