Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Commercial Law
Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States
Dependable imports packing, janitorial, floral, office supplies, and some glass items. In 2010, Dependable imported, from China, items invoiced as “Generic Bud Vases” valued at $0.30 or less and larger “Generic Trumpet Vases,” valued at no more than $3.00. Dependable sells the vases to flower-packing houses that fill them with flowers for shipment to supermarkets or similar retailers, where the vase and flower combinations are sold as a single unit. Dependable classified the vases under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 7018.90.50. At liquidation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection applied Heading 7013, which provides for “Glassware of a kind used for . . . indoor decoration.” Dependable protested but after a deemed denial and paying assessed duties, argued to the Court of International Trade that both vases should be classified under Heading 7010, which includes “containers, of glass, of a kind used for the conveyance or packing of goods ... Carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pots, vials, ampules and other containers, of glass ... for the conveyance or packing of goods; preserving jars of glass; stoppers, lids and other closures, of glass." The court stated that “a reasonable jury could only conclude that the vases here are commercially fungible with other inexpensive clear glass vases whose principal use is decorative, rather than with glass packing containers” and granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Dependable Packaging Solutions, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States
Between October 2007 and August 2008, R.T. foods made 24 entries of “Tempura Vegetables” and “Vegetable Bird’s Nests” (frozen tempura-battered vegetable mixtures) from Thailand, 10 through the port of Boston and 14 through the port of Long Beach. United States Customs and Border Protection classified the 10 Boston entries and three of the Long Beach entries under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 2004.90.85, which carries a duty rate of 11.2%. The remaining 11 entries into Long Beach were liquidated under R.T.’s proposed subheading, HTSUS 2106.90.99, which carries a duty-free preference for products from Thailand. HTSUS 2004.90.85 covers “Other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen, other than products of heading 2006: Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables: Other: Other, including mixtures.” HTSUS 2106.90.99 provides for “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other: Other: Frozen.” R.T. timely filed and Customs denied protests. The Court of International Trade held it only had jurisdiction over three of the entries, then entered summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Chemsol, LLC v. United States
In 2009, Chemsol made six entries of citric acid, purportedly from the Dominican Republic, and in 2009-2010, MCI made 13 entries of citric acid, purportedly from India; both claimed duty-free status for the entries and did not deposit any duties. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection initiated an investigation to determine whether Chinese citric acid was being transshipped through other countries to evade antidumping and countervailing duties applicable to citric acid imported from China. Customs extended the deadline for liquidation of the entries under 19 U.S.C. 1504(b) and notified Chemsol and MCI of the extensions. In response, the companies sought a declaration that the extensions were unlawful and that the entries were deemed liquidated. They asserted that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). The government argued that they were first required to challenge the extensions before Customs by post-liquidation protest, after which they could seek judicial review of any protest denial under 19 U.S.C. 1515, the Tariff Act’s “review of protests” provision. The court agreed, stating that “since the commencement of this action, ICE has completed its investigation and, but for .. suit, Customs could complete its administrative process and liquidate … remaining entries.” The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. View "Chemsol, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
Irwin v. West Gate Bank
Jack Irwin owed a warehouse that Shade rented to store personal property. West Gate Bank held notes payable from Shade that were secured by Shade’s personal property. Shade later defaulted on the notes. Irwin and West Gate subsequently agreed to move Shade’s personal property pursuant to an “Abandonment” document. When Shade filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved distribution of the proceeds in Shade’s personal property to West Gate, concluding that the Abandonment document was not an assignment or release of West Gate’s perfected security interest. Thereafter, Irwin filed this action against West Bank in district court alleging that West Gate breached its obligations under the Abandonment document by failing to pay the proceeds to Irwin. The district curt entered judgment in favor of West Gate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s determination regarding the preclusive effect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling with respect to an assignment or release of West Gate’s security interest in Shade’s property was not relevant to this appeal; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the Abandonment document was not an enforceable contract or a warranty. View "Irwin v. West Gate Bank" on Justia Law
Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States
