Justia Commercial Law Opinion Summaries

Golden Gate/S.E.T. Retail of Nevada, LLC, purchased an underground storage tank from Modern Welding Company of California, Inc. in 2008, which came with a one-year express warranty. In 2016, Golden Gate discovered a crack in the tank and sought replacement under the warranty, but Modern refused, citing the expired warranty. Golden Gate sued Modern, among others, initially for negligence and breach of express warranty, later amending the complaint to include a breach of implied warranty claim.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County granted summary judgment in favor of Modern, finding that both the express and implied warranty claims were time-barred. The court also awarded Modern attorney fees and costs. Golden Gate appealed, arguing that the discovery rule should toll the statute of limitations for the implied warranty claim.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that discovery tolling does not apply to breach of implied warranty claims under the Nevada Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court emphasized that NRS 104.2725(2) specifies that a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues upon delivery of the goods, regardless of the buyer's knowledge of the breach. Therefore, Golden Gate's implied warranty claim, filed in 2019, was time-barred as the statute of limitations expired in 2012.Additionally, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorney fees to Modern. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, including the summary judgment and the post-judgment award of attorney fees. View "Golden Gate/S.E.T. Retail of Nevada, LLC v. Modern Welding Co. of California, Inc." on Justia Law

DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC and DCA Capitol Hill SNF, LLC (collectively, “DCA”) leased a property from Capitol Hill Group (“CHG”) in Northeast Washington, DC, to operate a long-term acute care hospital and skilled nursing facility. In 2015, DCA began withholding rent payments, claiming dissatisfaction with CHG’s installation of a new HVAC system and generator. CHG sued for breach of contract, and DCA counterclaimed for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and fraud, alleging misrepresentations by CHG.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to CHG on DCA’s fraud counterclaims related to pre-lease representations, citing the lease’s integration clauses. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of CHG on its breach-of-contract claim and DCA’s counterclaims, finding that CHG had fulfilled its obligations regarding the HVAC system and generator work. The court also awarded CHG attorneys’ fees based on a provision in the lease.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court held that DCA’s fraud claims related to pre-lease representations failed as a matter of law because DCA’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable. The court also concluded that CHG had not breached the lease, as the term “new HVAC system” did not include distribution components, and CHG had fulfilled its generator-related obligations by replacing one generator. The court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to CHG, finding no abuse of discretion.The case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award CHG attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal. View "DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill Group" on Justia Law

The case involves a business venture between W.R. Cobb Company (Cobb) and V.J. Designs LLC (VJ Designs) to sell diamond products under the Forevermark brand. Cobb, unable to secure a license directly from Forevermark, entered into an agreement with VJ Designs, an existing Forevermark licensee, to form a new company, WR Cobb/VJ LLC (the Joint Entity). The agreement stipulated that the Joint Entity would operate under the Forevermark license. However, VJ Designs could not transfer its Forevermark rights without Forevermark's written consent. The venture quickly fell apart, and Cobb sued VJ Designs and its owner, Benjamin Galili, to recover funds paid under the agreement, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island held a two-day bench trial and ruled in favor of VJ Designs and Galili on all claims. The court found that VJ Designs did not breach the contract or misrepresent any material facts. Cobb appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not rescinding the agreement and not holding Galili personally liable for fraud and misrepresentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that VJ Designs did not breach the contract by failing to assign the Forevermark license to the Joint Entity upon execution of the agreement. The court found no provision in the agreement requiring immediate transfer of the license and noted that the parties understood Forevermark's consent was necessary. The court also rejected Cobb's claims of fraud and misrepresentation, finding no evidence of material misrepresentation by VJ Designs or Galili. Additionally, the court dismissed Cobb's mutual mistake theory as it was not pled in the complaint and was raised too late in the proceedings. View "W.R. Cobb Company v. VJ Designs, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Qualcomm Inc., alleging that its business practices violated state and federal antitrust laws. These practices included Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy, which required cellular manufacturers to license Qualcomm’s patents to purchase its modem chips, and alleged exclusive dealing agreements with Apple and Samsung. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had previously challenged these practices, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling in favor of the FTC, holding that Qualcomm did not violate the Sherman Act.The district court in the current case certified a nationwide class, but the Ninth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded to consider the viability of plaintiffs’ claims post-FTC v. Qualcomm. On remand, plaintiffs proceeded with state-law claims under California’s Cartwright Act and Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The district court dismissed the tying claims and granted summary judgment on the exclusive dealing claims. The court found that the Cartwright Act did not depart from the Sherman Act and that plaintiffs failed to show market foreclosure or anticompetitive impact in the tied product market. The court also rejected the UCL claims, finding no fraudulent practices and determining that plaintiffs could not seek equitable relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the tying claims and the summary judgment on the exclusive dealing claims under the Cartwright Act. The court held that Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy was not anticompetitive and that plaintiffs failed to show substantial market foreclosure or antitrust injury. The court also affirmed the rejection of the UCL claims but vacated the summary judgment on the UCL unfairness claim related to exclusive dealing, remanding with instructions to dismiss that claim without prejudice for refiling in state court. View "KEY V. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED" on Justia Law

