Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded a jury award of $260,464 after the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on its breach of contract and fraud claims against Defendant.In Stern Oil I, Defendant appealed a judgment awarding Plaintiff over eight years of lost profits in excess of $900,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, ruling that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its breach of contract claims against Defendant and by denying Defendant’s fraud claims against Plaintiff.On remand, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff on both claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred by (1) instructing the jury on consequential damages and the foreseeability of Plaintiff’s lost profits to Defendant at the time of contracting; and (2) excluding Plaintiff’s evidence on four damage scenarios. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants in this case brought by an independent contractor who sued for damages when he purchased a used tractor from a John Deere implement dealer that proved to be a “lemon.” The contractor brought suit against several parties, including the implement dealer. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the contractor’s express warranty claim against the implement dealer. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the disclaimers contained in the purchase agreement negated any express warranties allegedly made by the implement dealer. View "Cannon v. Bodensteiner Implement Co." on Justia Law

Lexington Insurance denied a claim by its insured, Double D Warehouse, for coverage of Double D’s liability to customers for contamination of warehoused products. One basis for denial was that Double D failed to document its warehousing transactions with warehouse receipts, storage agreements, or rate quotations, as required by the policies. PQ was a customer of Double D whose products were damaged while warehoused there. PQ settled its case against Double D by stepping into Double D’s shoes to try to collect on the policies. PQ argued that there were pragmatic reasons to excuse strict compliance with the policy’s terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lexington. PQ accurately claimed that the documentation Double D actually had (bills of lading and an online tracking system) should serve much the same purpose as the documentation required by the policies (especially warehouse receipts), but commercially sophisticated parties agreed to unambiguous terms and conditions of insurance. Courts hold them to those terms. To do otherwise would disrupt the risk allocations that are part and parcel of any contract, but particularly a commercial liability insurance contract. PQ offered no persuasive reason to depart from the plain language of the policies. View "PQ Corp. v. Lexington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dominion and Bransen entered into a contract wherein Bransen was paid $27 million for coal product which would satisfy rigid specifications and environmental regulations. When Bransen failed to deliver product meeting the requirements, Dominion filed suit in district court. Dominion was awarded partial summary judgment on claims related to Bransen's delivery of coke breeze, and the district court held in favor of Dominion after a bench trial on its claims related to the delivery of waste coal. The district court awarded Dominion $22 million in damages. The court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Dominion as to liability where Bransen was liable for delivery product that did not satisfy the contracts between the parties. The court rejected Bransen's argument that the district court awarded damages, including indirect damages, in violation of Section 8.8 of the parties' contract, and rejected Bransen's challenges to the calculation of the damages award. Because the court found no error, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Virginia Electric and Power v. Bransen Energy" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of contract for the shipment of used tires from Puerto Rico to Vietnam. Because it arrived late to Vietnam, the shipment accrued port storage charges, demurrage charges, and related administrative fees. The district court granted summary judgment to the carrier, Mediterranean Shipping Co., concluding that Best Tire Recycling, Inc. was the shipper, and therefore, pursuant to the bills of lading, was liable to Mediterranean for unpaid ocean freight charges, shipping container demurrage, port storage, and related administrative fees. Best Tire appealed, arguing that the parties’ course of conduct overcame the presumption that Best Tire, who was identified as “shipper” on all of the bills of lading, bore liability. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Best Tire was designated as the shipper on the bills of lading, there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Best Tire was the shipper. View "Mediterranean Shipping Co. v. Best Tire Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

Dana had a dealer agreement in Texas with AISCO. Unbeknownst to Dana, AISCO sold off most of its assets to newly-formed DanMar, which transferred the assets to UJoints. The name “UJoints” had been a trade name used by AISCO. Under Texas Business and Commerce Coe 57.154(a)(4), “a supplier may not terminate a dealer agreement without good cause.” Good cause exists “if there has been a sale or other closeout of a substantial part of the dealer’s assets related to the business.” Dana terminated the agreement, preventing UJoints from claiming to have been authorized to step into AISCO’s shoes and become a Dana dealer in Texas. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Dana, finding that the transfers gave Dana good cause to terminate its dealer agreement with AISCO. The court rejected an argument that Dana entered into a “dealer agreement,” with the “new, unknown entity the identity of which the owners had concealed from Dana for a significant time.” It was natural for Dana to continue selling, for a time, to its dealer’s, AISCO’s, successor—UJoints. Those sales did not make UJoints a party to a dealer agreement. View "Texas Ujoints LLC v. Dana Holding Corp." on Justia Law

