Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co." on Justia Law

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded.View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.View "Redco Constr. v. Profile Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Appellant Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates (CTSA) appealed an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment against CTSA and finding that CTSA's lien was second in priority to Appellee Metropolitan National Bank's lien on certain property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that there was not a final order in this case nor was there an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification. The Court concluded (1) it was impossible for the Court to determine if all claims and parties pertaining to the complaint had been settled; (2) the record contained no final disposition as to Metropolitan's claims against two individual defendants; and (3) The status of CTSA's breach-of-contract claims against individual defendants and its monetary-judgment claim against another party was unclear. View "Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving a residential sale. In the advertisement for the sale, the trustees included an additional condition not found in the mortgage documents or authorized by the Maryland Rules that any successful purchaser at the sale would be required to pay the legal fees of attorneys who would be utilized to review the documents on behalf of the trustees by which they would hold settlement and ultimately convey title. The circuit court and court of special appeals ratified the sale. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that in the absence of specific authority in the contract of indebtedness or contained in statute or court rule, it is an impermissible abuse of discretion for trustees or the lenders who 'bid in' properties to include the demand for additional legal fees for the benefit of the trustees in the advertisement of sale or in any other way that is in contrary to the duty of trustees to maximize the proceeds of the sales and, moreover, is not in conformance with state or local rules and is against public policy.View "Maddox v. Cohn" on Justia Law

After an auction sale was ratified, Respondent David Simard defaulted on his contract to purchase the real property in question. Simard admitted liability for the risk and expense of the initial resale, but when the purchaser at the resale defaulted as well, Simard balked at paying the expense and loss incurred at a second resale. Applying Md. R. Civ. P. 14-305(g), the circuit court held that Simard was liable for the risk and expense of both resales. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Rule 14-305(g) required that a defaulting purchaser be responsible for only one resale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent special circumstances, a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale of property is liable, under Rule 14-305(g), for only the one resale resulting from his or her default.View "Burson v. Simard" on Justia Law

The Faigins owned a lot in the Diamante subdivision. Diamante asserted a lien on the Faigins' lot for failure to pay monthly membership dues and thereafter filed a complaint in foreclosure on the lot. The Faigins filed a motion for class certification so that they could be sued as representative parties on behalf of all lot owners in the Diamante subdivisions. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the circuit court abused its discretion by basing part of its decision on the question of commonality upon the ability of the proposed class to withstand a Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, (2) the element of commonality was lacking in this case where there were only seven lot owners who were in foreclosure and the Faigins' defenses to the complaint were not common to the overwhelming majority of the proposed class, and (3) because Ark. R. Civ. P. 23 requires that all elements be present before class certification is appropriate, and at least one element was lacking here, class certification was appropriately denied.View "Faigin v. Diamante LLC" on Justia Law