Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Veltor Underground LLC, a construction business, applied for a $125,000 loan under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic, claiming it had six employees. However, the Small Business Administration (SBA) later discovered that these "employees" were actually independent contractors. Consequently, the SBA denied Veltor's request for loan forgiveness, as payments to independent contractors do not qualify as "payroll costs" under the CARES Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the SBA and associated individuals. The court found that Veltor's payments to independent contractors did not meet the statutory definition of "payroll costs," which is a requirement for loan forgiveness under the PPP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the CARES Act's definition of "payroll costs" includes only payments to employees and not to independent contractors. The court reasoned that the Act distinguishes between businesses with employees and self-employed individuals, including sole proprietors and independent contractors, and that the term "payroll costs" does not encompass payments made to independent contractors by businesses. Therefore, Veltor was not entitled to loan forgiveness and must repay the loan. View "Veltor Underground, LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, K7 Design Group, Inc. (K7) offered to sell hand sanitizer to Walmart, Inc., doing business as Sam’s Club (Sam’s Club). K7 and Sam’s Club discussed and agreed upon the product, price, quantity, and delivery terms for various hand sanitizer products through email communications. K7 delivered over 1,000,000 units of hand sanitizer to Sam’s Club, which paid approximately $17.5 million. However, Sam’s Club did not collect or pay for the remaining hand sanitizer, leading to storage issues for K7.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of K7 on its breach of contract claim and awarded $7,157,426.14 in damages. Sam’s Club’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Sam’s Club argued that K7 failed to present sufficient evidence of an obligation to pay for the products, the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the communications between K7 and Sam’s Club constituted binding orders under Arkansas’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or in denying Sam’s Club’s motions. The court also affirmed the district court’s award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees and costs. View "K7 Design Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc., a Ford dealership in North Branch, Minnesota, operates under a Ford Sales and Service Agreement. In late 2022, Ford announced plans to establish a new dealership in Forest Lake, Minnesota, and to reassign half of Anderson & Koch’s designated sales area to the new dealership. Anderson & Koch filed a lawsuit in state court, alleging violations of the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act (MVSDA), specifically sections 80E.13(k) and (p). Ford removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota partially granted Ford’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Anderson & Koch failed to state a claim under sections 80E.13(k) and (p) regarding the establishment of the new dealership. However, the court allowed Anderson & Koch to challenge the proposed change to its designated sales area under the same sections. Anderson & Koch then appealed the dismissal of its claims related to the new dealership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Anderson & Koch could not challenge the establishment of the new dealership under sections 80E.13(k) or (p) of the MVSDA. The court held that the establishment of a new dealership did not modify the existing franchise agreement, as required by section 80E.13(k), nor did it arbitrarily change the dealer’s area of sales effectiveness under section 80E.13(p). The court also noted that Anderson & Koch had dismissed its claims regarding the change to its sales area, leaving only the challenge to the new dealership on appeal. View "Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

Calvin Berwald, operating Sokota Dairy, filed a lawsuit against Stan’s, Inc., a local feed mill, alleging breach of contract and breach of implied warranties. Berwald claimed that Stan’s prematurely canceled a soybean meal purchase agreement and sold him contaminated calf starter, resulting in the death of over 200 calves. Stan’s argued that the contract was canceled due to Berwald’s late payments and that the calf deaths were due to poor facilities and feeding practices.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Jerauld County granted summary judgment in favor of Stan’s on the breach of contract claim, citing accord and satisfaction. The court found that Berwald’s acceptance and deposit of a check from Stan’s, which was intended to settle the dispute, discharged the claim. A jury trial on the breach of warranty claims resulted in a verdict that Stan’s breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but awarded no damages to Berwald. The jury found against Berwald on the claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and barratry.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that Stan’s satisfied the requirements for accord and satisfaction under SDCL 57A-3-311. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the good faith tender of the check, the existence of a bona fide dispute, and Berwald’s acceptance of the payment. The court also upheld the denial of Berwald’s motion for a new trial, finding no newly discovered evidence that would likely produce a different result and no prejudicial juror misconduct. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Berwald V. Stan's, Inc." on Justia Law

Sysco Machinery Corporation, a Taiwanese company, accused DCS USA Corporation, a North Carolina company, of business torts related to their manufacturer-distributor relationship. Sysco alleged that after some of its employees left to form a competitor, Cymtek Solutions, Inc., DCS sold machines made by Cymtek using Sysco's confidential information. Sysco claimed these diverted contracts were worth millions of dollars.Sysco first filed suit in Taiwan, where it claims to have won a preliminary injunction against Cymtek. Sysco then filed a suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina, which it voluntarily dismissed, followed by a suit in the District of Massachusetts, which was dismissed. Finally, Sysco returned to the Eastern District of North Carolina, where it brought claims for trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and denied Sysco's post-judgment leave to amend its complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sysco's trade secret misappropriation claim, finding that Sysco did not plausibly allege the existence of a valid trade secret or that DCS misappropriated it. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Sysco's other claims, noting that Sysco did not sufficiently develop its arguments for copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of Sysco's motion to alter or amend the judgment and for leave to amend the complaint, citing Sysco's repeated failure to state a claim and the potential prejudice to DCS. View "Sysco Machinery Corp. v. DCS USA Corp." on Justia Law

