Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
Tampa Investment Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc.; Legacy Communities Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc.
BB&T brought suit against Borrowers and Guarantors for more than $19 million then due under certain promissory notes at issue. The promissory notes were executed as a result of BB&T's issuance of 16 loans for residential housing development. In Case No. S1161728, appellants argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that no valid foreclosure sale occurred, erroneously relied on its determination that BB&T did not satisfy the Statue of Frauds. The court held that there were no valid foreclosure sales to prevent BB&T from suing on the notes in the absence of confirmation under OCGA 44-14-161, regardless of whether there was a valid executory sales contract which satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In Case No. S11G1729, the court held that, although the Court of Appeals correctly held that none of BB&T's claims was barred by its failure to seek confirmation after the foreclosure auctions, that court did err in holding that the 2008 guaranties did not sufficiently identify any pre-2008 notes and that the 2008 Guarantors were estopped by BB&T's part performance from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to BB&T's claims against them on pre-2008 notes.View "Tampa Investment Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc.; Legacy Communities Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat’l Bank
Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations.View "Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law
United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC
Appellants, Leland and Ilene Haugen and Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, defaulted on promissory notes held by respondent United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (UPB). The various loan agreements between the parties contained provisions in which Appellants agreed to pay UPB's reasonable costs and attorney fees associated with the protection of UPB's security interests and the enforcement of Appellants' obligation to repay the loans. The district court denied Appellants' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and subsequently awarded UPB over $400,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that UPB's claim for the recovery of attorney fees was equitable in nature and thus did not give rise to a jury trial right under the Minnesota Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants were constitutionally entitled to a jury determination on UPB's claim for attorney fees because the nature of the claim was contractual and the remedy sought was legal.View "United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC" on Justia Law
A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County Forest Products, Inc.
Galen Porter was the sole shareholder in County Forest Products. Porter began operating a fuel delivery business as Porter Cash Fuel but never registered that name with the Secretary of State. Porter ordered fuel and gas from A.E. Robinson in a series of transactions that continued for three years. Ultimately, the business relationship deteriorated, and A.E. Robinson refused to deliver any more products. A.E. Robinson sued County Forest and Porter seeking payment on the account. Following a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment for A.E. Robinson jointly and severally against County Forest and Porter in the amount of the invoices plus financing charges and attorney fees. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to remove the award of attorney fees and affirmed as modified, holding that the trial court (1) properly held Porter and County Forest jointly and severally liable; but (2) erred in awarding attorney fees to A.E. Robinson pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 2-207.View "A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County Forest Products, Inc. " on Justia Law
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co.
First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co." on Justia Law
St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth.
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) filed a complaint against the St. Joe Company and Advantis Real Estate Services Company alleging unjust enrichment and seeking imposition of a constructive trust and recovery of funds supplied by NRHA to its agent, Advantis, for the payment of contractors who had performed services for NRHA. St. Joe held a perfected secured interest in Advantis's operating account and exercised its rights as a secured creditor over that account to have funds from Advantis's account, including those entrusted to Advantis as NRHA's agent, transferred to a St. Joe account. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of NRHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of a constructive was was proper and necessary to prevent a failure of justice and unjust enrichment.View "St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth." on Justia Law
Universal Drilling Co., LLC v. R & R Rig Serv., LLC
R & R Rig Service moved Universal Drilling Company's drilling rig under a time and materials contract. Universal refused to pay R & R's invoice, claiming that it should only have to pay the amount it paid to have the rig moved a few weeks later by a different company. R & R brought suit for payment of the services it rendered, and Universal counterclaimed on the basis of fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court generally ruled in favor of R & R and against Universal, although it refused to grant R & R's request for pre-judgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding damages; (2) did not err in ruling that Universal had failed to prove its fraud claim; (3) properly denied Universal's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) erred in denying R & R's request for prejudgment interest. Remanded with directions to award R & R prejudgment interest.View "Universal Drilling Co., LLC v. R & R Rig Serv., LLC" on Justia Law
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Commercial Law, Contracts
Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis
The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded.View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law
Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc.
General Electric (GE) obtained a judgment against Intra-Med for breach of contract. Thomas Schultz was the president and sole shareholder of Intra-Med. After collecting only a portion of the judgment, GE intervened in another lawsuit and filed a third-party complaint against Schultz seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable for the judgment against Intra-Med. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of GE, allowing GE to pierce Intra-Med based upon the instrumentality theory of veil piercing. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding (1) none of Schultz's affirmative defenses negated the fact that he admittedly used corporate funds and property as his own to GE's detriment, and (2) Schultz's admissions fulfilled the requirements for piercing the corporate veil and supported the trial court's judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly granted GE's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as Schultz's admissions did not conclusively establish harm, fraud, or unjust loss, the three elements that must be established to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil under the instrumentality theory.View "Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law
Greenwood Products v. Greenwood Forest Products
Plaintiffs Greenwood Products, Inc. and Jewett-Cameron Lumber Corp. obtained a jury verdict in their favor on a breach of contract claim against Defendants Forest Products, Dovenberg, and LeFors. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the judgment entered on that verdict. The contract in question required Defendants to sell, and Plaintiffs to buy all of Defendants' inventory, for a certain percentage over Defendants' cost for that inventory. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had breached the contract by erroneously accounting for their cost of inventory, causing Plaintiffs to pay $820,000 more for the inventory than they should have. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, but the trial court denied the motion and sent the claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict because the contract did not impose any obligation on defendants to accurately account for the cost of the inventory. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court in this case properly rejected each of the grounds that Defendants' raised at trial for granting their motion for a directed verdict. The Court also concluded that the additional argument that the Court of Appeals relied on in reversing the trial court was not preserved, and therefore reversed the appellate court's decision overturning the trial court.
View "Greenwood Products v. Greenwood Forest Products" on Justia Law