Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
Unimeks LLC v. Purolite
Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant, alleging the nonpayment of goods totaling $713,970. Appellant did not answer the complaint, and the circuit court entered a default judgment awarding the amount alleged in the complaint, plus interest and costs. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to set aside default judgment and dismiss the case, contending that the summons did not bear a valid signature of the clerk as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and that the default judgment must be set aside as void under Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The circuit court refused to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that the summons here was indeed valid.View "Unimeks LLC v. Purolite" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, Consumer Law
Commc’ns Workers of Am., ALF-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.
Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards.View "Commc'ns Workers of Am., ALF-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md." on Justia Law
Maddox v. Cohn
This case arose out of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving a residential sale. In the advertisement for the sale, the trustees included an additional condition not found in the mortgage documents or authorized by the Maryland Rules that any successful purchaser at the sale would be required to pay the legal fees of attorneys who would be utilized to review the documents on behalf of the trustees by which they would hold settlement and ultimately convey title. The circuit court and court of special appeals ratified the sale. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that in the absence of specific authority in the contract of indebtedness or contained in statute or court rule, it is an impermissible abuse of discretion for trustees or the lenders who 'bid in' properties to include the demand for additional legal fees for the benefit of the trustees in the advertisement of sale or in any other way that is in contrary to the duty of trustees to maximize the proceeds of the sales and, moreover, is not in conformance with state or local rules and is against public policy.View "Maddox v. Cohn" on Justia Law
Burson v. Simard
After an auction sale was ratified, Respondent David Simard defaulted on his contract to purchase the real property in question. Simard admitted liability for the risk and expense of the initial resale, but when the purchaser at the resale defaulted as well, Simard balked at paying the expense and loss incurred at a second resale. Applying Md. R. Civ. P. 14-305(g), the circuit court held that Simard was liable for the risk and expense of both resales. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Rule 14-305(g) required that a defaulting purchaser be responsible for only one resale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent special circumstances, a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale of property is liable, under Rule 14-305(g), for only the one resale resulting from his or her default.View "Burson v. Simard" on Justia Law
CACH, LLC v. Askew
CACH, LLC, a debt collector, brought an action against Jon Askew for an alleged outstanding debt owed by Askew. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of CACH and against Askew. Askew appealed, contending that CACH did not properly demonstrate that it had been assigned the debt in question and that the circuit court improperly admitted an exhibit based on the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the disputed exhibit was erroneously admitted into evidence by the circuit court under the business records exception; (2) without admission of the exhibit into evidence, CACH failed to provide any competent evidence of the alleged assignment of Askew's account to CACH; and (3) without evidence of the validity of this assignment, CACH did not demonstrate it had standing to pursue the claim.View "CACH, LLC v. Askew" on Justia Law
Faigin v. Diamante LLC
The Faigins owned a lot in the Diamante subdivision. Diamante asserted a lien on the Faigins' lot for failure to pay monthly membership dues and thereafter filed a complaint in foreclosure on the lot. The Faigins filed a motion for class certification so that they could be sued as representative parties on behalf of all lot owners in the Diamante subdivisions. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the circuit court abused its discretion by basing part of its decision on the question of commonality upon the ability of the proposed class to withstand a Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, (2) the element of commonality was lacking in this case where there were only seven lot owners who were in foreclosure and the Faigins' defenses to the complaint were not common to the overwhelming majority of the proposed class, and (3) because Ark. R. Civ. P. 23 requires that all elements be present before class certification is appropriate, and at least one element was lacking here, class certification was appropriately denied.View "Faigin v. Diamante LLC" on Justia Law
Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp.
BIC, which has its principal place of business in New Jersey, distributed machines manufactured by BIL, BIC’s parent entity located in Japan. In 2001 BIC began distributing the Brother 3220C, a printer, fax machine, scanner and copier, accompanied by a Limited Warranty and User Manual drafted by BIL in Japan and translated by BIC. Huryk alleges that from 2002 to 2005, BIC and its executives in New Jersey, knew about but concealed information regarding defects in the 3220C that caused printer heads to fail and caused the machines to purge excess amounts of ink when not used frequently enough. The district court dismissed his putative class action claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 56:8 on the ground that South Carolina law, not New Jersey law, applied. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that South Carolina was the place where Huryk acted in reliance upon BIC’s representations, the place where Huryk, a domiciliary of South Carolina, received the representations, and the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction between the parties was situated at the time. View "Maniscalco v. Brother Int'l Corp." on Justia Law
Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Van Straaten
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), requires that electronically printed receipts not display more than the last 5 digits of the card number, but does not define "card number." A Shell card designates nine digits as the "account number" and five as the "card number" and has 14 digits embossed on the front and 18 digits encoded on the magnetic stripe. Shell printed receipts at its gas pumps with the last four digits of the account number. Plaintiffs contend that it should have printed the final four numbers that are electronically encoded on the magnetic stripe, which the industry calls the "primary account number." Plaintiffs did not claim risk of identity theft or any actual injury, but sought a penalty of $100 per card user for willful failure to comply. The district court denied Shell summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Shell did not willfully violate the Act.View "Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Van Straaten" on Justia Law
Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc.
Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.View "Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc." on Justia Law
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc.
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, provides that merchants who accept credit or debit cards shall not print the expiration date of the cards upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale. The district court found no willful violation where a retailer printed the expiration month, but not the year, of the credit card on a receipt. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the retailer's interpretation of the law was erroneous, but not objectively unreasonable. View "Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law