Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Del Monte imports products consisting of tuna, with sauce, in a sealed microwaveable package. The tuna accounts for 80 percent of the total product weight; the sauce accounts for 20 percent. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified two of the three flavors under subheading 1604.14.10 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which covers tuna packed “in oil,” because their sauces include some oil. Customs appraised the goods based on the price that Del Monte paid its supplier of importation, without adjusting for $1.5 million that Del Monte later received from its supplier after negotiations over the accuracy of the amount originally paid. The Court of International Trade held that Del Monte’s goods were properly classified and valued. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Fish products in which the only oil is added as part of a liquid substance introduced at the time of packing are considered “in oil” even if the liquid does not consist entirely of oil; there is no minimum threshold for the amount of oil that must be present. Imported merchandise must be appraised, when possible, based on its “transaction value,” 19 U.S.C. 1401a(a)(1), “the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation,” regardless of subsequent rebates.View "Del Monte Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated the Fifth Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order covering TPBI’s polyethylene retail carrier bags imported from Thailand during the 2008–2009 review period, 19 U.S.C. 1673. Commerce calculated the normal value of TPBI’s merchandise based on a constructed value, having determined that the sales in the exporting country of the foreign like product had been made at prices below the cost of production. Commerce found that TPBI’s methodology did not reasonably reflect actual costs because it resulted in products with few or minor physical differences being assigned significantly different costs of manufacturing. Commerce disregarded the below-cost sales. The Court of International Trade affirmed. Finding Commerce’s determinations supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law, the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Thai Plastic Bags Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.” View "Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Tariff Act of 1930 permits the Department of Commerce to impose two types of duties on imports that injure domestic industries: antidumping duties on goods sold in the U.S. "at less than ... fair value,” 19 U.S.C. 1673 and countervailing duties on goods that receive “a countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government, 1671(a). Commerce has long collected both types of duties from market economy importers. In 2012, Congress enacted legislation that overruled the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision, GPXI, and permitted imposition of both antidumping and countervailing duties with respect to importers from non-market economy (NME) countries. Because this law is retroactive and does not require Commerce to adjust for any double counting that may result from the retroactive imposition of both countervailing and antidumping duties, Wireking, an importer affected by the change, claimed that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of International Trade upheld the new law. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wireking did not show that the absence of a retrospective double-counting provision negates the law’s predominantly remedial impact. The 2012 law is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Guangdong Wireking Housewares v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, pursuant to a petition by U.S. furniture manufacturers and labor unions, the Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping investigation of Chinese wooden bedroom furniture manufacturers. The International Trade Commission (ITC) investigated whether the domestic industry had been materially injured and distributed questionnaires to all known domestic wooden bedroom furniture producers. Producers are required by law to respond. One question asked, “Do you support or oppose the petition?” and gave the choices: “Support,” “Oppose,” or “Take no position.” Ashley answered “Oppose;” Ethan Allen answered “Take no position.” The ITC issued an antidumping duty order. Commerce directed U.S. Customs to collect duties on entries of Chinese wooden bedroom furniture. The ITC prepared a list of Affected Domestic Producers eligible to receive a share of the duties, 19 U.S.C. 1675c(a), (d)(1) (Byrd Amendment). The ITC did not include Ashley and Ethan Allen, who sued. The Byrd Amendment has been repealed;t they sought their share from prior years. The Court of International Trade dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that “this framework may create incentives for domestic producers to indicate support for a petition even when they may believe that an antidumping duty order is unwarranted, it is not our task to pass on Congress’s wisdom in enacting the Byrd Amendment.”View "Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Itochu asked the U.S. Department of Commerce to act under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b) to revoke part of an antidumping-duty order applicable to imported steel nails. Before Commerce issued its preliminary determination, Itochu submitted comments and provided legal authority to urge that the requested partial revocation take effect at an early specified date. Commerce rejected that position in its preliminary ruling and generally invited interested parties to comment. Itochu did not avail itself of that opportunity. In its final ruling, Commerce adopted the partial revocation, which the domestic industry did not oppose, but with the later effective date. When Itochu challenged the effective-date determination, the U.S.s Court of International Trade declined to address the merits, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2637(d), because Itochu had failed to resubmit, after the preliminary ruling, the comments it had submitted earlier. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that in these circumstances, requiring exhaustion served no discernible practical purpose and resulting delay would have risked harm to Itochu. View "Itochu Bldg. Prods. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on wooden bedroom furniture from China; importers who were not individually investigated are required to post a deposit at a country-wide rate of 216.01%. Marvin, a Chinese furniture producer and exporter, did not export subject merchandise during the investigation period. In 2011, Marvin requested new shipper review to obtain an individual rate and avoid the country-wide rate. Based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, Commerce determined that Marvin’s exports had entered the U.S. in 2010. Marvin explained that the entries contained only non-subject merchandise samples for a trade show with no offers for sale. Commerce accepted Marvin’s explanation and initiated new shipper review covering Marvin’s exports entered from January 1 through June 30, 2011. Marvin later submitted information that the 2010 entries included some subject merchandise, entered for consumption, contrary to its initial request. In 2012, Commerce preliminarily rescinded Marvin’s new shipper review. Marvin argued harmless and unintentional error that did not affect new shipper review eligibility. Commerce finalized the rescission, citing19 C.F.R. 351.214(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B). The Trade Court affirmed, holding that 19 U.S.C. 1677m, which allows a party to correct filings, was inapplicable because Marvin’s request for a new shipper review was not filed in “response to a request for information” under the statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Marvin Furniture Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of International Trade rejected the Department of Commerce’s interpretation of an antidumping order, imposed under 19 U.S.C. 1673a(b), on nails from the People’s Republic of China. The Trade Court held that nails included in certain household tool kits imported by Target were subject to the order. The Federal Circuit vacated, noting that whether a “mixed media” item (a tool kit) is subject to an antidumping order that covers included merchandise is not addressed in the regulations. Commerce has historically treated the answer as depending on whether the mixed media item is to be treated as a single, unitary item, or a mere aggregation of separate items. Remand is necessary for Commerce to revisit its mixed media determination in light of a statutory requirement that any implicit mixed media exception to the literal scope of the order be based on preexisting public sources. Problems presented by this case could be avoided if Commerce identified, in its antidumping orders or in prospective regulations, factors that it will consider in resolving mixed media and other cases.View "Mid Cont't Nail Corp v. United States" on Justia Law

LSI imported beef jerky products consisting of sliced, cooked, cured, and dried meat seasoned with salt and other spices and flavors from New Zealand and Brazil. The manufacturing process for the imported jerky involves curing the sliced boneless beef in a mixture of seasoning, sodium nitrate, and water for 24 to 48 hours, after which the meat is cooked and smoked for several hours. In airtight bags, the product has a shelf life of 18–20 months. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified the subject beef jerky under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (HTSUS) subheading 1602.50.09 as “cured” prepared or preserved beef and denied LSI’s protests to classify it under subheading 1602.50.2040 as “other” prepared or preserved beef. LSI filed suit in the Court of International Trade, which granted the government summary judgment. The court considered LSI’s arguments that beef jerky is defined more by its dehydrated properties than by the curing process, but found that subheading 1602.50.09 included all forms of the named article, even improved forms. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Link Snacks, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law