Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant CTE Tech Corp. is a Taiwanese corporation that manufactures battery chargers. Defendant Invacare Corporation is an Ohio corporation that manufactures motorized wheelchairs. CTE agreed to supply Invacare with battery chargers built to Invacare's specifications, which Invacare then sold with its motorized wheelchairs in Oregon and the rest of the United States. Plaintiffs brought this action against CTE after their mother died in a fire allegedly caused by a defect in CTE's battery charger. CTE moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against it on the ground that Oregon lacks personal jurisdiction over it. CTE reasoned that due process would permit an Oregon court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it only if CTE had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business here. In CTE's view, the fact that it sold its battery chargers to Invacare in Ohio, which sold them together with its wheelchairs in Oregon, was not sufficient to meet that standard. The trial court denied CTE's motion, and the Supreme Court denied CTE's petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its ruling. CTE then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. After the Court issued its decision in "J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro," (131 S Ct 2780 (2011)), the Court granted CTE's petition for certiorari, vacated our order, and remanded the case to the Oregon Court for further consideration. On remand, the Oregon Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus to the trial court directing it to vacate its order denying CTE's motion to dismiss or show cause for not doing so. The trial court declined to vacate its order, and the parties briefed the question whether, in light of Nicastro, Oregon courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over CTE. Upon review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that they may and accordingly dismissed the alternative writ.View "Willemsen v. Invacare Corporation" on Justia Law

Dentist purchased dental practice management software from Company to aid his patient data requirement. The contract between Dentist and Company limited Dentist's remedies for damages in tort caused by defects in the Company's software. Although Company warned Dentist to back up his patient data, Dentist's patient data was lost when installing the software. Dentist sued Company under several theories, and the district court granted Company's motion for summary judgment. Dentist appealed only the order granting summary judgment on his tort claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the limitation of liabilities clause in the contract was enforceable, as provisions in software contracts allocating the risk of such a loss to the consumer are enforceable.View "Blaisdell v. Dentrix Cental Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

This case presented a battle between banks over the proceeds of the sale of cattle by a financially strapped borrower who had financial dealings with both banks. When Security Savings Bank (Security) obtained the proceeds of the sale, Peoples Trust and Savings Bank (Peoples) claimed a security interest in the proceeds and sued for conversion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples. After Security appealed, Peoples commenced garnishment proceedings against Security to enforce its judgment, and Security paid the underlying judgment. The court of appeals then determined that Security had waived its right to appeal and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant faced with post-judgment garnishment does not waive a pending appeal by paying the judgment in order to avoid further enforcement proceedings; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Peoples had a security interest in the proceeds superior to Security's interest and that Peoples did not waive its superior position through its course of conduct.View "Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v. Sec. Savings Bank" on Justia Law

Salem Logistics entered into a loan agreement with Ark Royal Capital that required Salem to instruct its customers to send payments directly to an account maintained by Ark at Wachovia Bank. Salem subsequently agreed to provide freight bill auditing services to Variety Wholesalers. Salem requested that Variety send the amounts on the master invoices directly to the Wachovia account but did not inform Variety that the account was actually controlled by Ark. Variety later terminated its contract with Salem and filed suit for recovery of money it had forwarded to Salem that had not been paid to carriers. When Variety discovered the Wachovia account actually belonged to Ark, Variety added Ark as a defendant. The trial court entered summary judgment for Variety on its claim of conversion against Ark and for Ark on Variety's claim of constructive trust and ordered Ark to pay Variety $888,000. The court of appeals reversed and entered summary judgment for Ark on both issues. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on both issues, holding (1) summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved; and (2) accordingly, the trial court also erred in its award of damages to Variety.View "Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant Chip Dave purchased a car on eBay. Before he took possession of the vehicle, the seller sold it to another buyer, Appellee Bill Valdez. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee citing a number of causes of action, including replevin. Following Appellee's failure to respond to Appellant's second amended complaint, a default judgment was entered and Appellant was granted a writ of replevin ordering Appellee to relinquish possession of the vehicle. Appellant then appealed the district court's denial of an award of attorney fees, arguing that the American rule, requiring each party to pay his or her own attorney fees, was inapplicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory exception to the American rule applies only where the legislature has made it explicit that attorney fees will be allowed; and (2) in this case, no exception to the American rule applied. View "Dave v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Minority shareholders (Plaintiffs) brought this action against minority shareholders (Defendants), individually and as officers or directors of Multi-Community Cooperative Dairy (MCC Dairy). Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged six causes of action, including oppression and/or unfairly prejudicial conduct toward minority shareholders, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and restraint of trade or commerce. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint. The court also granted Defendants' motion for sanctions on the ground that Plaintiffs and their counsel had abused the discovery process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court id not err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment, as there was no support that Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions against Plaintiffs for abuse of discovery in refusing to attend depositions scheduled by Defendants.View "Veblen Dist. v. Multi-Cmty. Coop. Dairy" on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations.View "Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Rudolph Slater was killed while operating a Yanmar tractor he purchased from Chris Elder Enterprises. The tractor had been manfactured by Yanmar Japan and later sold to Chris Elder Enterprises. Slater's wife, Wanda, filed a wrongful-death action against, among others, Yanmar Japan and Yanmar America, alleging claims for, inter alia, fraud, strict liability, breach of implied and express warranties, and negligence. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Wanda, awarding her damages in the amount of $2.5 million. The Yanmar defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Yanmar Japan, as there was no evidence to establish that Yanmar Japan had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction, and there was insufficient proof to show that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on the relationship between Yanmar Japan and its subsidiary, Yanmar America; and (2) the jury's finding that Yanmar America was negligent was not supported by substantial evidence, as Yanmar America owed no duty of care to Rudolph.View "Yanmar Co. Ltd. v. Slater" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Petitioner and conducted by two court-appointed trustees that were employed by a law firm (collectively, Respondents). Following the sale, Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty involving actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty involving constructive fraud by the trustees and alleging vicarious liability by the law firm. The trial judge granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents were entitled to qualified judicial immunity for their actions in connection with the sale. The court of special appeals (1) reversed with regard to Petitioner's allegations of actual fraud, and (2) affirmed with regard to the other causes of action on grounds of qualified judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Respondents were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the concept of qualified public official immunity was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.View "D'Aoust v. Diamond" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, David and Barbara Smith, asserted various claims arising out of the construction of their home against Defendants, Donald L. Mattia, Inc. (DLM), Donald Mattia, and Barbara Joseph (Barbara). The Chancery Court (1) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (ii) Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim; (2) denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation of Plaintiffs' backfill and money paid to DLM that was not applied to their project and (ii) Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to purchase excess lumber and misappropriated $8,836 in connection with the purchase of excess lumber; (2) granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as Defendants did not articulate a viable cause of action in their counterclaim; and (3) denied Barbara's motion for Chan. Ct. R. 11 sanctions where there was no evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney did not have a good faith belief in the legitimacy of the claims asserted against Barbara.View "Smith v. Donald L. Mattia, Inc." on Justia Law