Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged. View "Kreisler & Kreisler, LLC v. National City Bank, et al." on Justia Law

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Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded. View "Curtis v. Citibank" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1). View "HVT, Inc. v. Law" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff complained that defendant told credit agencies that she was behind in payments on a loan in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(a). The district court dismissed the federal claim on the ground that the statute does not create a private cause of action and held that state common law claims are not preempted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state claims should have been dismissed with prejudice. Allowing state common law claims would defeat the purpose of the statute. View "Purcell v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

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Appellants Thomas and Robin Branhan borrowed money from Appellee Great Western Bank. As collateral for the loan, the Branhans gave Great Western a security interest in their shares of Glacial Lakes stock. The Branhans later defaulted on their loan. Great Western subsequently brought a foreclosure action against the Branhans. As part of a settlement agreement, the Branhans agreed to surrender and transfer to Great Western all their rights to Glacial Lakes stock they were unable to sell by a certain date. After Great Western issued a satisfaction of judgment, Glacial Lakes announced a capital call repayment. In response, the Branhans filed a motion to determine which party was entitled to the capital call repayments. The circuit court concluded that Great Western owned the stock and was therefore entitled to the repayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Great Western was entitled to the capital call repayment because the benefit of capital call repayment transferred with the shares. View "Great Western Bank v. Branhan" on Justia Law

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Petitioner William Daane defaulted on a loan secured by a mortgage on his residence. CR Title Services, the trustee of the deed of trust, filed a notice of default to initiate the foreclosure process. Daane opted to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (Program). The district court later found that CitiMortgage, the beneficiary of the deed of trust, had participated in the mediation in bad faith. After the foreclosure process was reinitiated, Daane again elected for mediation in the Program. Daane subsequently brought a petition for a writ of prohibition, seeking to preclude the Program from proceeding with further mediations or issuing a letter of certification. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that a writ of prohibition was unwarranted to preclude the Program from conducting further proceedings with respect to Daane's residence because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

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Janelle Gabay defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of her real property. HSBC Bank USA, the holder of the mortgage, filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale against Gabay. The district court granted HSBC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that entry of judgment as a matter of law was precluded where (1) HSBC's statement of material facts failed to properly present proof of ownership of the mortgage note; (2) HSBC's statement of material facts did not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address; (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the order of priority and amounts due to other parties-in-interest; and (4) the amount of costs due as part of the amount due on the mortgage was not included in the summary judgment record as required. Remanded.

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David Pyper hired attorney Justin Bond to represent him in a probate matter. Bond's law firm subsequently sued Pyper to obtain payment of the attorney fees. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the law firm for $10,577. To satisfy the judgment, Bond filed a lien against a house owned by Pyper that was worth approximately $125,000. Bond was the only bidder at the sheriff's sale auctioning Pyper's home and purchased Pyper's home for $329. Pyper later communicated his desire to redeem his property to Dale Dorius, another attorney at the firm, but was unable to speak to Bond after several attempts. After the redemption period expired, the deed to Pyper's home was transferred to Bond. Pyper subsequently filed a petition seeking to set aside the sheriff's sale of his property. The district court set aside the sheriff's sale. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in (1) concluding that gross inadequacy of price together with slight circumstances of unfairness may justify setting aside a sheriff's sale and (2) affirming the district court's conclusion that Bond and Dorius's conduct created, at least, slight circumstances of unfairness.

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Loan borrowers entered into a residential mortgage loan. After a dispute about whether the borrowers paid the proper amount of property taxes, the mortgage holder filed a foreclosure action, alleging that the borrowers failed to pay monthly mortgage payments and fees. The borrowers asserted numerous legal defenses and claims against the mortgage holder and loan servicer. The borrowers asked for a jury trial on these defenses and claims, but the trial court denied the request, reasoning that foreclosure was an "essentially equitable" cause of action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the essential features of this case were not equitable. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the borrowers' request for a jury trial, holding that the borrowers' claims and defenses shall be tried in equity because the core legal questions presented by the borrowers' defenses and claims were significantly intertwined with the subject matter of the foreclosure action.

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Sheryl Crasco secured three payday loans from three different lenders. After the payor banks returned the checks for insufficient funds, the payday lenders assigned the checks to Credit Service, a collection agency. Credit Service filed an action against Crasco to recover the face value of the checks, a service fee per check, and bad check penalties of $500 per check. The county justice court concluded (1) Crasco must pay to Credit Service the face amount of each check and the service charge on each check, (2) Credit Service could not collect the bad check penalties, and (3) Crasco could recover damages for Credit Service's illegal pursuit of the bad check penalties. The district court reversed, determining that Credit Service could collect the bad check penalties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding a collection agency cannot charge bad check penalties for checks assigned to it from payday lenders when the payday lenders themselves are statutorily prohibited from charging such penalties. Remanded to determine whether the justice court incorrectly awarded Crasco damages.