Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Ford provides a warranty, entitling buyers of new vehicles to have Ford repair or replace defective components at any Ford dealer, regardless of where they purchased the vehicle. Ford reimburses dealers, providing a mark-up of 40% over cost for most parts. However, under the New Jersey Franchise Protection Act, Ford must reimburse dealers for parts at the "prevailing retail rate," charged customers for non-warranty work. Ford implemented a Dealer Parity Surcharge to recoup the increased cost. Ford calculated, for each New Jersey dealer, the cost of increased warranty reimbursements and divided by the number of vehicles purchased by that same dealer. That amount constituted the surcharge added to the wholesale price of every vehicle. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment that DPS violated the NJFPA. Ford devised a new system, NJCS, under which Ford calculated its total cost of complying with the NJFPA and divided by the number of wholesale vehicles sold in the state. A dealer’s total NJCS increased in proportion to the number of vehicles it purchased, regardless of how many warranty repairs it submitted. The district court found that NJCS violated NJFPA. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the scheme does not violate the statute. View "Liberty Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Companion was authorized to license space in Wal-Mart stores to companies that sell durable medical equipment and entered into licensing agreements with defendants. In 2007, defendants shut down operations. Companion sued. Problems arose during discovery, including defense counsel motions to withdraw, allegations of inadequate responses to discovery requests, objections to the scope of discovery, refusal to attend depositions, motions to compel, multiple extensions, and claims of obstruction. After three years, the district judge imposed a default as to all counts, based on discovery violations by the defendants. The court eventually lifted the default except as to Companion's veil piercing claim, allowing the substantive claims to go to trial. A jury found for Companion and awarded more than $1 million in damages. Defendants, personally liable as a result of the default, appealed. The First Circuit vacated the default and remanded, "because the district court imposed such a severe sanction based on a very limited slice of the relevant facts." View "Companion Health Servs, v. Majors Mobility, Inc." on Justia Law

The LLC was organized in 1999 to own and operate 100 fast-food restaurants. Khan owned 40% of the common units. Remaining common units, and all preferred units, were owned by Sentinel. Plaintiffs, restaurant managers, claim that they accepted lower salaries because Khan told them that he would acquire full ownership and would reward top managers with equity. In 2005, Khan became the sole equity owner, but did not distribute common units to any managers. Plaintiffs calculated that the price paid for Sentinel's interest implied that the business was worth about $48 million; in 2005, 20 managers qualified for units, so each lost about $1.2 million. The district court held that plaintiffs had not adequately estimated damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that value is what people will pay. The judiciary should not reject actual transactions prices when they are available.View "Malik v. Falcon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.View "Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, BP began converting company-operated gas and convenience stores into franchisee-operated stores. From 2006 to 2008, plaintiffs purchased gas station sites and entered into long-term contracts with BP for fuel and use of BP's brand name and marks. In 2009 plaintiffs sued under the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act. Consolidated cases were removed to federal court when plaintiffs added claims under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. They later added price discrimination claims under the Robinson-Patman Act. Before trial, all federal claims were withdrawn. The district judge relinquished supplemental jurisdiction and remanded to Illinois state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A district court has broad discretion and the general presumption in favor of relinquishment was particularly strong because the state-law claims are complex and raise unsettled legal issues. View "RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought separate suits alleging unlawful retaliation by their corporate employers, which are private companies that act as contract advisers to and managers of mutual funds organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court addressed both cases in a single order, holding that the whistleblower protection provision within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1514A extends beyond "employees" of "public" companies to encompass employees of private companies that are contractors or subcontractors to those public companies if the employees report violations "relating to fraud against shareholders." The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the protections are limited to employees of public companies, as defined by the statute. View "Lawson v. FMR LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, provides that merchants who accept credit or debit cards shall not print the expiration date of the cards upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale. The district court found no willful violation where a retailer printed the expiration month, but not the year, of the credit card on a receipt. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the retailer's interpretation of the law was erroneous, but not objectively unreasonable. View "Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiff began consulting for defendant and signed an agreement prohibiting disclosure of proprietary information to third parties, and a non- competition covenant effective during his employment and for two years thereafter. In July, 2006, he left the company. In January 2007, he began consulting for another company. Defendant sued under the agreement. The company filed for bankruptcy. A purchaser moved to substitute itself as plaintiff, but the state court dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. After the court reinstated the case, plaintiff filed in federal court, alleging that the state court suit constituted abuse of process under Massachusetts law and seeking to enjoin the proceedings. He alleged that the amount in controversy was "at least $1,000,000," based on "emotional distress" and harm to his reputation, emotional tranquility, and privacy. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to allege damages with substantial particularity to establish jurisdiction. He provided no substantiation for or valuation of any of the alleged economic, emotional or physical damages and could not meet the "good faith" requirement with respect to his assertions. View "Abdel-Aleem v. OPK Biotech LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Russian citizen, attended graduate school and owns real property, vehicles, and bank accounts in Ohio. He spends some time in Ohio each year, ranging from 40 days in 2007 to a total of 17 days in 2008–2009. He visits under a tourist visa and does not have an Ohio driver's license. After going to Russia to take part in a business venture with defendant, plaintiff filed suit in Ohio. The contract had no connection to the state. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that defendant was not served with process in a manner that automatically confers personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that notions of fair play and substantial justice weigh against jurisdiction in Ohio. The court quoted a Russian proverb, “If you’re afraid of wolves, don’t go into the forest” that could be read, “If you’re afraid of the Russian legal system, don't do business in Russia.” View "Conn v. Zakharov" on Justia Law

The title company provided real estate closing services. From 1984 through 1995, it served as exclusive agent for defendant and managed an escrow account that defendant contractually agreed to insure. The title company was not profitable and its managers used escrow funds in a "Ponzi" scheme. In 1989, there was a $26 million shortfall. To fill the hole, the managers began looting another business, Intrust, to pay defendant's policyholders ($40.9 million) and to pay defendant directly ($27 million), so that defendant was a direct and indirect beneficiary of the title company's arrangement with Intrust. In 2000 the state agency learned that the funds were missing, took control of Intrust and placed it in receivership. In July 2010, the Receiver filed suit for money had and received, unjust enrichment, vicarious liability), aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. The district court dismissed based on the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois doctrine of adverse domination does not apply. That doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for a claim by a corporation against a nonboard-member co-conspirator of the wrongdoing board members. View "Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Serv. Corp." on Justia Law