Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.View "Berg v. Torrington Livestock Cattle Co." on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations.View "Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Rabo Agrifinance and Rabo AgServices (collectively, Rabo) commenced a foreclosure action in 2009 on a mortgage granted by Connie and David Finneman (Finnemans) on 17,000 acres of farmland. Rabo commenced its action against Finnemans, Rock Creek Farms (RCF), and all parties who may have had an ownership or leashold interest in the land. Approximately forty-four defendants were listed in the complaint, including Ann and Michael Arnoldy (Arnoldys) and the U.S. as lienholders. The trial court eventually entered a decree of foreclosure in which it recognized RCF's owner's right of redemption. After a sheriff's sale, Ann Arnoldy redeemed from an assignee of the purchaser of the sheriff's certificate. The Arnoldys filed a motion to partially vacate the decree of foreclosure. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the decree of foreclosure recognizing RCF's redemption rights on the basis that RCF and its predecessors, Finnemans, waived those rights. RCF and Finnemans appealed. Arnoldys and the U.S. filed motions to dismiss the appeals for failure to serve the notice of appeal on the U.S. and a number of named parties. The Supreme Corurt dismissed Finnemans' and RCF's appeals for failure to serve their notices of appeal on each party to the action. View "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

The State brought a consumer-protection action against Bennett & DeLoney, a Utah law firm, and the owners and principals thereof to redress and restrain alleged violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA). The thrust of the complaint alleged that Bennett & DeLoney violated the ADTPA by attempting to collect penalties on dishonored checks greater than those amounts permitted by Ark. Code Ann. 4-60-103. The circuit court (1) granted partial summary judgment for the State, finding that the collection of amounts in excess of those set forth in section 4-60-103 violated the ADTPA; and (2) found that section 4-60-103 provided an exclusive remedy for recovery on dishonored checks and that the use of remedies set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 4-2-701, relating to a seller's incidental damages, was not permitted. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that the ADTPA has no application to the practice of law by attorneys, and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Bennett & Deloney P.C. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants, Leland and Ilene Haugen and Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, defaulted on promissory notes held by respondent United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (UPB). The various loan agreements between the parties contained provisions in which Appellants agreed to pay UPB's reasonable costs and attorney fees associated with the protection of UPB's security interests and the enforcement of Appellants' obligation to repay the loans. The district court denied Appellants' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and subsequently awarded UPB over $400,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that UPB's claim for the recovery of attorney fees was equitable in nature and thus did not give rise to a jury trial right under the Minnesota Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants were constitutionally entitled to a jury determination on UPB's claim for attorney fees because the nature of the claim was contractual and the remedy sought was legal.View "United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC" on Justia Law

Because Property Owner failed to pay real estate taxes on his property, the Town held a tax sale of Property Owner's property. Buyer purchased the property after Property Owner defaulted on the action. The superior court subsequently granted Buyer's petition to foreclose Property Owner's right of redemption to the property. Subsequently, a judgment was entered declaring the prior tax sale void and vesting the property back to Property Owner. Property Owner then executed a warranty deed conveying the property to his Sister. Concurrently, a stipulation was entered as an order of the superior court vesting title in the property to Buyer. Thereafter, Property Owner and Sister filed the instant action, seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the stipulation order. The superior court determined that Buyer was the proper record title holder of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a superior court judgment cannot "re-vest" title to property back to a prior owner once that owner has been defaulted in a petition to foreclose his right of redemption and a final decree has been entered.View "Medeiros v. Bankers Trust Co." on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank, NA (the Bank) filed a complaint for foreclosure against David and Lee Anne deBree, alleging that the deBrees were in default of a mortgage note owned by the Bank. The complaint also alleged that the Bank was a successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The deBrees denied they were in default and denied the allegation that the Bank was successor to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank. At issue on appeal was an affidavit submitted by the Bank in favor of its motion that showed the rights on the note and mortgage were transferred not to Wells Fargo Bank, NA, but rather to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded, holding that the Bank failed to offer evidence that it owned the deBrees' mortgage and note, and therefore, it failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.View "Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. deBree" on Justia Law

Lewis Hatch signed a promissory note to an institution later renamed to The Bank of Maine. Although Lewis alone signed the note, both Lewis and Kathleen Hatch secured it by mortgaging undeveloped land. The Bank subsequently filed a foreclosure complaint, and later filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of its motion, the Bank relied on an affidavit of its own employee. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Bank. The Hatches appealed, challenging the foundation presented by the Bank to support the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence, as the affidavit was sufficient to support the foundational facts required for the admissibility of the Bank's business records.View "The Bank of Maine v. Hatch" on Justia Law

After My Truong's home was foreclosed on, a trustee's sale was held, and Fannie Mae purchased Truong's home. Despite the sale, Truong continued to maintain possession of his home. Fannie Mae filed a petition for unlawful detainer. The circuit court granted Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment and awarded Fannie Mae $6,000 in damages. Truong appealed, challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 534.010, among other things. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that Truong's failure to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 512.180.1, prior to seeking relief in the Supreme Court, deprived the Court of the authority to adjudicate his claims.View "Fannie Mae v. Truong" on Justia Law

Insured appealed the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Broker on Insured's claims that Broker violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Insured by not disclosing that Broker received contingent commissions from Insurers for directing Insured's business to them and that Broker kept all interest earned on the premiums Insured sent it between the time Broker received them and the time they were forwarded to the Insurers. In addition, Insured argued that Broker breached a duty to find it the least costly policy possible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) brokers do not have a duty to find insureds the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs; (2) Missouri law specifically authorizes a broker to receive commissions from the insurer and to deposit premiums in an account pending their payment to the insurer or refund to the insured; but (3) the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because it could not be said as a matter of law that Emerson could not recover on one or more of its claims. Remanded.View "Emerson Elec. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos." on Justia Law