Payroll Management, Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and received $1,070,330.23 from British Petroleum, Inc. for economic losses due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sunz Insurance Company claimed a first-priority security interest in these funds, asserting that its security interest attached and perfected before any other creditor. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that its federal tax lien had first priority as it attached and perfected first. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS, determining that Payroll’s BP claim was a commercial tort claim when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The court found that the IRS’s tax lien attached and perfected first, while Sunz’s security interest did not attach to commercial tort claims. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Payroll’s BP claim remained a commercial tort claim in March 2017 when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The settlement agreement did not automatically convert the tort claim into a contract, as it did not create an automatic obligation for BP to pay Payroll a certain amount. Therefore, the IRS’s tax lien, which attached and perfected first, took priority over Sunz’s security interest. The court concluded that the IRS was entitled to the $1,070,330.23 payment. View "Sunz Insurance Company v. Treasury Department" on Justia Law

A non-medical entrepreneur, Randhir Tuli, helped form a medical business with Dr. Andrew Brooks, creating a group of surgery centers. Tuli, who was initially active, later became inactive but continued to take profits. His colleagues, frustrated by his inactivity, sought to buy him out, but Tuli refused. Tuli then sent a threatening letter to potential investors, suggesting criminal liability, without a good faith basis. In response, the company warned Tuli to rectify the situation within 30 days or face ejection without compensation. Tuli did not comply, and the company ejected him, paying him nothing. Tuli then initiated a decade-long litigation against his former colleagues.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County rejected all of Tuli’s claims. Tuli appealed, and the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the business judgment rule protected the company’s decision to eject Tuli. The court found that the company acted rationally to protect its interests and that Tuli’s letter was disruptive and baseless.The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that the business judgment rule applied, as the company’s actions were rational and in the best interest of the business. The court found no conflict of interest, bad faith, or improper investigation by the company. It also ruled that Tuli’s claims for declaratory relief, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were without merit. The court concluded that Tuli’s ejection and the zero-dollar redemption of his shares were not an illegal forfeiture, as Tuli had already received substantial returns on his investment and had disrupted the business. View "Tuli v. Specialty Surgical Center of Thousand Oaks, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

Daniel Genho and Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC had a dispute over payment for construction work Genho performed at Riverdale Resort. Genho was not a registered contractor at the start of the project but became registered midway through. Riverdale refused to pay Genho and prevented him from retrieving his tools and materials. Genho filed a Mechanic’s and Materialmen’s Lien and sued for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, conversion, and to foreclose on the lien.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho granted Riverdale’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim but denied it on the other claims. The court found that there were two separate transactions: one before and one after Genho became a registered contractor. The court allowed the jury to consider the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, conversion, and lien foreclosure claims. The jury found in favor of Genho, awarding him $295,568, which was later reduced to $68,681. The district court also awarded attorney fees to Genho.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that equitable remedies are available under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) for work performed after a contractor becomes registered, provided the work is severable from the unregistered work. The court affirmed the denial of a directed verdict on the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and lien foreclosure claims but reversed the award of attorney fees for the conversion claim, as it was not based on a commercial transaction. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees for the foreclosure action under Idaho Code section 45-513. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. The judgment was vacated and remanded for modification consistent with the opinion. View "Genho v. Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC" on Justia Law

Windy Cove, Inc., HB Fuels, Inc., and Staffing and Management Group, Inc. (collectively “Windy Cove”) are gasoline dealers who own Mobil-branded stations in southern California. In 2012, they entered into a 15-year exclusive fuel supply agreement with Circle K Stores Inc. as required by the agreement under which they purchased their gas stations from ExxonMobil. Windy Cove alleged that Circle K did not set gasoline prices in good faith under this exclusive distributorship contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K. The court found that the prices charged by Circle K were within the range of those charged by its competitors, including at least one refiner, and thus were set in good faith under California Commercial Code § 2305(2). Windy Cove failed to provide evidence that Circle K's prices were discriminatory or commercially unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Circle K’s prices were presumptively set in good faith because the contract had a “price in effect” term. The court noted that the safe harbor provision under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305, which is codified as California Commercial Code § 2305(2), presumes good faith if the prices are within the range of those charged by competitors. The court found that Circle K’s prices were lower than at least one refiner, thus falling within the range of prices charged by competitors. Windy Cove’s arguments regarding Circle K’s use of a non-industry-standard pricing formula and higher prices compared to other wholesalers did not rebut the presumption of good faith. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "WINDY COVE, INC. V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law

Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law