Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

In this consolidated appeal, three sets of landowners asserted claims against Arrington for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment relating to Arrington's failure to pay cash bonuses under oil and gas leases. The district court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the breach of contract claims and thereafter dismissed the landowners' other claims with prejudice on the landowners' motions. The court rejected the landowners' assertion that the lease agreements could be construed without considering the language of the bank drafts; the drafts' no-liability clause did not prevent enforcement of the lease agreements; Arrington entered into a binding contract with each respective landowner despite the drafts' no-liability clause; the lease approval language of the drafts was satisfied by Arrington's acceptance of the lease agreements in exchange for the signed bank drafts and as such, did not bar enforcement of the contracts; Arrington's admitted renunciation of the lease agreement for reasons unrelated to title precluded its defense to the enforceability of its contracts; Arrington's admission that it decided to dishonor all lease agreements in Phillips County for unrelated business reasons entitled the landowners to summary judgment; there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arrington disapproved of the landowner's titles in good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims. View "Smith, et al. v. David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Foster, Jr., et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Hall, et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants signed a note secured by a deed of trust on their home. Respondents, Regional Trustee Services Corporation (RTSC) and One West Bank, were the trustee and beneficiary of the deed of trust. After Appellants stopped making payments, RTSC initiated judicial foreclosure. Appellants elected mediation under the foreclosure mediation program (FMP), which provides proof of compliance with the state's law requiring mediation upon homeowner request before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale can proceed on an owner-occupied residence. When RTSC failed to attend the mediation, the district court declared RTSC in bad faith and directed that RTSC be denied the FMP certificate needed to conduct a valid foreclosure sale. RTSC later reinitiated nonjudicial foreclosure. Appellants sought to enjoin Respondents from pursuing foreclosure, arguing that the order denying the FMP certificate permanently prevented foreclosure. The district court denied Appellants' request and directed the parties to return to FMP mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a lender who has been denied an FMP certificate for failing to mediate in good faith can reinitiate foreclosure by means of a new notice of default and election to sell and rescission of the original, thereby restarting the FMP process. View "Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Anna Miller executed a promissory note to a finance company and conveyed by way of a mortgage her interest in real property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Defendant's mortgage was thereafter assigned to Plaintiff, RMS Residential Properties (RMS), which became the holder of the note prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant contended that RMS lacked standing to commence the foreclosure action because there was no statutory authority that conferred standing on a mere holder of a note to foreclose a mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-17 raises a rebuttable presumption that a holder of a note is the owner of the debt, the statute may confer standing to foreclose a mortgage on a holder of a note. View "RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against Nicolle Bradbury for residential property she owed in Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest. During a deposition, a GMAC employee testified that he did not read the affidavits he signed or execute the affidavits before a notary. Fannie Mae subsequently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the deposition, which the district court denied. The district court ultimately dismissed without prejudice the complaint after finding Fannie Mae submitted a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. As sanctions, the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attorney fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of the affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to find GMAC in contempt even though the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee; and (2) failing to award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order. View "Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued in state court challenging the validity of both the foreclosure of his home by Chase and the redemption of his home by a junior lienholder, National. The district court subsequently granted Chase's and National's respective motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that Minnesota law required Chase to hold both the mortgage and the promissory note at the time of the foreclosure, and genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Chase held the note. Plaintiff also contended that National's redemption was invalid because the foreclosure itself was invalid. The court held that Chase was the party entitled to commence a foreclosure by advertisement under Minnesota law, even if the promissory note had been transferred to someone else. Assuming arguendo Minnesota law required Chase to possess the note, the district court correctly granted Chase's motion for summary judgment in any event because plaintiff did not raise any genuine issues of material fact showing Chase was not the holder of the note at the time of the foreclosure. The court declined to address plaintiff's argument regarding redemption because plaintiff never challenged it in the district court. View "Stein v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer. View "Vasquez v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant bank sued Appellees, a corporation and its members, after loans granted to Appellees went into default and Appellees transferred certain property into a trust. After a jury rendered its verdicts, the circuit court (1) granted foreclosure against the property securing the debts, (2) dismissed Appellant's claim to avoid the transfer of one of the properties in the trust and ruled that the deed of another property in the trust was void, and (3) denied Appellant's various post-trial motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in submitting Appellant's foreclosure and fraudulent-transfer claims to the jury because they were equitable in nature; and (2) the circuit court properly granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on Appellee's abuse-of-process claim. Remanded. View "Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. River Crossing Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiffs, residents of Puerto Rico, contracted with defendants, Florida corporations, to purchase condominiums to be built in Florida, and submitted earnest money. Because of the financial crisis, the units were not completed and defendant terminated the agreements. Plaintiffs sued for return of the earnest money. The district court dismissed, finding the defendants did not have minimum contacts with Puerto Rico necessary to establish jurisdiction. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that there certain contacts that could establish jurisdiction that were not adequately addressed at trial.View "Carreras v. PMG Collins LLC" on Justia Law

After Dorothy Leighton failed to pay taxes on her property and the Town of Blue Hill recorded a tax collector's lien certificate on the property, the Town filed a complaint against Leighton for forcible entry and detainer (FED), seeking possession of the property and costs. The district court entered judgment in Leighton's favor. The superior court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Town. On appeal, Leighton contended that the Town was required, as a matter of law, to prove that it held current title to the property in the FED action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town produced evidence that it held title superior to Leighton by virtue of the statutorily-foreclosed tax lien mortgage on the property, the Town presented sufficient evidence that it was entitled to possession of the property. View "Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton" on Justia Law

Petitioner William Daane defaulted on a loan secured by a mortgage on his residence. CR Title Services, the trustee of the deed of trust, filed a notice of default to initiate the foreclosure process. Daane opted to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (Program). The district court later found that CitiMortgage, the beneficiary of the deed of trust, had participated in the mediation in bad faith. After the foreclosure process was reinitiated, Daane again elected for mediation in the Program. Daane subsequently brought a petition for a writ of prohibition, seeking to preclude the Program from proceeding with further mediations or issuing a letter of certification. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that a writ of prohibition was unwarranted to preclude the Program from conducting further proceedings with respect to Daane's residence because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.