Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

After Beneficial Maine filed a complaint for foreclosure against Timothy and Kathleen Carter in district court, Beneficial moved for summary judgment. To support its motion, Beneficial relied on an affidvait of an employee of a separate business identified as Beneficial's servicer. Beneficial cited to the affidavit as the sole evidentiary support for its allegations of its ownership of the promissory note and mortgage, the Carters' obligation on the note, the Carters' default, and the amount that the Carters owed. The district court entered summary judgment in the bank's favor on its foreclosure complaint. The Carters appealed, challenging the foundation presented by Beneficial to support the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment entered in favor of Beneficial, concluding that because the employee did not establish that she was a custodian or other qualified witness who could provide trustworthy and reliable information about the records, the affidavit could not establish the foundation for the records' admissibility. Therefore, the district court could not properly consider those records on summary judgment. Remanded.

Plaintiff's suit concerning purchase of an aircraft claimed specific performance; and, in the alternative, breach of contract; breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and breach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.2105. The district court rejected the claims; proceeded under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, as requested by plaintiff; ruled in favor of defendant, but refused to award attorney fees under FDUPTA. After concluding that FDUTPA and its fee award provision are applicable as substantive law of the forum state, the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: Whether an offer of judgment may be viable when it purports to settle "all claims," even though it does not explicitly state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether fees are part of the legal claim; Whether the fee provision applies to a lawsuit seeking damages or, in the alternative, specific performance; Whether the fee-shifting provision applies to an action with the case's unique procedural history; and Whether the provision applies only to fees incurred during the seven months before the FDUTPA claim was defeated at summary judgment, or also to fees incurred during subsequent litigation.

Mortgage company Fifth Third filed a foreclosure action against a debtor. Judge Nancy Russo of the county court issued an order stating if the parties reached an agreement to notify the court. Subsequently, the parties negotiated a loan-modification agreement, and Fifth Third filed a notice voluntarily dismissing its complaint without prejudice. Judge Russo issued an entry (1) striking Fifth Third's notice of dismissal, and (2) ordering a show-cause contempt hearing due to Fifth Third's filing a notice of dismissal when the case was settled via loan modification. Fifth Third filed complaints against Judge Russo in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate her order striking Fifth Third's notice of voluntary dismissal and a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding on the foreclosure case but denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the contempt order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals ruled properly in the underlying writ case because (1) Fifth Third properly dismissed its case without prejudice, and (2) Fifth Third had an adequate remedy at law following the contempt order.

Countrywide Home Loans, a mortgage holder on certain real estate, foreclosed its mortgage, took title to the property at a sheriff's sale, and then sold the property to a third party. Before these events, the property owners executed a promissory note in favor of Citizens State Bank. When the property owners failed to pay the note, Citizens Bank obtained a judgment in trial court, which was properly recorded. At the time Countrywide filed its foreclosure action, it did not name Citizens Bank as a party. After Countrywide discovered Citizens Bank's judgment lien on the property, Countrywide filed an action to foreclose any interest Citizen Bank may have had on the property. Citizens Bank filed a separate complaint seeking to foreclose its judgment lien. The trial court directed Citizens Bank to redeem Countrywide's mortgage or be barred from asserting its judgment lien. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court also reversed the judgment of the trial court but on different grounds, holding that because Citizen Bank's lien on the property was properly recorded and indexed and because Countrywide did not explain why the lien was overlooked, Countrywide failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to the remedy of strict foreclosure.

Cach, L.L.C., alleging that it was an assignee of Bank of America, filed a complaint against Nathaniel Kulas seeking principal and interest on an unpaid credit card balance. The complaint stated that Kulas owed $6042 on the account. Cach then filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting its motion with affidavits and other documents alleging that the balance due on the account was $6042. In response, Kulas filed an objections to the summary judgment motion. The court found Kulas's responses were procedurally defective and granted Cach's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Cach's support for its assertions that it received an assignment of the account from the bank and that Kulas owed $6042 on the account was inadequate. Because Cach failed to properly establish each element of its claim without dispute as to material fact, the Court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case.

Plaintiff Kathy Lamarque executed a mortgage with defendant Centreville Savings Bank. After defaulting on another loan for a second mortgage on the same property, defendant disclosed the balance of plaintiff's mortgage to the purchaser of plaintiff's property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for negligence and a violation of plaintiff's privacy rights. At trial, defendant moved for a judgment on partial findings, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her right to privacy was violated by defendant and that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and defendant's privacy policy created a legal duty to protect private information from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the facts of the case, plaintiff's privacy rights were not violated and defendant did not breach its duty to plaintiff.

Citizens Bank filed a complaint against Howard Issler, seeking to recover funds allegedly owned to the bank in connection with a line of credit that the bank had extended to him. After judgment was entered against Howard and execution was returned unsatisfied, Citizens filed for a writ of attachment. Kymberly Issler, who had a joint account with Howard, then intervened in the civil action, objecting to the attachment and to the release of any funds to Citizens. A hearing officer granted the attachment. Citizens then filed a motion to charge garnishee to reach funds in the personal account. After a hearing, an order was entered granting Citizens' motion to charge garnishee and denying Kymberly's objection to the attachment of funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, according to precedent, a bank has a right to use funds in a joint account to set off the debt of one account holder, regardless of whether that holder contributed any funds to the account. The Court then held that Citizens had a right to set off Howard's debt with the funds in the joint account to which he and Kymberly were signatories.

Plaintiffs Mark and Karla Gibbs brought claims in the federal district court against, among other defendants, Corinthian Title, Jeffrey Brown, Shelley Hickson, and Christine Tueckes, for civil conspiracy. The above defendants argued that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates the state's long-arm statute. The Court answered in the negative. Arkansas's long-arm statute does not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to certain enumerated circumstances and is therefore limited only by federal constitutional law. Because jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process, the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas's long-arm statute.

"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.