Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co." on Justia Law

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) filed a complaint against the St. Joe Company and Advantis Real Estate Services Company alleging unjust enrichment and seeking imposition of a constructive trust and recovery of funds supplied by NRHA to its agent, Advantis, for the payment of contractors who had performed services for NRHA. St. Joe held a perfected secured interest in Advantis's operating account and exercised its rights as a secured creditor over that account to have funds from Advantis's account, including those entrusted to Advantis as NRHA's agent, transferred to a St. Joe account. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of NRHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of a constructive was was proper and necessary to prevent a failure of justice and unjust enrichment.View "St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded.View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hawkeye Foodservice Distribution filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Iowa Educators Corporation (IEC) and ten Area Education Agencies (AEAs) comprising IEC, seeking (1) a declaration that the operation of IEC was in violation of Iowa Code 273 and 28E; (2) equitable relief enjoining the AEAs and IEC from further operation in violation of Iowa law; and (3) injunctive and declaratory relief on the ground that the AEAs and IEC operate in violation of Iowa Code 23A. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding (1) Hawkeye lacked standing to bring the chapter 273 and 28E claims; and (2) Hawkeye failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating it was entitled to relief under chapter 23A. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that the district court erred in (1) dismissing Hawkeye's chapter 273 and 28E claims for lack of standing, as Hawkeye's petition alleged facts that gave it standing to challenge the actions of the AEAs and IEC; and (2) dismissing the action, as the factual allegations set forth in the petition, if proved, stated statutory claims sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.View "Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp." on Justia Law

Heritage Bank sued Jerome Bruha on promissory notes that it had purchased from the FDIC. The FDIC had obtained the notes after it became a receiver for the failed bank that had initially lent the money to Bruha. The notes secured lines of credit for Bruha's benefit. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage and awarded it $61,384 on one of the notes. The primary issues on appeal were whether the holder-in-due-course rule of Nebraska's Uniform Commercial Code or federal banking law barred Bruha's defenses to the enforcement of the note. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed in part, concluding that federal law barred Bruha's defenses; and (2) reversed in part because of a minor error in the court's calculation of interest. Remanded.View "Heritage Bank v. Bruha" on Justia Law

Appellant Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates (CTSA) appealed an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment against CTSA and finding that CTSA's lien was second in priority to Appellee Metropolitan National Bank's lien on certain property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that there was not a final order in this case nor was there an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification. The Court concluded (1) it was impossible for the Court to determine if all claims and parties pertaining to the complaint had been settled; (2) the record contained no final disposition as to Metropolitan's claims against two individual defendants; and (3) The status of CTSA's breach-of-contract claims against individual defendants and its monetary-judgment claim against another party was unclear. View "Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Petitioner and conducted by two court-appointed trustees that were employed by a law firm (collectively, Respondents). Following the sale, Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty involving actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty involving constructive fraud by the trustees and alleging vicarious liability by the law firm. The trial judge granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents were entitled to qualified judicial immunity for their actions in connection with the sale. The court of special appeals (1) reversed with regard to Petitioner's allegations of actual fraud, and (2) affirmed with regard to the other causes of action on grounds of qualified judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Respondents were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the concept of qualified public official immunity was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.View "D'Aoust v. Diamond" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the clerk of superior court had the authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees that a trustee-attorney in a foreclosure proceeding paid to himself in addition to his trustee's commission. The superior court affirmed the clerk's order. The court of appeals vacated the clerk's and trial court's orders, holding that the clerk lacked the statutory authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees paid in a foreclosure proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the clerk exceeded his statutory authority by reducing the trustee-attorney's attorney's fees, and (2) absent a viable challenge for breach of fiduciary duty from a creditor with standing, the trustee-attorney's payment of attorney's fees to himself in addition to a trustee's commission could not be upset. View "In re Foreclosure of Vogler Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, David and Barbara Smith, asserted various claims arising out of the construction of their home against Defendants, Donald L. Mattia, Inc. (DLM), Donald Mattia, and Barbara Joseph (Barbara). The Chancery Court (1) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (ii) Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim; (2) denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation of Plaintiffs' backfill and money paid to DLM that was not applied to their project and (ii) Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to purchase excess lumber and misappropriated $8,836 in connection with the purchase of excess lumber; (2) granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as Defendants did not articulate a viable cause of action in their counterclaim; and (3) denied Barbara's motion for Chan. Ct. R. 11 sanctions where there was no evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney did not have a good faith belief in the legitimacy of the claims asserted against Barbara.View "Smith v. Donald L. Mattia, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the distribution of surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale of property encumbered by multiple successive mortgages obtained through fraud. Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Defendant First American Title Insurance Company and ordering that the remaining proceeds of a foreclosure sale be distributed to First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly granted First American's motion to intervene in the action, (2) the trial court applied a proper standard of review in granting relief pursuant to First American's motion to reargue the trial court's decision determining the priorities of the parties; and (3) the trial court's conclusion that First American was entitled to receive all of the remaining funds from the foreclosure sale could be upheld on the alternate ground that, because First American's mortgage was recorded prior in time to Stewart Title's mortgage, it was entitled to all of the surplus proceeds on deposit pursuant to the first in time, first in right rule.View "Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel" on Justia Law