Resco filed a petition with the Department of Commerce requesting initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations on imports of certain magnesia carbon bricks (MCBs) from China and Mexico. MCBs are a type of refractory brick used to line ladles and furnaces used in steelmaking and steel handling processes. Resco’s petition proposed that the scope of the investigations be limited to certain types of MCBs, distinguishing MCBs from other types of refractory bricks and stating that the different types of bricks are not generally substitutable, due to varying chemical and physical properties and wear characteristics. Commerce studied the proposed scope of the investigation and published notices of initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and its final determinations, using almost all of the language proposed by Resco to define the scope of the investigations: Fedmet is a domestic importer of refractory bricks and other products used in the steelmaking industry. Fedmet was not a party to the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations Fedmet requested a scope ruling that its Bastion® line of magnesia carbon alumina bricks was outside the scope of the outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders on MCBs from China and Mexico. Commerce and the Trade Court rejected Fedmet’s arguments. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding Fedmet’s bricks outside the scope of the order. View "Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
Riddell, Inc. v. United States
Jerseys, pants, and girdles imported by Riddell are all designed to be worn, in conjunction with protective pads (having both hard and soft components), while playing football. As imported none of the merchandise contains such protective items. U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified all of the merchandise as articles of apparel under either chapter 61 or chapter 62 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS0. Riddell filed two protests under 19 U.S.C. 1514, arguing that the merchandise should have been classified as football equipment under HTSUS chapter 95. Customs denied Riddell’s protests. Riddell then filed civil actions in the Court of International Trade upheld the classification. The Federal Circuit affirmed the classifications as apparel, rather than sports equipment.
View "Riddell, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law, International Trade
Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co.
A Law Firm had an escrow account with a Bank and authorized an employee to sign checks on the account by herself. The employee began embezzling money from the Firm’s various escrow accounts by engaging in a scheme called “check-kiting,” which involved the employee writing and depositing checks between the Bank account and the Law Firm’s account at another bank. More than three years after the last activity on the Bank account the Law Firm sued the Bank, raising four claims, including violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and common-law causes of action. The court of appeals concluded that the claims were barred by the one-year repose period of Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-406. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-111. View "Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law
Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc.
Cascade Yarns, Inc. (“Cascade”) sued Knitting Fever, Inc. (“KFI”) in federal district court in Washington asserting that KFI made false representations about the cashmere content of its yarns. During discovery, Cascade subpoenaed documents from a nonparty to the action, Cashmere and Camel Hair Manufactures Institute (“CCMI”), in Massachusetts. CCMI is a nonprofit corporation that offers confidential tests of the fiber content of cashmere samples to retailers and suppliers of cashmere and camel hair goods. Cascade sought CCMI’s correspondence with KFI and documents related to yarn distributed by KFI. Unsatisfied with the redacted documents CCMI produced, Cascade moved to compel CCMI’s compliance with the subpoena in Massachusetts federal district court. A magistrate judge denied the motion to compel, and the district court affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Cascade failed to overcome the high hurdle of showing the discovery order was both plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice. View "Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law
Delphi Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Capital Cmty.
Certified Tool and Manufacturing Corporation purchased a Komatsu press and agreed in a “lease” to pay Capital Community Economic/Industrial Development Corporation monthly payments for the press. Certified Tool later obtained a loan from Delphi Automotive Systems, LLC and granted Delphi an interest in its property under a security agreement. Delphi perfected its security interest. After Certified Tool defaulted on the promissory note and security agreement, Delphi filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that its perfected security interest in the Komatsu press was superior to the unperfected security interest claimed by Capital Community. The court of appeals concluded that Capital Community’s security interest in the Komatsu press was not subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the state’s Uniform Commercial Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for excusing Capital Community’s failure to comply with Article 9, and therefore, Delphi’s perfected security interest in the Komatsu press prevailed over Capital Community’s unperfected security interest. View "Delphi Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Capital Cmty." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Commercial Law
In Re: Motors Liquidation Co.
Plaintiff appealed from an order of the bankruptcy court holding that a mistakenly filed UCC-3 termination statement was unauthorized and therefore not effective to terminate a secured lender's interest in a debtor's property. The court certified to the Delaware Supreme Court the following question: Under UCC Article 9, as adopted into Delaware law by Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, art. 9, for a UCC-3 termination statement to effectively extinguish the perfected nature of a UCC-1 financing statement, is it enough that the secured lender review and knowingly approve for filing a UCC-3 purporting to extinguish the perfected security interest, or must the secured lender intend to terminate the particular security interest that is listed on the UCC-3? View "In Re: Motors Liquidation Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Bankruptcy, Commercial Law