In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering class certification. Plaintiffs, service station operators and franchised dealers for gasoline products supplied by Defendant, a wholesale supplier, commenced this putative class action alleging that the proposed class members had been overcharged. Defendant then commenced a separate action against one of the plaintiffs. In response, that plaintiff filed a counterclaim styled as a proposed class action that mirrored Plaintiffs’ complaint in the earlier action. The trial court solicited the two actions and then allowed the action to proceed as a class action. Defendant appealed from the orders certifying the class. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering class certification. View "Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law
Defendant Anna Miller executed a promissory note to a finance company and conveyed by way of a mortgage her interest in real property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Defendant's mortgage was thereafter assigned to Plaintiff, RMS Residential Properties (RMS), which became the holder of the note prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant contended that RMS lacked standing to commence the foreclosure action because there was no statutory authority that conferred standing on a mere holder of a note to foreclose a mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-17 raises a rebuttable presumption that a holder of a note is the owner of the debt, the statute may confer standing to foreclose a mortgage on a holder of a note. View "RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law
Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1). View "HVT, Inc. v. Law" on Justia Law
Posted in: Business Law, Commercial Law, Connecticut Supreme Court, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Trusts & Estates
An employee of Plaintiff, the town of Southbury, was injured in a car accident with Defendants, Patricia and Joseph Gonyea, during the course of employment. Employee applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from Plaintiff. Employee also made a claim against Defendants, which was settled for the Defendants' policy insurance limit. After Plaintiff perfected its statutory lien rights, Employee forwarded to Plaintiff the net proceeds he received from the settlement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action to recover past and future works' compensation benefits it had paid, or would become obligated to pay, as a result of Employee's injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff had assented to the settlement between Employee and Defendants and, thus, was barred from pursuing this action. The trial court granted Defendants' motion, concluding Plaintiff had assented to the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff assented to the settlement and voluntarily relinquished its rights to recover an outstanding balance through subsequent litigation.
Posted in: Commercial Law, Connecticut Supreme Court, Injury Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law