Two brothers, Roland and Robert, ran an automotive business together under Guieb Inc. Their relationship deteriorated when Robert made decisions that Roland disagreed with, including using their company for his own benefit and allegedly stealing the trade name and most profitable shop for his personal companies. Roland sued Robert, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices, unfair methods of competition, and deceptive trade practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 480-2 and 481A-3. He also sought punitive damages for fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Robert’s motion for partial summary judgment (MPSJ) and dismissed Roland’s claims under count 12, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted Robert’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on punitive damages, preventing the jury from considering them. Additionally, the court ruled that brotherhood did not establish a fiduciary duty, granting Robert’s MPSJ on that issue as well.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court on three issues. It held that Roland’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim should have gone to the jury, as there was evidence that Robert represented Guieb Inc. and Guieb Group as the same entity. The ICA also held that the jury should have considered punitive damages, given the evidence of Robert’s actions that could justify such damages. Lastly, the ICA found that brotherhood created a kinship fiduciary duty, which should have been considered by the jury.The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed with the ICA that the jury should have considered Roland’s claims under count 12 and punitive damages. However, it disagreed that kinship created a fiduciary duty, affirming the circuit court’s MPSJ on that issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Guieb v. Guieb" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of in-state and out-of-state precious metal traders and their representatives (the "Bullion Traders") challenging Minnesota Statutes Chapter 80G, which regulates bullion transactions. The Bullion Traders argued that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause due to its extraterritorial reach, as defined by the term "Minnesota transaction."The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota initially found that Chapter 80G violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was then remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a severability analysis. The district court concluded that striking portions of the "Minnesota transaction" definition cured the extraterritoriality concern and complied with Minnesota severability law.The Bullion Traders appealed, arguing that the severed statute still applied extraterritorially and that the district court erred in applying Minnesota severability law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the severed definition of "Minnesota transaction" no longer regulated wholly out-of-state commerce and that the statute, as severed, was complete and capable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court correctly severed the extraterritorial provisions from Chapter 80G, and the remaining statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court also agreed that the severed statute complied with Minnesota severability law, as the valid provisions were not essentially and inseparably connected with the void provisions, and the remaining statute was complete and executable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Styczinski v. Arnold" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a putative class action against a dietary supplement company, alleging that the supplement Hydro BCAA was mislabeled. The plaintiff claimed that preliminary testing showed the supplement contained more carbohydrates and calories than listed on its FDA-prescribed label. The plaintiff tested the supplement using FDA methods but did not follow the FDA’s twelve-sample sampling process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint, holding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the claims because the plaintiff did not plead that he tested the supplement according to the FDA’s sampling process. The district court noted a divide among district courts on whether plaintiffs must plead compliance with the FDA’s testing methods and sampling processes to avoid preemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint allowed a reasonable inference that the supplement was misbranded under the Act, even without allegations of compliance with the FDA’s sampling process. The court found that the plaintiff’s preliminary testing of one sample, which showed significant discrepancies in carbohydrate and calorie content, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court emphasized that plaintiffs are not required to perform the FDA’s sampling process at the pleading stage to avoid preemption.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s state-law claims to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to avoid preemption and stated a plausible claim that the supplement was mislabeled under the Act. View "SCHEIBE V. PROSUPPS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dudley King and eight other individuals consigned their recreational vehicles (RVs) to Music City RV, LLC (MCRV), an RV dealer, for sale. On August 28, 2008, an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed against MCRV in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The issue before the bankruptcy court was whether the consigned RVs were part of the bankruptcy estate. The parties stipulated that MCRV was not primarily engaged in selling consigned vehicles, was a merchant under UCC § 9-102(20), and performed the services of a consignee. None of the consignors filed a UCC-1 financing statement.The Bankruptcy Trustee argued that the consigned RVs were governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and were subordinate to the rights of perfected lien creditors, including the Trustee. Mr. King contended that the consignment was a true consignment of "consumer goods" and not a sale, thus not covered by the UCC, and the RVs should not be part of the estate. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Tennessee regarding whether such a consignment is covered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the statutory language and the Official Comments to the UCC. The court concluded that the 2001 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326 removed consignment transactions from the scope of Article 2. The court held that the consignment of an RV by a consumer to a Tennessee RV dealer for the purpose of selling the RV to a third person is not covered under section 47-2-326 of the UCC as adopted in Tennessee. The court assessed the costs of the appeal to the respondent, Robert H. Waldschmidt, Trustee. View "State of Tennessee v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves Ma Shun Bell, who filed a lawsuit against the law firm Friedman, Framme & Thrush (FFT), formerly known as Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, alleging unfair trade practices and abuse of process. Bell claimed that FFT, representing First Investors Servicing Corporation (FISC), pursued a deficiency debt from her despite knowing it was not lawfully recoverable due to procedural defects in the vehicle repossession process.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Bell's second amended complaint was dismissed. The court ruled that the complaint failed to allege the elements of a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) violation, that FFT was immune from suit under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) and the D.C. Automobile Financing and Repossession Act (AFRA) due to its role as litigation attorneys, and that the complaint did not articulate how FFT’s conduct violated the Debt Collection Law (DCL). Additionally, the court found that Bell’s claims were barred by res judicata based on a Small Claims Court judgment in favor of FISC, with which FFT was found to be in privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that Bell’s DCL cause of action could proceed, but her other causes of action were properly dismissed. The court held that the Superior Court erred in finding privity between FFT and FISC solely based on their attorney-client relationship and a contingency-fee arrangement. The court determined that the DCL claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and that Bell had sufficiently alleged that FFT misrepresented the amount of the debt and charged excessive fees. The court affirmed the dismissal of the UCC, CPPA, and abuse of process claims but reversed the dismissal of the DCL claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA" on Justia Law