Arundel Valley, LLC, the developer of a facility for a butter manufacturer, filed a complaint against Branch River Plastics, Inc., a manufacturer and distributor of insulated roofing panels, alleging, inter alia, defects in roofing panels that Branch River had manufactured and supplied to Arundel Valley for a construction project. A jury found in Arundel Valley’s favor on its claims that Branch River breached implied warranties by supplying defective roofing panels. Branch River filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to adjudicate whether Branch River had disclaimed implied warranties. Remanded. View "Arundel Valley, LLC v. Branch River Plastics, Inc." on Justia Law

This lawsuit involved a loan agreement between Lender and Borrowers. The agreement gave Lender an option to purchase the collateral for the loan - the famous ex-Presidential Yacht Sequoia. A valuation of the Sequoia for purposes of securing the loan was established via fraud on the part of Borrowers. The claims and counterclaims arising out of the loan agreement were eventually resolved by a settlement entered as a court order. The only issue remaining for the Court of Chancery was to oversee the computation of the amount due Borrowers from Lender should Lender elect to acquire the Sequoia. Lender agreed to a minimum option price of zero dollars. The Court of Chancery found the option price to be zero dollars. View "The Sequoia Presidential Yacht Group LLC v. FE Partners LLC" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jazz Photo Corp., one of several commercial entities (collectively referred to as the Jazz Entities), entered into a factoring agreement with Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. Jazz Photo sold Rosenthal its accounts receivable in return for cash. Five years later, Vanessa Benun, the daughter of Jack Benun, a principal of the Jazz Entities, guaranteed Jazz Photo's obligations under that agreement. At that time, Benun also executed a mortgage on real property she owned in Monmouth County as security for her personal guaranty. In March 2005, another of the Jazz Entities, Ribi Tech Products, LLC entered into a factoring agreement with Rosenthal. Benun personally guaranteed Ribi Tech's obligations to Rosenthal. In March 2007, Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, L.L.P. (Riker), a law firm providing legal services to Jack Benun and the Jazz Entities, obtained a third mortgage from Benun on the same real property. This mortgage was executed in favor of Riker to secure Jack Benun's personal debt under a letter agreement. When Benun executed the mortgage, Jack Benun owed Riker $1,679,701.33 in unpaid legal fees, and the letter agreement reflected his obligations to Riker and Riker's promise to provide continuing legal representation. Riker's mortgage was recorded on April 13, 2007. Rosenthal received actual notice of the Riker mortgage in August 2007. Despite notice of the Riker mortgage, Rosenthal continued to make advances to the Jazz Entities that totaled millions of dollars. In September 2009, Jazz Products filed for bankruptcy. The Jazz Entities defaulted on their obligations to Rosenthal, owing Rosenthal close to $4 million. Benun, in turn, defaulted on her personal guaranty to secure the debt. After Riker recorded its mortgage on the Monmouth County property, it continued to perform legal services for Jack Benun, and his unpaid legal fees ballooned to over $3 million. Jack Benun, and the Jazz Entities defaulted on their obligation to Riker and Benun defaulted on her guaranty. Rosenthal filed a foreclosure complaint against Benun, her husband, and Riker. Benun and her husband did not respond, and Rosenthal requested that a default judgment be entered against them. Riker answered, disputing the priority of Rosenthal's mortgages. Later, both Rosenthal and Riker filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the priority of their respective mortgages. The trial court granted Rosenthal's motion, determining that the dragnet clauses in the Rosenthal mortgages were fully enforceable. With regard to priority, the trial court held that Riker's argument that its mortgage displaced the two Rosenthal mortgages was legally flawed because the firm accepted a mortgage on the property with knowledge of two prior mortgages, each securing an obligation of up to $1 million, and with knowledge of the anti-subordination clauses. The court concluded that there was no convincing justification for rewarding Riker a superior priority. Riker appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division, finding that Rosenthal had advance notice of the law firm's intervening lien but nonetheless proceeded to make optional advances to the commercial entities. "Having done so, its mortgages securing those optional future advances were subordinated to the law firm's intervening lien." View "Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun" on Justia Law

Between 2002-2006, Lucht purchased treated lumber for a deck on his vacation home in the Virgin Islands. The lumber allegedly decayed prematurely and he began replacing boards in 2010; he claims he did not discover the severity of the problem until the fall of 2011. Lucht sued the retailer, wholesaler, and treatment company of the lumber in February 2013, alleging a Uniform Commercial Code contract claim; a common law contract claim; a breach of warranty claim; a negligence claim; a strict liability claim; and a deceptive trade practices claim under the Virgin Islands Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court rejected the claims as time-barred. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the “‘gist of the action doctrine,” which bars plaintiffs from bringing a tort claim that merely replicates a claim for breach of an underlying contract. View "MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp" on Justia Law