Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Arrow Financial Services filed a complaint against Sarah Guiliani alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Arrow then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to establish that Arrow owned a credit card account registered to Guiliani and that Guiliani owed an unpaid balance of $5044 on the account. In support of its motion, Arrow asserted in an affidavit that it was the assignee of Guiliani's credit card account with Washington Mutural. The district court granted Arrow's motion and awarded Arrow $3493, plus interest and court costs. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of Arrow because disputes remained as to material facts regarding the balance due on the account and its assignment to Arrow. View "Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC v. Guiliani" on Justia Law

JLB Corporation, a mortgage brokering service, entered into an agreement with Bonnie Hargis to refinance her home. JLB then prepared Hargis's loan application and other financial disclosure documents. JLB alleged it played no role in drawing the note or deed of trust, which were prepared by third parties, and it did not charge for their preparation. Hargis, however, filed a three-count petition against JLB, alleging, inter alia, that JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of JLB on all counts. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment to JLB as to the first two counts relating to the unauthorized practice of law where the record showed that JLB assisted Hargis only in preparing financial documents and did not show that JLB procured or assisted in the drawing of Hargis' note, deed of trust, or other legal documents; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment to JLB on the third count alleging unjust enrichment, as JLB's summary judgment motion failed to negate any element of Hargis' unjust enrichment claim. Remanded. View "Hargis v. JLB Corp." on Justia Law

Liberty Group (Liberty) retained Reliable Copy Service (Reliable) to provide services in connection with litigation. Later, Reliable filed a complaint in a Pennsylvania court of common pleas in an effort to collect on the sums owed. The Pennsylvania court subsequently entered a default judgment against Liberty. Following the end of the litigation in the Pennsylvania court, a Maine superior court entered a judgment in favor of Reliable and issued a writ of execution at Reliable's request. Liberty filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the Pennsylvania default judgment was not enforceable in Maine because the Pennsylvania default judgment was void. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Pennsylvania judgment suffered from no jurisdiction defect or due process impediment that would render it void pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); and (2) Liberty's procedural due process rights were not violated when Reliable requested and received from the Pennsylvania court an increased damages award. View "Reliable Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty" on Justia Law

Defendants Sedo, Inc. ad its founder, president and sole shareholder Goran Lucic, appealed a district court ruling that held both the company and Mr. Lucic liable to Plaitiff Holloway Automotive Group d/b/a Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester for breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's enforcement of a liquidated damages provision in the parties' contract, but concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to "pierce the corporate veil." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's award against Lucic as well as the award of attorney's fees. View "Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic" on Justia Law

The president of a company signed a commercial credit application, which contained language immediately above the signature line stating that the individual signing the contract personally guaranteed amounts owed to the vendor. The company defaulted on the balance of the account, and the vendor filed suit against both the company and the president. The trial court granted summary judgment to the vendor, holding that the president had signed the contract both personally and in a representative capacity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the president had signed the contract only in a representative capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the application contained clear and unambiguous language sufficient to bind the president as an individual guarantor of the contract. View "84 Lumber Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are producers of coal bed methane gas; defendant is large coal-mining company. Gas extraction firms need access to coal from which to extract gas and coal companies need to have gas removed from their mines before mining. To form an alliance for that purpose, plaintiff began by acquiring options to buy coal-mining rights; it planned to sell the options in exchange for the right to extract gas from its partner's coal. The parties signed memorandum of understanding, which stated that it did not constitute a binding agreement, and, later, a non-binding letter of intent. Plaintiff began transferring coal rights to defendant as contemplated by the letter of intent, but defendant delayed reciprocating. Ultimately defendant announced that it was terminating the letter of intent. The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant on a fraud claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that "when a document says it isn't a contract, it isn't a contract" and that plaintiff did not establish promissory fraud or justifiable reliance.View "BPI Energy Holdings, Inc. v. IEC (Montgomery), LLC" on Justia Law

Gene Shields, an agent for State Farm Insurance Companies, opened an account with Bankcorp Bank. The owner of the account was State Farm. Shields's office manager subsequently diverted funds that were due to be deposited into the account, and Shields allegedly suffered at least $77,925 in losses as a result of over 100 overdrafts on the account. Shields sued Bancorp Bank for negligence in failing to notify him of overdrafts. Bancorp moved to compel arbitration based on the account's arbitration clause. The circuit court denied the motion to compel, and Bancorp appealed. At issue on appeal was whether the parties' 2005 agreement to modify the contract entered into by the parties in 1982 controlled when Shields signed the agreement but State Farm was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 2005 agreement, which contained the arbitration provision, was not binding because the agreement was entered into in contravention of the rights of the account owner, State Farm. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Shields" on Justia Law

The manufacturer notified franchise dealers that it was discontinuing the Sterling (a subsidiary of Daimler) line of trucks. The letter offered dealers the opportunity to continue as a service dealership under a new agreement. Plaintiff, a dealer, was warned that, following the termination of the existing agreement, if it did not sign the general release and agree to terminate its Sterling franchise, Daimler Trucks would not renew its Detroit Diesel Direct Dealer Agreement. Daimler later terminated that agreement, which plaintiff alleges prevented it from obtaining parts at wholesale and performing warranty work on Detroit Diesel engines. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 and claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The circuit court dismissed all but two counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear several counts under the Act, because those counts should have been brought before the Motor Vehicle Review Board. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp." on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank, the holder of a note and mortgage on the Pelletiers' home, filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Pelletiers. The Pelletiers filed a motion to dismiss and asserted affirmative defenses through which they sought rescission as a remedy. The district court entered summary judgment for the Pelletiers, ruling that, because the bank offered no evidence to oppose the facts offered by the Pelletiers in support of rescission, and because the evidence offered by the Pelletiers established that they had timely notified the bank of their rescission right, they were entitled to judgment on their demand for rescission as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded for further proceedings to determine how the rescission should be effectuated. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Pelletier" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiffs, residents of Puerto Rico, contracted with defendants, Florida corporations, to purchase condominiums to be built in Florida, and submitted earnest money. Because of the financial crisis, the units were not completed and defendant terminated the agreements. Plaintiffs sued for return of the earnest money. The district court dismissed, finding the defendants did not have minimum contacts with Puerto Rico necessary to establish jurisdiction. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that there certain contacts that could establish jurisdiction that were not adequately addressed at trial.View "Carreras v. PMG Collins LLC" on Justia Law